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For Edward Snowden,
and thousands more whistleblowers like him
The State … does not exist in the phenomenal world; it is a f iction of the 
philosophers. What does exist is an organization, i.e., a collection of indi-
vidual human beings connected by a complex system of relations. Within 
that organization different individuals have different roles, and some are 
in possession of special power or authority, as chiefs or elders capable of 
giving commands which will be obeyed, as legislators or judges, and so on. 
There is no such thing as the power of the State; there are only, in reality, 
powers of individuals – kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, 
party bosses, and voters.
– A.R. Radcliffe-Brown
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 Introduction
Players and Arenas Formerly Known as the State
James M. Jasper
Those who study protest and social movements recently emerged from a 
period of paradigm wars (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). Structuralists began 
to incorporate culture and to develop more dynamic models (McAdam 
et al., 2001; Tilly, 2008). Culturalists began to add emotions to the frames, 
identities, and narratives that were their major tools (Gould, 2009). Both 
historical (Marxist and Tourainian) theories and rational-choice theories 
faded from the landscapes in both the United States and Europe (Accornero 
and Fillieule, 2015). This should open the way to theoretical synthesis, but 
instead there has been more of a retreat from theory altogether (Rucht, 2015).
Yet from the rubble a new synthesis has recently begun to emerge. It 
is more micro than macro, but more cultural than the traditional micro 
approaches of rational-choice and game theories (Jasper, 2010; 2012a). Its 
focus is on strategic interactions, in which players emerge and engage one 
another in structured arenas. Although it revives elements of the Chicago 
School of Robert Park and Erving Goffman, the new paradigm – if we can 
apply such a grand label to a collection of middle-range theories – is not 
directly related to any of the grand paradigms of the past (Cefaï, 2006). It 
can incorporate emotions, leaders, and creativity – concepts neglected in 
many older theories – without abandoning structures, culture, and other 
traditional concepts. It also acknowledges the decisions at the heart of 
rational-choice theory and the expectations from game theory.
Breaking Down the State aims to elaborate on this strategic perspective, 
also developed in the companion book Players and Arenas. That volume 
examined other major players: internal factions, foundations, corporations, 
professions, unions, intellectuals, scientists, the media, religious groups, and 
bystanders. This book looks at off icial state arenas plus the United Nations. 
Both volumes are concerned with the interactions between protestors and 
these other prominent players. Here are some components of this strategic 
interactionist view, developed more thoroughly in the introduction to Play-
ers and Arenas (also Jasper, 2004; 2006).
– Models should include both simple players (individuals) and compound 
players (teams).
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– Individuals can influence events and understandings both as direct de-
cision makers and as symbols representing groups and moral positions.
– Every player (even simple players) can also be viewed as an arena in 
which decisions are made.
– Players grapple with a number of strategic goals, trade-offs, dilemmas, 
and choices.
– Players are audiences for each other’s actions, and so must be treated 
through an interpretive, cultural lens, including acknowledgement of 
their emotions.
– Players deploy three basic means: they try to persuade others, to coerce 
them physically, or to pay them to do what they want; they also occupy 
positions in arenas that allow them to do these three things.
– Boundaries of both players and arenas are porous, to varying degrees; 
players especially are constantly shifting and re-forming.
– Arenas are governed by a range of formal and informal rules, even though 
the rules are forever being broken, bent, ignored, and reinterpreted.
– Players often shift arenas in the search for new advantages.
– What appears as “contingency” in more structural models can often 
be explained in strategic models through patterns of choices and 
interactions.
Among other things, the new strategic view both builds on and challenges 
one of the mainstays of structural theory: for several decades, the study 
of social movements centered on the relationship between movements 
and the state. In this view “the state” is both opponent and judge for 
protestors, who are generally demanding admission to the polity – many 
scholars have even defined social movements as efforts by the oppressed 
to become full citizens (McAdam, 1982: 25). During the same long period, 
in political sociology and political science, many burning questions about 
the state revolved around its relationship to Society: How autonomous is 
the state from society? Is there a ruling class? What are the social origins 
of state off icials? In some cases, the same scholars, such as Charles Tilly 
or Theda Skocpol, studied both states and their challengers. For a long 
time, the States-and-Movements paradigm generated exciting research 
on politics.
Recently the pendulum has begun to swing to questioning whether 
“movements” and “states” are not a bit of a f iction, implying a unity for 
each that does not really exist. What exactly are social movements? A kind 
of public opinion in favor of change? Networks of individuals and organiza-
tions? A collective identity? A series of public events and statements? What 
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are a movement’s boundaries? Does the movement include an individual 
who shows up for one demonstration?
Similarly, what is the state? What are its boundaries with the rest of 
society? With the rest of the world? How much unity do we see in the 
decisions made by its various agencies, off icials, and politicians? How often 
do legislators and the police, for instance, pursue the same goals? What 
happens when they do not? Or when the army clashes with the president? 
Does it make sense analytically (as opposed to rhetorically) to even speak 
of the state, or a social movement, as an agent doing something?
We try in this volume to deploy more persuasive images of both move-
ments and states by breaking the latter down into the parts that really 
matter, where decisions are made, policies implemented, data gathered, 
and more. What is a state? For one thing, it is a web of sub-players (bureaus, 
legislatures, executives, police forces, and so on) tied together by a set of 
rules (laws, norms, and traditions) that purport to govern their relationships 
but do so very incompletely. Each sub-player of the state brings a variety 
of capabilities to its strategic engagements, which include many informal 
interactions as well as the formal ones covered by laws. Even the laws are 
regularly reinterpreted or changed as a result of strategic campaigns by 
interested players. Because strategic action is only partly covered by formal 
rules, the boundaries of state agents are porous, with a range of other players 
included in some ways at some times, excluded at others. In almost no cases 
does “the state” act as a unif ied player.
This does not mean that state players do not get anything done; they do an 
immense amount. Taxes are collected, wars launched, borders patrolled, cor-
porations are enabled and constrained, the rights of minorities are protected 
or violated, protestors are beaten or tolerated, and thousands of other actions 
take place every day. But “the state” does not do these things; sub-units of it 
do. Tax agencies collect taxes, municipal police departments control protests. 
These sub-players usually patrol their own arenas. Much government action 
occurs precisely when one part of the state achieves relative autonomy from 
other parts that might interfere with it, or when it manages to cooperate with 
other state sub-players, a coordination that can never be assumed in advance. 
(Arenas contain as much cooperation as conflict.) Typically, for instance, 
agencies try to insulate themselves from legislative interference. We can 
usefully envision the state as a “complex amalgamation of agencies, charged 
with distinct functions, having domains that are frequently overlapping, and 
often compelled to compete for resources” (Chibber, 2002: 957).
But this view, while recognizing the state’s complexity, still assumes too 
sharp a distinction between what is inside and outside the state. States 
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include arenas in which a variety of players participate: courts, elections, 
administrative hearings, and more. Units of the state participate in other 
arenas, too, such as markets, the media, and public opinion. One part of 
the state can be an arena in which another segment of the state is a player; 
sub-players often lobby each other, as chapter 4 shows. In what Javier Auyero 
(2007: 20) calls “the grey zone,” individuals can be both state or party of-
f icials and be protestors trying to pressure the state.
Whether we view a segment of the state as a player or as an arena some-
times depends on our analytic interests: all players are also at the same 
time arenas in which decisions are made. But some players are arenas in 
another sense: their role is to produce arenas for other players. Courts are 
especially clear cases. As an initial approximation, if a group of people share 
goals, coordinate their action, and have some collective identity, they are a 
player. If they organize a place where interactions occur, with some rules 
and some outcome at stake, they are an arena. It is apparent how many 
groupings can be both player and arena at the same time.
With social movements, too, we see a range of players whose interaction 
makes up what is commonly called a movement. There are formal organiza-
tions, with resources and internal rules, often governed by laws. There are 
informal groups with few formal rules and varying amounts of informal 
tradition. There are networks of individuals and organizations. There are 
campaigns which bring together formal and informal (and shifting) alli-
ances of these various players. Within these compound players there are, 
of course, individuals, many of whom have the clout to strike out on their 
own from time to time. We see this most clearly, perhaps, with celebrities, 
who bring attention to their favorite causes but also sometimes remake 
those causes according to their own tastes. (A case of the powerful allies 
dilemma: we want allies who are strong because they can help us, but their 
very strength allows them to bend us to their purposes instead of helping 
us attain our own goals [Jasper, 2004: 8].)
All players, especially those as sprawling as states and movements, can 
be broken down into sub-players, who engage one another for influence 
over decisions. A sub-player can in turn be broken down further, and so 
on. Ultimately, we get to the level of individuals, whose role has never been 
well explained in political sociology. We need to follow John Ikenberry’s 
suggestion (1988: 46) that “we pay attention to the activity of executive 
off icials as they are influenced and constrained by larger international 
and domestic structures.” A proper strategic approach shifts back and 
forth between these perspectives, of players and of arenas, combining and 
disaggregating players to follow decisions and actions. Analysts sometimes 
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describe these layers as multi-level games, although the analogy relies on 
an unsustainable differentiation between distinct games (della Porta and 
Kriesi, 1999). The same conflict can spill across different arenas.
Even if they are not unif ied players, “states” and “movements” matter as 
rhetorical references. Appeals to the nation as under threat still encourage 
young women and men to enlist in the military forces (note the plural: the 
forces often compete with each other for prestige and resources). A nation’s 
f lag, symbol of its unity, still inspires positive feelings in many. It is easy to 
castigate our nation’s “enemies” in simplistic terms, speaking of “the Soviets” 
or “Iran” as though they were all of one mind, a united (and hence more 
dangerous) foe. Similarly, belonging to a “social movement” is inspiring, 
as it suggests a national or international effort of people like oneself, all 
aiming at the same goal through compatible means. The image of such an 
entity, powerful and eventually triumphant, is a rhetorical accomplish-
ment. Heroes and villains are alive and well in political propaganda, even 
though they have disappeared from sophisticated f iction (Jasper et al., 
forthcoming).
The collective identities so important to social movements have been 
recognized as necessary f ictions: necessary for sustaining collective action, 
but in the end f ictional in the sense that they paper over considerable 
heterogeneity in the groups they are meant to represent (McGarry and 
Jasper, 2015). States and movements are necessary f ictions in much the same 
way. They pretend to have more unity than they do, and they claim to speak 
and act as representatives of a united territory or people. Both movements 
and states help bring themselves into being through the performances of 
their own claims and actions.
Philip Abrams (1988) made a similar point years ago: “the state” is a claim 
that is intended to legitimate all sorts of activity that occur in a complicated 
“state system” (Miliband, 1969). The term attributes democratic will and 
intention to activities that are in fact meant to benef it ruling elites. (Of 
course, in the hands of Marxist rhetoricians like Abrams, the term the state 
is meant to do just the opposite, attribute unity and intentionality to those 
elites who control it.) So even Abrams thought there was a unif ied state 
system beneath the performative mask of the reif ied state.
The reif ication of a unif ied state reaches its apogee in Weberian tradi-
tions, which emphasize the capacities of states – both military and financial 
– and their autonomy from the rest of society. Theda Skocpol, for instance, 
in her introduction to the 1985 volume Bringing the State Back In, explicitly 
criticizes pluralist and structural-functional theories for seeing the state 
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purely as an arena in which societal interests battle it out, but also Marxist 
theories for viewing it as a mere instrument of the ruling class. Her focus on 
the coercive power of the state inevitably exaggerates its unity, even when, 
as in the 1980s, the state’s f iscal capacities are also acknowledged (these are 
often seen to depend ultimately on a state’s coercive power [Tilly, 1985]). 
State off icials also persuade, but they do many, many additional things that 
often conflict with each other: they employ the unemployed, they create 
scientif ic knowledge, they restrict the heights of buildings, they protect 
the rich, they clean the air and water, they promote the health and safety 
of workers, they guarantee home loans and bank accounts.
Theorists of revolution, who necessarily focus on the interactions 
between challengers and the state, began to see this entity less as a 
monolithic structure than as a set of strategic players who interact with 
challengers. Although he does not quite put it in strategic terms, Jeff 
Goodwin (2001) shows that revolutions unfold according to an interac-
tive logic: revolutionary movements emerge in response to actions by the 
main components of the state (dictators, police, armies, party off icials), 
whose further actions determine whether revolutions succeed or fail. 
Above all, both revolutionaries and states react nastily when the other 
side threatens their own existence. The salient state player in revolutions 
is the army, and Goodwin (2001: 248) highlights the cultural beliefs and 
practices of off icers, their economic incentives and corruption, and their 
interactions (and privileges) with other state players (also Stepan, 1988). 
Like the study of protest, the study of revolutions could benef it from an 
explicit attention to strategic interactions and dilemmas (see chapter 8 
below and Boudreau, 2004).
Except for the realist tradition in international relations, political scien-
tists have generally had a more nuanced vision of states than sociologists 
of protest have. Even in international relations, James Rosenau (1990: 117) 
criticized the idea of the state “as an actor whose nature, motives, and 
conduct are so self-evident as to obviate any need for precise conceptual-
izing,” while Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004: 12) calls for “disaggregating” the 
state to get beneath “the f iction of a unitary will and capacity for action.” 
Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (2004: 15) have further broken down 
the state, arriving at a strategic perspective in which politics “is a seamless 
web extending from individuals in families and other communities all the 
way to global structures, and what has been called ‘international relations’ 
is neither a distinctive f ield nor discipline.”
This new emphasis on the micro-interactions of politics is compatible 
with, and much influenced by, Michel Foucault’s famous capillary vision 
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of power, as something that is not imposed by a central state but generated 
throughout society’s institutions during recurring interactions. He aimed to 
“decapitate” the sovereign in theories of the state. The disciplinary practices 
that he described, carried out by experts and supported by discourses of 
knowledge, cut across traditional boundaries of what is inside and what 
is outside the state, dividing up the world in a different way. Yet even in 
the Foucauldian tradition, power is sometimes reif ied as though it were a 
thing that structures interactions but is also created by them. I prefer to see 
people as having various resources, organizational positions, and degrees 
of authority (possibly based on expert knowledge and credentials), and 
then making strategic choices to set all these in motion. The actions and 
outcomes are shaped by these unequal advantages, but not pre-determined 
by them.
Scholars of protest have occasionally called for more attention to the 
“internal workings of government” (Zald, 1992: 339) to overcome the f ield’s 
“movement-centered” bias (McAdam et al., 2001; McAdam and Boudet, 2012), 
but few researchers have heeded the call. China specialists Kevin O’Brien 
and Lianjiang Li (2006: 1) are exceptions, complaining that, “Thinking in 
terms of two parties can be especially misleading in those cases when 
aggrieved persons employ government commitments and established 
values to persuade concerned elites to support their claims.” They focus 
on horizontal divisions of the state, following “rightful” resisters as they 
jump to higher levels to pursue their grievances, often expressing faith 
that the true intentions of the central government are being corrupted by 
local off icials. This “principal-agent” challenge may be especially severe 
in a nation as large as China, but all states face some version of it in the 
implementation of off icial decisions.1 What is more, states are also divided 
into vertical segments, as industry ministries, for instance, battle f inance 
ministries or elected off icials (Jasper, 1990). “Political opportunities” are 
1 To quote O’Brien and Li (2006: 51) further, “It is important to think about ‘them’ more 
systematically by disaggregating the state. This prescription, uncontroversial though it sounds, 
goes well beyond the familiar injunction to avoid reifying state power. It involves recognizing 
that every regime has its own institutional structure and that agents of a government are not 
always principled agents. Particularly in far-f lung, many-layered bureaucracies, off icials at 
different places in the hierarchy often have diverging interests and are subject to different 
constraints and incentives. From the vantage point of people contemplating collective action, 
this means that states often present attractive, multidimensional targets… And these openings 
appear not only because there are regime defectors, minority elites, or elites out of power who 
seize the role of tribune of the people.” As we break down the state analytically, we can see that 
there are always “political opportunities” due to the interactions among the various players who 
comprise the state.
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always there, in some form, rather than being special results of infrequent 
crises (Jasper, 2012b).
More often, the reigning structural approach to states and movements 
proceeds by reducing the state to a simple typology of regimes based on 
a couple of variables. Thus it would seem, according to the Charles Tilly 
of Regimes and Repertoires (2006), that the state dimensions which mat-
ter to social movements are institutional capacity and a regime’s level of 
democracy. To be fair, at other times Tilly (2005) suggested that such broad 
categories need to be broken down into causal mechanisms, which would 
be in line with our strategic approach, but here and in his other research 
the “regime environment” remained fairly structural and static. Yet the 
“environment” of a social movement consists of other players, so it seems 
more straightforward to examine engagements rather than environments, 
interactions rather than “relationships” (Jasper, 2012b).2
Even in sophisticated research, such as Tilly’s, regimes are put in static 
boxes with little room for strategic choices. A patrimonial regime will act 
… like a patrimonial regime. A capitalist state will protect capitalism. (I 
suspect that Tilly’s typological approach owes a debt to Marxist theories of 
the state, which were concerned with identifying what was or was not an 
“essentially” capitalist state, versus others that might be revolutionary.) It 
sometimes seems, in these theories, as if the structures impose such severe 
constraints on players that they do not have decisions to make. Although 
we do not want to deny external constraints, a strategic perspective helps 
us observe maneuvers within them. These constraints are imposed by the 
actions and reactions of other players.3 We must picture politics as a long 
sequence of interactions among many players, including but not confined 
to protestors and state players (Rasler, 1996; Goldstone, 2004; Jasper, 2004).
Scholars of social movements no longer think of protestors as “challeng-
ers” or “outsiders” seeking entry to the polity, a view that was once at the 
heart of political-process theory thanks to Tilly’s pathbreaking work on 
the nineteenth century and McAdam’s (1982) on the US civil rights move-
ment. Instead of some distinct line between insider and outsider, Goldstone 
(2003: 9) offers “a continuum of alignment and influence, with some groups 
having very little access and influence through conventional politics, others 
2 Citing how researchers have distorted Swedish social movements, Abby Peterson (2015) 
blames dichotomized variables for necessarily oversimplifying complex cases.
3 Edwin Amenta offers a more sophisticated “mediation model,” suggesting that the suc-
cess of different strategies also depends on whether elected off icial and state bureaucrats are 
sympathetic to the goals and interests of protestors: Amenta, Halfmann, and Young (1999), 
Amenta (2006).
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having somewhat more, and still others quite a lot; but groups may move up 
and down this continuum fairly quickly, depending on shifts in state and 
party alignments.” This view has a healthy dynamism, although it may not 
go far enough toward breaking the state down into its component parts. 
It assumes that the main influence is through political parties, and it still 
seems to assume a relatively unif ied state.
In other work Goldstone (2004: 357) suggests replacing “political op-
portunity structures” with “relational f ields,” which would include other 
movements and countermovements, political and economic institutions, 
various levels of state authorities and political actors, assorted elites, di-
verse publics, symbolic and value orientations, and critical events. Here as 
elsewhere, the concept of f ields lumps together players and arenas, along 
with actions and culture (see Jasper, 2015, for a comparison of f ields with our 
players-and-arenas approach). But the point about many players, including 
multiple parts of the state, is well taken. Instead of a movement facing a 
state (Rucht, 2004: 197), we need to imagine a “large co-evolving context in 
which the characteristics and actions of any contender are facilitated and 
constrained by the characteristics and actions of all other actors in the 
environment” (Bosi, 2008: 244).
We can better see the interaction between arenas and players if we 
concentrate initially on players’ actions. In strategic engagement there 
are three basic types: persuasion, coercion, and payment. These are the 
things that players do to get what they want (Jasper, 2006). Persuasion, 
in particular, operates across formal boundaries, although the contacts 
with various audiences are sometimes highly structured, as with access to 
the news media or standing in courts. Payments can either recognize the 
formal boundaries of organizations, f lowing through proper channels, or 
ignore them, flowing instead (usually illegally) to individuals within the 
organizations. When we identify who actually does what, we can see how 
important sub-players are. Such actions “assemble” various individuals and 
physical resources, often in the name of a f ictive compound player such as 
a state or social movement (Latour, 2005).
The language of players and arenas is meant to overcome longstanding 
debates about agency and structure in order to move toward a dynamic, 
strategic model. All social interactions contain both agency and structure, 
since these are primarily analytic interests. One solution has been to 
distinguish static periods from critical junctures when people’s choices 
and actions matter more (Swidler, 1986; Katznelson, 2003; Capoccia and 
Keleman, 2007). The problem with contrasting stable and unstable periods is 
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that it tends to place all the structure in one and all the agency in the other. 
For most authors, this is a structural solution, since it is the breakdown of 
institutions, from internal collapse or external shocks, that creates openness 
to change. A more agentic view suggests that players can sometimes create 
– rather than waiting for – critical junctures, which are acknowledged as 
critical only later (Goodwin, 2001; Kurzman, 1996).
Players develop expectations based on past interactions and reputations. 
They do not start each engagement from scratch. There is, in the ungainly 
term, “path dependency.” A strategic approach helps us understand how 
players can be more or less constrained by past choices. It suggests that 
individuals, who are never fully socialized into their institutions, can bring 
new points of view to situations, including situations of apparent stalemate 
or equilibrium. In addition, strategic dilemmas often force players to in-
novate, as they recognize they are trapped in old ways of doing things.
If we pay closer attention to arenas, we may be better able to understand 
the kinds of constraints placed on players. A broad structural factor such as 
a “f iscal crisis of the state” enters arenas when one player cannot pay other 
players, or its component members, who react in turn. Or the perception of a 
f iscal crisis may lead other players to react, such as refusing to lend money to 
the Finance ministry, or to buy state-issued bonds. Structures matter when 
they prevent or allow players to do things: to pay, coerce, or persuade others. 
Most of the external constraints on one player come from the actions of other 
players; they do not come – at least not directly – from structures. (The meta-
phor of a structure, like a building channeling our movement through doors 
and hallways but preventing us from going through brick walls, is misleading.)
New arenas provide new opportunities for action. You can’t bring a 
lawsuit in a nation without courts. Tilly (1997: 250), the great student of how 
arenas shape players, comments on the increasing centrality of Parliament 
in Great Britain in the early nineteenth century: “It weakened the autonomy 
and power of the crown and of great lords, reduced direct involvement of 
troops and other repressive forces in claims-making, and diminished the 
importance of local dignitaries both as objects of contention and as vehicles 
for the relaying of claims to higher authorities.” The institutional changes 
did not entirely close off old arenas or entirely push action into new ones: 
they shifted the potential benefits and costs of various strategic programs. 
They promoted persuasion at the expense of payments and especially of 
coercion in domestic politics.
Players interacting in structured arenas: this sounds like game theory, which 
has done the most to develop this perspective in the social sciences. But 
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game theory is barely a social science, as opposed to an applied branch of 
mathematics. Its inadequacies for our purposes include a focus on games 
that have clear endpoints, from which observers can work back to discover 
the best choices; a limited range of goals, which for humans are much more 
complicated than game theory can model (as opposed to evolutionary game 
models that can concentrate on number of offspring as the only important 
outcome); a fondness for mathematical precision over messy realism; an 
inability to adequately incorporate humans’ interpretations of what they 
are doing; and an assumption that players can anticipate many moves ahead 
(whereas one or two is about it). Games end, politics does not. As Clifford 
Bob (2012: 6) puts it, “most ‘outcomes’ are at best respites in wars lasting 
decades. Win or lose, the combatants f ight on. They adapt themselves to 
the changed conditions, even while undermining them. They assert their 
root visions in new guises or different arenas.” After a policy decision, the 
battle often turns to implementation, where the losers can still block the 
decision, turning it into a “zombie policy.”
We can see the strengths and weakness of game theory, to take just one 
example, in Karklins and Petersen’s (1993) analysis of regime-protestor 
interactions in 1989 in Eastern Europe. They wisely break down “regime” 
and “masses” into their component parts, ultimately down to the in-
dividuals who must in the end make strategic calculations. They also 
recognize the complex perceptions that go into these choices (although, 
like most game theories, they do not have a sophisticated analysis of the 
cultural and emotional processes that shape these perceptions). And 
they focus on a series of decisions and actions, back and forth between 
state agencies and people in the street. By the time they have all these 
theoretical pieces of a strategic engagement in place, their f inal step – 
labeling it a set of assurance games – adds little to our strategic model. 
The unique contribution of game theory is the least useful part of their 
sensible explanation.
Wins and losses may inspire or impose new strategies, especially shifts 
to different arenas. Losses, if they are not altogether devastating, can often 
be the rallying cry for further mobilization, as “the power of the negative” 
kicks in (Jasper, 1997: 362). There is even struggle over the def inition of 
wins and losses. Describing an outcome as a win for your team gives your 
members confidence; a loss makes them either depressed (deflating action) 
or indignant (encouraging action). “After an institution’s decision,” Bob 
(2012: 33) points out, “much of the conflict involves portraying the outcome 
as either a win or a loss – or sometimes both in different settings.” Both sides 
in a controversy often claim victory in the same result.
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If we desire a strategic approach to players that highlights agency, we 
may wish to focus on the trade-offs these players face. When they recognize 
the trade-offs, they become dilemmas, with which players must grapple 
(Jasper, 2006). One of the most common is what I call Naughty or Nice, a 
choice between aggressive tactics of which most players, authorities, and 
the public disapprove versus tactics that are popular and nonthreatening. 
Naughty options heighten the risks: there is usually more to be gained from 
disruption, physical coercion, and aggression, but also more to be lost, in 
that disruptive players often arouse a sharp reaction from authorities. A 
strong backlash may even kill off the player. Both protestors and their 
opponents face the Naughty or Nice dilemma; in chapters 5, 6, and 8 we see 
both dictators and police in liberal democracies grappling with the amount 
of force to use against dissidents.
In this volume we try to develop a more strategic-interactive picture of 
politics, full of actions and reactions, expectations and calculations, and also 
emotions: reactions like anger, moods such as cynicism, and long-run patterns 
of love and hate. A strategic vision respects the rich complexity of the people 
we study instead of reducing them to stick f igures. We owe them that. We 
also owe that to ourselves, because we end up with fuller, better explanations.
Brian Doherty and Graeme Hayes examine the interactions between protes-
tors and the courts in chapter 1 with cases from Britain and France. For 
many protest movements, direct action is intended to open the new arena of 
a public trial. Not only the media, but juries and prosecutors become players 
here. Juries matter to protestors in Britain because they represent the moral 
view of their fellow citizens, in addition to rendering a verdict. They often 
acknowledge the justice of protestors’ claims and their sense of urgency.
Chapters 2 and 3 examine legislators and political parties, one with an 
emphasis on the United States (by Katherine Krimmel) and the other on 
Mexico (by Hélène Combes). Movements often view laws as their ultimate 
aim, but pushing policies through complex decision-making bodies like 
legislatures can be very diff icult, even for movements with powerful al-
lies. Lawmakers’ primary goals, the tools they typically employ, and the 
institutional rules and norms all facilitate and constrain the activities of 
protest movements.
Christian Bröer and Imrat Verhoeven examine governance networks 
in chapter 4, showing that government bureaucrats can act like social 
movements or encourage social movements. They use two Dutch cases to 
show how state players interact strategically with other state players, with 
bystanders, and with the publics they seek to mobilize.
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In chapter 5 Donatella della Porta and Kıvanç Atak analyze the police as 
one of the state’s key players on the front lines engaged with social move-
ments. Protest policing is an arena where interactions can be conflictual 
or cooperative in nature, conditioned by the political functions served by 
the police, the means and strategies of policing, police cognitive schemes, 
and the involvement of external players in policing.
Drawing on the case of the Irish struggle for independence (1912-1923), 
Ian Roxborough examines the strategies and cognitive frames of the Irish 
republicans and the British state in chapter 6, concentrating on the army 
as a sub-player. The collapse of British rule in Ireland was partly due to 
overcommitment elsewhere, but also to internal divisions within the British 
state between hardliners and moderates. All players adjusted their tactics to 
those employed by other players, including those on their own side, and the 
introduction of paramilitary police forces (the “Black and Tans”) by the British 
state set in motion an escalating spiral that proved impossible to control.
David Cunningham and Roberto Soto-Carrión, in chapter  7, show 
how inf iltrators exemplify the complexities associated with players who 
navigate – often simultaneously – multiple arenas of contentious political 
struggles. By conceptualizing the infiltrator role as emerging within diverse 
arenas, they replace easy assumptions about infiltrators as straightforward 
representatives of their employing agency, uniformly undermining the 
efforts of the groups that they penetrate, with more fluid conceptions of 
active and passive participation, and authentic versus deceptive behavior.
In echoes of chapters 5 and 6, Vince Boudreau shows in chapter 8 the stra-
tegic dance between dictators and demonstrators. Authoritarian regimes, 
like the police, face the Naughty or Nice dilemma, negotiating just how far 
they can repress or make concessions without alienating bystanders entirely 
on the one hand or showing fatal weakness on the other.
In chapter 9 Clifford Bob analyzes conflict at the United Nations between 
two compound players, a transnational activist network promoting gay 
rights and another opposing them. Documenting how the two players 
formed and acted in response to one another and to the specif ic charac-
teristics of the UN arena, the chapter highlights both aff irmative strategies 
by which they promoted their contrary goals and negative ones through 
which they sought to demobilize and destroy their rivals. Many players 
attempt similar character work on their opponents as well as shaping their 
own collective identities.
In the conclusion Jack Goldstone, whose work has done so much to 
promote a strategic-interactive vision, comments on the other chapters 
and suggests future directions for research and theory.
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These diverse cases all reveal how sub-players of the state pursue their 
own goals, instead of or at the same time as they pursue the off icial goals 
of the broader “state,” but also how goals emerge from strategic interaction 
itself. Just as social movements turn out to be complex entities with many 
players, so do the states they interact with.
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Part 1
The Rules of Law

1 The Courts
Criminal Trials as Strategic Arenas
Brian Doherty and Graeme Hayes
In this chapter we analyze cases where social movement activists are pros-
ecuted in the courts for protest actions. The courthouse is a significant arena 
for social movement strategy, a symbolic site for the arbitration of collective 
disputes, the legitimization of political action, and the production of social 
meaning; the court is “one of society’s most sacred institutions since its role 
in defining, interpreting and enforcing the law puts it in close proximity to 
the moral basis of society” (Antonio, 1972: 291-292). The outcomes of trials 
depend on the organization of the criminal justice system but also the 
responses and strategies of multiple other players, inside and outside the 
court, including social movement activists, allies and supporters.
In common with the other chapters in this volume, our argument here is 
about “breaking down the state,” about thinking through the relationships 
of power and agency that def ine the interactions between state and non-
state players. We seek to go beyond conceptualizations of state-movement 
relationships which might cast criminal trials merely as “state repression,” 
setting out the architecture of the court as an arena for political interaction 
and tactical choice, identifying the players who act within it, and arguing 
that more attention be given to the courts in analyses of protest action.
Social Movements and the Law
It is perhaps surprising therefore that the study of social movements has 
so far afforded relatively little place to analyzing and understanding the 
role, forms and outcomes of criminal prosecutions in the trajectories of 
movements and the fates of the individual activists that constitute them. 
The criminal law – “arguably the most direct expression of the relationship 
between a State and its citizens” (Law Commission for England and Wales, 
1989) – fulf ills a role of symbolic social regulation; it def ines, delineates, 
and enforces the codes which demarcate the sphere of legitimate social 
and political action, enabling the identif ication and repression of what 
is considered deviant, illegitimate behavior. Yet it is precisely on this line 
of demarcation that social movements operate, because they represent 
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constituencies whose choices and identities are repressed by the law, or they 
organize challenges to the dominant arrangement of the social, political, 
cultural and economic order, or they engage in political actions which 
deliberately disrupt legitimated modes of interest representation. Indeed, 
as Dinos and Gibelin point out in their discussions of factory occupations 
in France in 1936, “all the achievements of the working class have involved 
methods operating either at the margin of the law, or in clear opposition 
to it” (1986: 130).
More generally, the relationship between social movements and the law 
is fundamental because the law is not just a system of social regulation 
and resource distribution but the site of production of systems of meaning. 
Courts are thus physical arenas in which defendants (one set of players) 
are ascribed symbolic roles: guilty or innocent, convicted or acquitted or 
discharged or, in some criminal justice systems, not proven; and, where 
guilt is demonstrated, they are arenas in which consequent tariffs are ap-
plied, reflecting the circumstances and gravity of the proscribed act. But 
courts are arenas for the production of meaning in other senses, including 
the construction of political and symbolic challenge, and the interplay of 
formal, rational-legal justice with other, “natural,” extra-legal, forms of 
justice. In this sense, the goal of social actors, when they are challengers 
within the legal system, is to reveal the claims of the law to neutrality 
and universality as particular and partial relations of power. If, as Melucci 
says, the function of players in social conflicts is “to reveal the stakes, to 
announce to society that a fundamental problem exists in a given area” 
(1985: 797), then criminal trials offer a regulated space of engagement for 
the construction and revelation of these stakes through the interplays of 
persuasion and coercion.
The extensive literature on “legal mobilization” – broadly, “the idea that 
the law has the potential to be an effective instrument for political or social 
change” (Vanhala, 2011: 6) – has developed a wide understanding of the roles, 
motivations, and effects on social movement campaigns of one set of the 
many players in the courts – in particular, legal professionals. The emphasis 
is foremost on cause lawyers, those who “commit themselves and their legal 
skills to furthering a vision of the good society” (Sarat and Scheingold, 1998: 
3) and so help movements “def ine the realm of the possible” (Sarat and 
Scheingold, 2005: 10), on collective litigation strategies articulated explicitly 
around rights claims making (Scheingold, 2010; McCann, 1994; Epp, 1998) 
and, on “legal opportunity,” where the emergence, progress and outcomes 
of litigation are influenced, if not determined, by the conditions of access to 
the court arena (the attribution of “standing”), the availability of potential 
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issue frames (“legal stock”), and the extent of judicial receptivity (Hilson, 
2002; Andersen, 2005; De Fazio, 2012).
Here, we seek to broaden the analysis of social movements and the law. 
In the following sections of this chapter we therefore examine the strate-
gies typically pursued by social movement players facing prosecution. Our 
principal focus is on groups involved in campaigns of deliberate lawbreak-
ing in Western democracies, such as environmentalists, anti-advertising 
campaigners, and campaigners against nuclear weapons or militarism more 
generally. Following this, and as a necessary consequence, we examine 
how the formal rules of the judicial arena shape the choices available to 
various players, and how the players adapt tactically to the properties of the 
arena. We base our case mainly on evidence from civil (France and Belgium) 
and common law jurisdictions (England and Wales, and the United States), 
drawing out differences between the roles of judges, juries, prosecutors, and 
lawyers in each type of system, which then affect the form of the court as 
arena. Our data are drawn from observation of trials, trial reports, interviews 
with activists, and the alternative and mainstream media. We start by dis-
cussing the broad types of crime most relevant for social movement players.
Social Crime
In the late 1960s and 1970s, influential Marxist historians in Britain began 
to discuss the development of the legal code in early modern England, and 
especially the extraordinary extension in the eighteenth century of capital 
criminal offences in what was widely known as the “Bloody Code.” In their 
work (Hobsbawm, 1969; Hay et al., 2011; Thompson, 1975), they discussed 
and developed the notion of “social crime,” where “the perpetrators oper-
ated within a broad local custom or customary consensus of right,” and 
“often had the support or silent acquiescence of signif icant parts of the 
community” (Linebaugh, 2011: xlviii). The category of social crime revealed 
an embryonic working-class resistance to the development of the modern 
capitalist state based on individual property rights, opposing “customary 
forms of compensation” – poaching, smuggling, wrecking, the breaking 
of enclosures, and so on – to a criminal code that served the ruling class, 
“constantly recreating the structure of authority which arose from property 
and in turn protect[ing] its interests” (Hay et al., 2011: 25). In a 1979 essay, 
Rule ref ined social crime into two categories: “survival crimes,” activi-
ties integral to “getting or supplementing a living,” which were not held 
to be crimes by those committing them and were considered legitimate 
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by popular opinion; and “protest crimes,” such as pulling down fences, 
rick-burning, cattle-maiming and machine-breaking. In contrast, these 
were “not in themselves regarded as legitimate actions in all circumstances 
and by whomsoever committed” (Rule, 1997: 161, 156).
Defined in this way, “social” crime is closely connected with its particular 
historical context. The concept remains relevant, however, for understand-
ing the choices and actions of players engaged in collective political chal-
lenges to prevalent social norms. Indeed, re-categorizing social crime as 
“direct action” and “civic” crime can enable us to better understand the kind 
of actions for which contemporary social movement players f ind themselves 
prosecuted in the courts. Here, “direct action” crime refers to action which is 
understood as unlawful even if politically legitimate by those undertaking 
it. It is deliberately undertaken as such in order to advance a collective cause. 
Our second category is “civic crime.” Like Rule’s “survival” crime, civic crime 
is not perceived or undertaken as deliberately unlawful, but is based in the 
customary praxis of a community or group which has been criminalized 
by power-holders, though it does not necessarily refer to actions integral to 
material survival. Contemporary examples of such praxis include struggles 
over civic rights and freedoms, and involve the criminalization of private 
behaviors as well as of public manifestations of collective identity in defense 
of a social, sexual or ethnic minority constituency. Those prosecuted for 
civic crime are not necessarily activists themselves, but their trials may 
become the focus for social movement campaigns. Examples might include 
the prosecution of homosexuality, of women for illegal abortions, or of 
women whose religious dress codes have been prohibited in public spaces.
Our focus in this chapter is on the f irst of our categories of social crime, 
direct action crime. We replace Rule’s broader category of protest crime 
with this specif ic term in order to reflect the changes in the relationship 
between protest and citizenship that have taken place in the states forming 
our study since the eighteenth century. In this we follow Tilly’s discussion 
of the transformation of protest in France and Britain between the mid-
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from reactive to proactive claims by 
movements and from bifurcated to autonomous action repertoires (Tilly, 
1978; 1995). This transformation resulted in the legalization of some forms 
of protest, and is reflected in the specif icity of illegal forms of direct action 
in which discursive struggles for legitimacy are central, much as they were 
for Rule’s “protest crime” in the eighteenth century.
Protesters prosecuted for “direct action crime” in our chosen states typi-
cally (1) stress their non-violence, (2) defend their actions in courts as those 
of responsible citizens, acting on the basis of collective moral principles, and 
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(3) seek to persuade the magistrates and jury as fellow citizens that their 
actions were justif ied. Direct action crime thus includes civil disobedience 
but is not reducible to it. The latter is normatively considered to entail an 
acceptance of the right of the state to arrest and punish its adherents (Rawls, 
1991; Bedau, 1991); but for some movements, illegal action is justif ied irre-
spective of whether the state decides to prosecute. A second difference from 
civil disobedience is that direct action crime is not necessarily intended as 
an appeal to the political authorities to place an issue on the political agenda 
or to “correct” oversights of the democratic system. Rather, direct action 
which causes material damage is often defended as politically legitimate 
in itself, whether carried out covertly or publicly. Furthermore, whereas for 
liberal political theory, once formal democratic rights have been achieved, 
social crime (both direct action and civic variants) is at best a theoretical 
paradox and at worst an oxymoron, for players engaged in contentious 
politics it captures the way that strategies for social and political change 
often involve illegal, challenging action and thereby establishes the political 
and normative, as opposed to the natural, character of law. In this sense, 
therefore, social crime is social movement politics by other means, and it is 
consistent with the argument that protest is likely to increase rather than 
decline in established democracies (Goldstone, 2004).
The idea of “social crime” has been the subject of much critical discussion, 
particularly over its unstable boundaries (see Lea, 2002: 37-39). We f ind 
the concept useful nevertheless because it highlights that the “anti-social” 
nature of criminal activity is not a pre-determined given. Rather, the social 
nature of crime depends upon its discursive production by movement play-
ers, as they seek to frame their (illegal) action such that its objectives are 
acknowledged to be not “individualistic, self ish, or cruel” (Linebaugh, 2011: 
xlviii). The def inition of crime as social is thus one of the fundamental 
stakes of the trial process. The concept of social crime is useful, therefore, 
because it draws our attention to tactics and to interaction around the law; it 
enables us to cast our eyes toward the ways in which social movements seek 
to establish authority and legitimacy when their actions are criminalized.
Trials, Players, and Arenas
The significance of criminal prosecutions and trials therefore lies in the fact 
that they are regular, routine, “normal” activities for many social movements 
(Barkan, 2006: 183), undertaken in highly codif ied public settings, struc-
tured around the justification and opposition of ideas and actions, produced 
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by the dynamic interaction of players whose roles are clearly def ined, and 
which potentially carry far-reaching consequences. We may surmise that 
the transformative potential of criminal trials lies in a combination of 
their dramatic and didactic functions; for Falk, “the very limitations of 
time and space afforded by the courtroom promote a social concentration 
that enhances the narrative and legitimation potential of the proceedings” 
(2008: 12). Above all, trials are a strategic arena for movement players. One 
experienced Belgian anti-militarist activist expressed it this way:
Law and the judicial system is part of the political battlef ield. I am 
personally interested in how movements can act in this battlef ield, keep 
their space for action open and disarm legal repression by turning it into 
something useful for their campaigns. Such strategizing means on the 
one hand looking at how legal systems frame the possibility to get rights 
and which space they leave for political action. This is both a question 
of f inding legal arguments to base your cause on and coping with the 
framing of the debate through the legal procedure.
On the other hand trials take place in a political context. Of course legal 
repression is a mean to keep movements silent. For social movements 
strategizing implies looking at the possibilities to avoid prosecution, 
to turn trials into campaigning tools and how to be able to continue 
campaigning under repression. Court decisions and the decision to 
prosecute are heavily inf luenced by how society reacts. Coping with 
trials is not only a question of legal strategy, but also a question of media, 
mobilizing allies for public support and how to strengthen activists to 
drop their fear.1
In the courthouse, trials therefore present a series of tactical dilemmas for 
movement actors, with tactical considerations dependent upon strategic 
def initions of successful outcomes (the relationship between ideology and 
objectives) and the likelihood of their attainability (the interplay between 
players, resources, culture, and systems). Tactical decision making can 
therefore be expected to vary as a function of both the specif ic properties 
of the trial arena and the strategies deployed by opposing players, such 
as prosecutors and, occasionally, countermovements. In common law 
systems especially, the presence of a third set of players, jurors, can also 
be expected to affect the strategic calculus of players on both sides. The 
1 H., personal email communication, March 2012.
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specif ic composition of trial arenas can therefore be a crucial factor in the 
structure of interaction.
In criminal trials in both civil and common law traditions, juries and 
magistrates broadly fulf ill the same functions. Where they sit, it is the 
role of juries to decide on matters of fact, on the basis of the evidence and 
guidance in law presented to them; it is the role of magistrates to decide 
on matters of law, on the basis of analogy between the facts and the rules. 
In both civil and common law systems, where trials are heard without 
juries – in other words, by bench – magistrates combine the functions of 
ruling in fact and law; and in both systems, the vast majority of criminal 
cases are heard in this way.
These broad similarities of function mask significant cultural and opera-
tional differences between legal systems, however. In the Anglo-American 
tradition, juries are fundamental to the construction of the fairness of 
the criminal justice system. Juries are seen as representatives of the com-
munity and repositories of natural justice, capable of counterbalancing 
excessive state power; the defense in United States v. Berrigan, representing 
the Catonsville Nine (a group of anti-war activists who were put on trial in 
October 1968 for pouring napalm over and setting fire to draft board records 
in Catonsville, Maryland), said this to the jury: “[W]e are speaking to the 
community, and we are hoping to reach you, a microcosm, a small segment, 
12 people, four alternates, who are the community sitting in judgment” 
(Kunstler, 1969: 72).
The jury remains a powerful symbol of citizen participation in the law 
– a symbolic power which may persist even where the jury’s sociological 
composition is structured against the defendant.2 Tocqueville, indeed, 
recognizes that the jury is both a judicial and a political institution, placing 
fundamental social choices directly in the hands of the people,3 as important 
as universal suffrage to the exercise of popular sovereignty (1961: 405). In 
both England and the United States, the right to trial by jury is enshrined 
in the founding charters of the state (Magna Carta, the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution of the United States). As Pole points out, 
the jury’s importance lies not simply in its socially representative nature, 
but in its capacity for moral agency: in early modern England, for example, 
2 To be sure, the nature of the community represented in the jury is dependent upon the 
long-run rules of access which determine its racial, gender, and class composition, as well as 
short-term considerations for specif ic cases, and upon the practices of jury packing or jury 
strengthening (on this point, see Thompson, 1986).
3 In the English case in the mid-nineteenth century, property-owning men.
34 BrIan Dohert y anD Graeme hayeS 
juries frequently “notoriously mitigated the severities of the law by f inding 
guilt of lesser crimes than those charged, where these could lead to the 
death penalty, and often showed a propensity to side with those accused 
of social crimes” (Pole, 2002: 102). The power of nullif ication – where a jury 
“refuses to follow the law and convict in a particular case even though 
the facts seem to allow no other conclusion but guilt” (Weinstein, 1992: 
239) – remains part of the arsenal of Anglo-American juries, a power secured 
in both contexts through acts of resistance within the courthouse to the 
exercise of authoritarian control.4
Systems and Outcomes
In the civil law tradition, however, the cultural projection of justice is rather 
different. In such systems, fairness is imagined in the criminal procedure 
as centralized codif ication: as equality, rationality, professionalization, 
and the elimination of error. Where juries are therefore central to the 
common law projection of justice, they are much less signif icant in the 
civil law tradition. In France, for example, juries are only present in major 
criminal cases (“crimes,” def ined by prospective sentences of at least ten 
years in prison), judged in cours d’assises, and even then the jury of twelve 
includes the three sitting magistrates. Less serious offences (“délits”) are 
held in tribunaux correctionnels before a magistrate, normally accompanied 
by two assessors, or for very minor offences carrying no possibility of a 
custodial sentence (“contraventions”), in tribunaux de police, again before 
a magistrate.5 Of cases brought to court in France in 2008, only 0.4 percent 
concerned crimes; the vast majority, 92.2 percent, concerned délits (Timbart, 
2009). In contrast, the thresholds for accessing a jury trial are far lower in 
England and Wales. Here, again, there are three broad categories of offence: 
summary, tried by bench, in a Magistrates court; indictable, tried by jury 
in a Crown court; and “either way” offences, where defendants can elect to 
be committed for trial by jury in a Crown court. This last category includes 
theft, robbery, some forms of trespass, and under the 1971 Criminal Damage 
Act, criminal damage of an estimated value in excess of £5,000. This charge 
is faced frequently by direct action protesters.
4 See Barkan (1983) for a discussion of the restraints placed on nullif ication in the United 
States.
5 A similar hierarchy operates in Belgium.
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The differential effects of juries on trial proceedings are perhaps most vis-
ible in trial outcome data. In England and Wales, juries produce acquittals 
in criminal cases more frequently than magistrates sitting alone. Conviction 
rates in Magistrates courts are traditionally high: for summary offences 
dealt with in these courts in 1999, only 2.2 percent produced not guilty 
verdicts after trial. In contrast, for indictable offences which came to trial 
in Crown courts (i.e., where defendants pleaded not guilty), 62 percent were 
acquitted (Auld, 2001, Appendix 4). More recent figures confirm this propor-
tion: according to Ministry of Justice statistics, 64 percent of defendants who 
pleaded not guilty in cases dealt with in 2010 were acquitted, although only 
28 percent of these were acquitted by the jury.6 The comparison is perhaps 
most relevant for either-way offences: of the 296,000 either-way cases tried 
by Magistrates courts in 1999, 11,000 resulted in acquittals (3.7 percent); 
in contrast, of the 56,000 either-way cases completed the same year after 
being committed to the Crown court for trial, 13,000 resulted in acquit-
tal (23.2 percent) (Auld, 2001, Appendix 4). For a given criminal offence, 
therefore, the probability of acquittal is significantly higher when tried by 
jury rather than by bench.
In practice, therefore, where activists commit a criminal offence related 
to direct action – acts of trespass, criminal damage, theft, public order 
offences, and so on – there are structural differences between the type of 
trial that they can expect to face, and thus the composition and population 
of the court arena, depending on the judicial context. Indeed, for the type 
of offence likely to be committed by social movement actors, in civil law 
systems there is effectively no opportunity to make a case before a jury.7 The 
major difference is between a jury trial in the common law tradition with 
(in the broadest statistical terms) a signif icant possibility of securing an 
acquittal; and a bench trial in the civil law tradition, with a low probability 
6 Of the rest, 62 percent were discharged by the judge, 8 percent were acquitted on the direc-
tion of the judge, and 1 percent were acquitted by other means (Ministry of Justice, 2011: 91).
7 It is of course possible that movement actors will commit serious violent crime. We have 
excluded “terrorist” offences from our discussion for reasons of space, but it is worth noting 
here that for a variety of reasons (the potential for jury intimidation, jury bias, the public 
dissemination of classif ied information), jury trials in such cases are considered problematic 
and defendants are often subjected to specif ic judicial regimes. In France, terrorist cases have 
been held in special assize courts without jury since 1986; in the United Kingdom, juries were 
suspended in Northern Ireland in 1973 (though not in the rest of the UK); in the United States, 
juryless military tribunals were introduced in November 2001 for foreign nationals indicted on 
terrorist charges (though US citizens are tried before a jury); in Belgium, the right of defendants 
in “political trials” to be tried before a jury is constitutionally protected, but since 2003, “terrorist” 
trials are held without a jury in special assize courts.
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of acquittal. This probability is not nil, of course; magistrates in both civil 
and common law systems have on occasion demonstrated their own moral 
agency and capacity to produce relative innovation with respect to the law. 
However, Stengers argues that, in civil law systems especially, the concern 
for sécurité juridique – the security of the law – limits this, rendering this 
capacity for innovation necessarily weak (2004: 23-28).
Evidence comparing trials for criminal damage caused by anti-GMO 
“crop-trashers” in England and France supports this general hypothesis 
(Doherty and Hayes, 2012; 2014). In France, between February 1998 and Janu-
ary 2012, courts in 23 different towns heard 28 prosecutions, with 13 verdicts 
taken to appeal, with activists consistently pleading a “necessity” defense, 
arguing that their deliberate destruction of genetically engineered crops 
was designed to stop a greater harm. On three occasions magistrates did not 
convict, agreeing with the defendants that they had acted legitimately out 
of necessity, and acquitting them. On a further occasion, at Poitiers in June 
2011, defendants were discharged after the trial was nullif ied for procedural 
reasons. On each of these four occasions, the decision was subsequently 
overturned on appeal. In other words, on each occasion, trial has resulted 
in conviction, either on initial hearing or on appeal.
Comparison with the fate of defendants tried for similar actions in 
England proves instructive. Most notoriously, Greenpeace UK destroyed 
a f ield of GM crops at Lyng in Norfolk in 1999; all 28 activists were twice 
acquitted at Norwich Crown Court the following year. Only one jury trial 
of “crop-trashers” produced a conviction (in 2003, for an action in 2001); 
the two activists found guilty received f ines. This is in line with a broader 
pattern in England where over the previous ten years, prosecutions of 
protesters against new roads, incinerators and nuclear, chemical and arms 
trade companies frequently produced acquittals on the basis of lawful 
excuse defenses. In 2000-2001 the Crown Prosecution Service lost three 
major trials against anti-GMO activists, and this trend has carried on since 
the scaling-down of such activism: English juries have notably acquitted 
Greenpeace climate change activists at Maidstone Crown court in 2008, 
peace campaigners at Bristol Crown court in 2007 (for damaging US B-52 
bombers at Fairford airbase in 2003, prior to the Iraq War) and at Brighton 
Crown court in 2010 (for breaking into and damaging the premises of EDO, 
a defense equipment manufacturer that had supplied the Israeli army).
For movement actors on trial, a jury is of both instrumental and symbolic 
value: the jury’s capacity for moral agency seemingly increases the prob-
abilities of a successful outcome (here, measured as acquittal); equally, 
the jury’s socially representative function means that activists may state 
the courtS 37
their case in front of citizens representing the democratic community as a 
whole. For example, in the September 2008 trial of the “Kingsnorth Six,” six 
Greenpeace activists who had broken into a coal-fired power station in Kent, 
England, were cleared of causing £30,000 of criminal damage by the majority 
verdict of a jury at Maidstone Crown court. The acquittal was won after the 
defendants claimed “lawful excuse” under the 1971 Criminal Damage Act, in 
what became widely known as the f irst “climate change defense” (Hilson, 
2010). Following the verdict, one of the defendants argued that
This verdict marks a tipping point for the climate change movement. 
When a jury of normal people say it is legitimate for a direct action group 
to shut down a coal-f ired power station because of the harm it does to 
our planet, then where does that leave Government energy policy? We 
have the clean technologies at hand to power our economy. It’s time we 
turned to them instead of coal.8
In contradistinction, in April 2009, 114 activists were arrested in Notting-
ham, England, for “conspiracy to commit aggravated trespass” by planning 
to shut down a coal-f ired power station at Ratcliffe-on-Soar, leading to two 
trials, of 20 activists in December 2010 and a further six, in January 2011. 
In the f irst trial, the activists, pleading lawful excuse, were found guilty 
(unanimously) by the jury, but given a mixture of small f ines, conditional 
discharges, and unpaid community service sentences by the judge, who 
underlined their sincerity, commitment, and courage; the second prosecu-
tion collapsed when it was revealed on the eve of the trial that one of the 
activists was an undercover police off icer, who had agreed to testify in favor 
of the defendants. One of the defendants initially found guilty in the f irst 
trial argued that in failing to convince a jury, they had failed a “revealing 
litmus test”:9
The jury received a more extensive education on climate change than 
most people get in a lifetime. That they could not vindicate our actions 
is nothing to get self-righteous about; it is deeply disturbing. If the jury, 
8 Michael McCarthy, “Cleared: Jury Decides That Threat of Global Warming Justif ies Breaking 
the Law.” The Independent, 11 September 2008.
9 Rob Evans and Paul Lewis, “Ratcliffe-on-Soar Activists Furious as No Disciplinary Charges 
Brought over Withheld Tapes.” The Guardian, 5 April 2012.
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after everything they had heard, couldn’t bring themselves to sympathise 
with our actions, who will?10
Juries are thus important players within the court arena as they are poten-
tially receptive to ideas of justice that exceed the justice that is limited to 
the letter of the law.
Legal Culture and Court Operation
This does not tell the whole story, however. Verdict possibilities are depend-
ent on the contingent availability in law of certain defenses, such as that 
of “lawful excuse.” And, beyond verdict probabilities, more complex are 
the effects that the presence of juries has on the organization and opera-
tion of the court arena. Civil law criminal procedure is inquisitorial and 
predominantly bureaucratic: the judge leads the questioning, with the 
role of lawyers for each side being to suggest to the judge the existence of 
certain problems or evidence, and to make a closing argument. The judge 
may retain witnesses until satisf ied with their testimony; there is no cross-
examination of defendants by counsel. As Spencer (2002) notes, the broad 
distinction between “inquisitorial” civil law and “adversarial” common 
law criminal procedures is over-stated. Yet, in the common law system, 
criminal procedure is essentially composed as (melo)dramatic performance, 
structured by rhetorical combat between defense and prosecution counsel, 
with the jury’s verdict providing a theatrical climax. Carrington (2003: 92) 
points out that a key aspect of jury trials is the oral nature of the conduct of 
the trial, itself fundamental to the construction of the trial as “a dramatic 
and not a bureaucratic event.”11
The role of the judge in common law jury trials is formally that of a 
neutral arbiter. Yet the judge has two important powers: directing the 
jury through summing up, and acting as a gatekeeper, with the capacity to 
prohibit the defense from submitting certain forms of evidence to the court. 
Two cases are illustrative of this power. In July 2009, 29 climate activists 
were prosecuted at Leeds Crown court in England under the 1861 Malicious 
Damage Act, for obstructing a train carrying coal to the Drax power station 
10 Bradley Day, “The Climate Movement Is in Desperate Need of Renewal.” The Guardian, 
5 January 2011.
11 This is, of course, the foundation for the jury trial as a staple of the plots of novels, plays, 
f ilms, and multiple TV series.
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in North Yorkshire the previous year.12 Because they were prosecuted under 
the 1861 Act rather than the 1971 Criminal Damage Act, the defendants had 
no entitlement to make a “lawful excuse” defense; instead, they sought to 
make a “necessity” defense, potentially available to defendants facing any 
criminal charge (Schwarz, 2010). However, the judge in this case ruled that 
the defendants were not allowed to mount a necessity defense based on 
climate change, effectively disbarring them from calling expert witness-
es.13 Unable to present the defense they had planned, the defendants were 
resigned in advance to being found guilty by the jury. The trial’s dramatic 
potential, and media and political impact, were minimized.14
The second case is United States v. DeChristopher, from another com-
mon law tradition. DeChristopher was sentenced in June 2011 to a two-year 
prison sentence in California for a climate change action in Salt Lake City 
in December 2008, for disrupting a federal auction of oil and gas drilling 
rights in south Utah by pretending to be a bona fide bidder. Offered pre-trial 
mediation, DeChristopher refused, choosing to put his case before a jury, 
arguing that
As citizens have been squeezed out of the political process in general, 
the role of citizens in our legal system has been minimized, and power 
has been concentrated into the hands of judges and into government 
off icials.… And I wanted to put the power in the hands of citizens rather 
than in the hands of government off icials.15
The trial judge, however, refused to let DeChristopher put forward a po-
litical necessity defense, arguing that in cases of so-called “indirect” civil 
disobedience – where action breaks not the contested law itself, but only a 
circumstantially related one (DeChristopher’s action did not break the law 
enabling the state to auction land permits, but rather the laws against false 
representation) – a defendant has no grounds to present such a defense. The 
judge’s decision is consistent with the jurisprudence set by a 1992 ruling of 
the Ninth Circuit, in United Sates v. Schoon, regarding the prosecution of 
activists who staged a protest against US policy in El Salvador by illegally 
12 Seven pleaded guilty; the trial was thus of the 22 activists who pleaded not guilty.
13 Though the judge did in fact allow two defendants to discuss climate change during their 
own testimony.
14 Discussion with two Drax defendants, March 2012.
15 Jason Mark, “Tim DeChristopher Speaks about His Impending Prison Sen-
tence.” 14  June 2011, http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/
tim_dechristopher_speaks_about_his_impending_prison_sentence.
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entering the IRS off ices in Tucson, Arizona, in December 1989. Prior to 
this ruling, activists had regularly been successful in US state courts (on 
issues such as US policy in Central America, nuclear power and weaponry, 
apartheid, the politics of the CIA), winning jury acquittals or having charges 
dropped (Cavallaro, 1993: 361-362). Unable to explain why he broke the law, 
DeChristopher was found guilty in March 2011 by the unanimous verdict 
of a jury able to hear the details of the offences, but not the motivations for 
committing them.
The Tactical Choices of Movement Players
Attention to criminal justice systems enables us to identify reasonably 
stable, long-term properties affecting the organization and operation of 
trial proceedings, which differ between state (and even sub-state) context, 
and which produce a balance of probabilities of trial outcomes for social 
movement players subjected to these proceedings. However, these proper-
ties, though (axiomatically) subject only occasionally to renegotiation and 
change, are also a site of strategic interaction, adversarial negotiation, and 
discursive contest, undertaken by state and non-state players seeking to 
maximize their political advantage within the court arena.
Defendants in criminal trials are faced with a profound power imbalance, 
which governs not just the potential outcomes, but also the terms of their 
appearance in court. The decision whether and whom to prosecute, and 
the terms of the indictment, are the preserve of the public prosecutor. 
These decisions may have powerful material effects on the defendants, 
dividing groups (when some are prosecuted and others not), excluding some 
defenses and allowing others, configuring arenas with or without juries, 
and permitting or denying players to go to trial.
For movement players faced with this power imbalance, the most fun-
damental decision is whether to recognize or reject the authority of the 
court. For example, considering trials a propaganda opportunity, in 1905 
Lenin instructed members of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
to represent themselves in court and challenge the legitimacy of the trial 
process. This model was subsequently developed by French communist 
lawyers representing combatants in post-war decolonization struggles in 
Africa. Most famously, in the 1957 trial of four members of the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) accused of participating in a bombing campaign 
in Algiers, defense lawyer Jacques Vergès developed a défense de rupture, 
using the trial to challenge the legitimacy of the state, refusing courtroom 
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codes, and turning the judicial process into a political event located outside 
the courthouse (Israël, 2009: 63-71). More counterculturally, the defendants 
in the Chicago Eight conspiracy trial systematically violated the court’s 
ceremonial codes of deference and demeanor, acting in a fashion “consistent 
with their self conceptions as revolutionaries” and “actively assert[ing] 
the validity of their values over those of the court and the wider society it 
represents” (Antonio, 1972: 295).
Such “rupture” defenses are relatively rare, anti-colonial, revolution-
ary and terrorist movements excepted (de Graaf et al., 2013). Few trials of 
movement actors involve explicit attempts to undermine the authority of 
the court in this way. Defendants therefore have to decide how to engage 
in the arena of the court tactically as players. Given that those indicted as 
movement players invariably believe that their own actions are legitimate, 
the strategic dilemma that they typically face is between maximizing their 
chances of acquittal, by exploiting the opportunities provided by the legal 
system, and prioritizing the presentation of their action as authentic, ir-
respective of the effects this will have on the legal outcome. The choice 
between these strategies can vary even within the same compound group 
of players.
For example, during the mid-1980s, there were hundreds of trials of 
women from the anti-nuclear peace camp at RAF Greenham Common in 
Berkshire, set up to protest the deployment of Cruise missiles in the UK. 
Rather than seeking an acquittal, the Greenham women often adopted 
symbolic defenses, stating their case in court by citing international law or 
their own personal experience. However, if the opportunity arose to expose 
inconsistencies (or downright lies) in the evidence of police or others, and 
gain an acquittal, most took it. Defendants typically refused to conform 
to the hierarchies of court decorum: supporters in the gallery frequently 
interrupted proceedings, humming or singing when the police were giving 
evidence. More than anything, the process was unpredictable. The court 
off icials had no way of knowing if a defendant would plead guilty so that 
the case was over fast (which the defendants might do if, for example, 
they needed to be somewhere else the next day); or whether they would 
plead not guilty, calling expert witnesses, effectively making the trial last 
several days. As time went on, more women chose to defend themselves, 
partly as a matter of resources (because applications for legal aid were 
refused), partly as a matter of political strategy (because it gave them more 
freedom to speak). Having themselves attended so many trials as one type of 
player (supporters, defendants), they thus became able to act as other types 
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of player, becoming experts in cross-examination and court procedure, 
learning rules and gambits (Roseneil 1995: 253-259).
Securing access to particular arenas can be the subject of tactical battles 
in themselves. For example, in England in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
anti-GMO activists waged a battle with the Crown Prosecution Service over 
access to jury trials: as an activist newsletter reported, “The Crown became 
somewhat reluctant to press for damages of over £5,000 because this gives 
activists the right to ask for a trial by jury rather than a magistrate.”16 Prosecu-
tors would claim that there had been hardly any damage; campaigners would 
claim that they had in fact caused plenty, in order to try to get a jury trial.
In France, Les Déboulonneurs commit regular, open and public direct 
action against billboards, seeking to impose a maximum size of 40 cm x 
30 cm on commercial advertising posters. For the group, which is based 
in a handful of French cities but mobilizes relatively few core activists, 
being prosecuted is a strategic aim. Yet the complaint of many activists is 
that they are unable to get themselves prosecuted; often, they can’t even 
get themselves arrested.17 Since 2005, activists have undertaken over 40 
actions in Lille and over 50 in Paris; nationally, only about 1 in 15 actions has 
produced a prosecution. The tactical choices made in the knowledge that 
action would lead to arrest and thence to trial could thus be undermined 
by operational decisions made by police not to arrest, and state prosecutors 
not to pursue the case.
Tactical conflict between players therefore centers on liability, and on 
the configuration of and access to the judicial arena. In relation to this we 
can distinguish between three common strategic approaches by movement 
players: (1) where the trial is anticipated and planned for as an end in itself, as 
in the Plowshares anti-nuclear movements; (2) where activists seek to avoid 
arrest, but once arrested adapt their strategy to maximize the opportunities 
available in the legal arena, such as animal rights or radical environmental 
activists prosecuted for acts of sabotage; (3) an intermediate position in 
which individuals adopt a pragmatic position that varies according to the 
kinds of action taken, since in some cases arrest is to be expected (as in site 
occupations) whereas in others (such as covert crop trashes) it might be 
avoided. For the first of these types of group, preparation for trials is typically 
much more codif ied by movement traditions than for the other groups.
What is at stake for all those prosecuted in cases of citizenship crimes 
is precisely the symbolic meaning of acts, their def inition as criminal or 
16 Genetix Update, 20, Winter 2001.
17 Discussion with N., Paris, September 2011.
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lawful. We may surmise that defendants, where they engage with the trial 
process and seek to present a justif ication of their acts, will have four broad 
objectives: (1) to construct the social nature of their offence; (2) to broaden 
the focus of the indictment from its narrowly legal character (whether a 
given offence has been committed in law) to its political character (the rea-
sons for the committal of the offence); (3) to thus engage the moral agency 
of the court’s decisional players, and secure favorable outcomes within and 
outside the court space; (4) in so doing, to reveal the norms and dispositions 
underpinning the legal system as ideologically structured. Though tacti-
cally disadvantaged by the structure of the trial process, defendants can 
mobilize f ive sets of players in order to achieve these goals: the defendants 
themselves; their lawyers; the witnesses that they call; their supporters, 
inside and outside the courtroom; third parties, such as the media.
The number of players who are actual or potential opponents for move-
ments facing prosecution is at least as numerous, including – within the 
court – judges, prosecutors, witnesses (usually including the police); and 
beyond the court: government ministers (whose role varies according to the 
structure of the political system), corporate actors, countermovements and 
once again, the media. The separation of powers may protect the judicial 
system from overt political interference but in direct action prosecutions, 
normal practice may be broken or suspended. For example, following the 
acquittal of Greenpeace UK activists at Kingsnorth in 2008 the energy 
company that owned the power plant lobbied the government to impose 
stiffer sentences on climate campaigners as a deterrent against similar 
protests.18 The 2009 Drax and 2010 Ratcliffe-on-Soar UK convictions of 
climate activists (discussed above) were overturned on appeal when it 
emerged that the rules of the legal process had been broken by the Crown 
Prosecution Service, which had failed to pass crucial evidence gathered by 
an undercover policeman to the defense. Thus, although often disguised 
by state secrecy, the state is not a unitary institution: tactical interaction 
between different players within the state and with other opponents of 
movements is evidently a material factor affecting trials for direct action 
crimes. Furthermore, abuse of process by the state, when discovered, causes 
major political damage to the authorities.19
18 James Ball, “E.ON Lobbied For Stiff Sentences against Kingsnorth Activists, Papers Show,” 
The Guardian, 19 February 2013.
19 The success of activists and journalists as well as the bravery of police whistleblowers in 
exposing the work of undercover units that target political activists led the UK government to 
concede, reluctantly, the need for an independent inquiry into their role. 
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Social Crime and Event Construction
As Vanhala points out, one of the main problems facing collective actors 
in the courts is that the justice system is “inherently individualistic,” with 
legal process generally focused on “an individual with a concrete issue that 
requires a legal resolution” (2011: 12). Indeed, prosecution players can be 
expected to mobilize the rules of the arena to change the nature of their 
opponents, to transform compound players into simple players; a strategic 
challenge for activists is therefore to remain compound players. Securing a 
collective prosecution with its attendant possibilities of imposing costs on 
opponents and creating occasions for solidarity displays from supporters 
can itself be a goal of action. State players thus face potential decision-
making dilemmas over arrest and charging that mirror the plight of the 
Déboulonneurs (above).
For example, the French Faucheurs Volontaires have adapted their tactics 
across multiple trials in order to anticipate the response of police to their 
f ield actions. This adaptation involves establishing, prior to undertaking an 
action, a set of common verbal responses for use under police questioning, 
in order to forestall prosecutors from differentiating leaders from followers 
(and thus differentiating between them in their own decision making, 
including whom to prosecute and on what charges). This tactic has proved 
increasingly successful for the Faucheurs, resulting in a series of signif icant 
collective trials. In the UK, recent guidance from the Crown Prosecution 
Service explicitly directs prosecutors toward identifying and prosecuting 
protest organizers, and thus targeting the most disruptive players (Bowcott, 
2012). In the case of the 145 UK Uncut activists arrested by the police for oc-
cupying the Fortnum & Mason’s luxury store in Piccadilly, central London, 
in a corporate tax avoidance protest in March 2011, prosecutors singled out 
30 for trial. This whittling down was undertaken on the basis that protesters 
were prosecuted if they were carrying megaphones, beach balls, or at least 
20 UK Uncut leaflets at the time of arrest. The seeming arbitrariness of this 
distinction produced an absurd outcome: during the trial, one defendant 
was released without charge when it transpired that some of her leaflets 
were in fact theater ticket stubs, and she did not after all have the requisite 
number to be prosecuted.
Within the court arena, penalties are applied individually, according 
to role and motive; again, while magistrates and prosecution lawyers may 
aim to differentiate, defendants and defense lawyers can be expected 
to maintain the collective nature of responsibility. Equally, in order to 
establish the collective legitimacy of their action, defendants are foremost 
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faced with socializing their action, whether by demonstrating community 
support, testifying to the integrity of their motives and the collective good 
of their objectives, or by mobilizing other players (supporters in the court-
house, moral witnesses). In their own testimony, defendants may seek to 
establish the ethical basis of their acts through the “moral presentation 
of self” (Schervish, 1984: 196), establishing their character, integrity, and 
biographical commitment to the cause, in the way that impressed the judge 
in the f irst Ratcliffe trial.
Whether players are individual or compound players, and what type of 
compound players, therefore emerges as a strategic outcome of the trial 
process. We may expect that, especially where defendant players have 
deliberately courted prosecution, socializing crime is both a key symbolic 
aim and embedded in the original strategic planning of illegal action. For 
example, in the Lyng anti-GMO action for which 28 activists were tried in 
Norwich, Greenpeace deliberately sought to replicate the social representa-
tivity of the trial jury by constructing the activist group as a cross-section of 
the general public (in age, regional origin, gender and social background).20 
In the trial of 62 French anti-GMO activists in Colmar in September 2011, the 
defendants similarly aimed to be representative of the French population as 
a whole.21 In Belgium, where 11 activists were prosecuted in January 2013 on 
charges of organized criminality for having destroyed a f ield of genetically 
modif ied potatoes in May 2011, the Field Liberation Movement consciously 
foregrounded the presence of Dutch-speaking activists, while adopting the 
tactic of self-indictment from the French Faucheurs Volontaires in order to 
build solidarity outside the courthouse; 80 supporters signed an aff idavit 
demanding to be placed on trial alongside the defendants.22
Defendants may also typically be expected to attempt to shift the 
focus from the defense of their own actions to the “prosecution” of their 
opponents, as the case of the December 2010 trial in Caen, France, of six 
anti-nuclear activists demonstrates. The previous month, the activists had 
physically blocked a train carrying vitrif ied nuclear waste traveling from 
Valognes in Normandy to Gorleben in Germany, using what is now the 
routine practice of chaining themselves to the rail track and to each other. 
Throughout the trial, the prosecution and defense were constantly engaged 
in a contest to def ine the process: the prosecution sought to restrict debate 
20 Discussion with Greenpeace defendant, Stafford, June 2008.
21 Discussion with three Faucheurs Volontaires activists, Ghent, May 2011. Note that in neither 
case did social representativity involve ethnic diversity.
22 Discussion with FLM defendants, Brussels, July 2011.
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to the bare facts of the action (themselves uncontested by the defendants), 
and thus to depoliticize the legal process; the defense sought to generalize, 
to draw the debate into political terms, establishing their motivation as 
democratic, asserting the contradiction between a nuclearized society and 
participative citizenship:
C.: Our goal is to create a real debate about nuclear power, the public has 
never been consulted.
State prosecutor: It’s not in court that that type of debate can take place, 
but within the democratic organs of society. You are here to be judged 
for your actions, not to make the world anew.
C.: That’s exactly why I am here.23
The capacity of defendants to make these arguments is heavily dependent 
upon the gatekeeping role of the judge, who as a player in the court arena has 
scope for discretion. In the September 2011 Colmar trial, the presiding mag-
istrate gave the floor to each defendant in turn to explain the reasons why 
they had participated in the destruction of a scientif ic trial of genetically 
modified vine roots at the French National Agricultural Research Institute’s 
(INRA) local research facility the previous summer. In contrast, during the 
trial in Bobigny, France, in July 2012 of one environmental activist for having 
trespassed onto the runaway at Charles de Gaulle airport and stood in front 
of an Airbus the previous month in a protest against global warming, the 
presiding magistrate refused to let the defendant explain the motivations 
for his actions, bringing the defendant’s testimony to an abrupt close.24
In trials for direct action crimes, the witnesses called by the defense are 
particularly important in providing “expert” testimony as scientific or moral 
authorities (Hayes, 2013). As we have seen in the Drax and DeChristopher 
cases, this is again heavily dependent upon both the gatekeeping role of 
the magistrate and of previous judicial decisions. Given the public and 
contestatory nature of trials, it is perhaps unsurprising that Jasanoff sees 
“expert” testimony by scientists (where it is allowed) as a privileged site of 
co-production, of the public socialization of scientif ic knowledge (2004: 3). 
For Lynch, criminal cases can “provide vivid public tutorials on the flexible 
and contentious way in which parties negotiate the boundaries between 
science and non-science, and expert and non-expert knowledge” (2004: 
165). Thus in the Kingsnorth and Ratcliffe climate change trials, defendants 
23 Personal trial notes.
24 Personal trial notes.
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sought to substantiate a lawful excuse defense by calling expert testimony, 
arguing that their action prevented a greater harm. Climatologist James 
Hansen, Director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, testif ied 
in court in both cases that accelerating coal use in the new century is “a 
prescription for planetary disaster,” concluding that this “would leave a 
reasonable person to take steps to urgently and deeply cut CO2 emissions.”25
Typically therefore, defendants stress their biographical and ethical 
commitment, underline the social nature of their action in various ways, 
and mobilize other players to contextualize and legitimize their action 
or deliver a public pedagogy. This will be particularly important where 
defendants seek to mount a necessity or lawful excuse defense. But the 
importance of these tactics is not limited to the courtroom; rather, it is also 
a communicational strategy outside the courthouse.
Media coverage is crucial in this respect. Protesters need media coverage 
to be able to reach beyond the audience in the court and their existing sup-
porters. Ideally, for social movement actors, a trial will create a dramaturgy 
that will end with their vindication (through an acquittal), a demonstration 
of their commitment to the cause, and the wide publicization of their argu-
ments. Conviction and harsh penalties may alternatively work to increase 
solidarities within and beyond the core movement group. However, even 
when the media play their part in this drama by sending reporters, their 
increasingly limited time and resources means that most media organiza-
tions only cover the f irst and last days of the trial. These are the worst days 
from the activists’ perspective, since the f irst day is when the prosecution 
generally makes its case and the last day is when the verdict is given. The 
time in between, when activists give evidence and make their case, is the 
least likely to be reported.
Conclusion: Strategic Interaction in the Court Arena
There is perhaps no greater symbol of the power and purpose of the state 
than the criminal law, its procedures, processes, institutions, and person-
nel. As an arena, the criminal law functions to articulate, adjudicate, and 
discriminate: it def ines and announces prohibited conduct; it assesses 
liability for transgression; it constructs hierarchies of harm and culpability 
(Robinson, 1994). By its very definition, it patrols and polices the boundaries 
25 James Hansen, witness statement to trial of Ratcliffe activists, Nottingham Crown Court, 
September 2010.
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of the dominant social and political order, and it sets the terms of the inclu-
sion and exclusion of the citizenry within or from that order. Again by 
definition, when movement players oppose the specif ic or general terms of 
the social and political order, this brings them into the arena of the criminal 
law. But the courthouse is also an institutional arena in which various state 
(judge, prosecution, and police) and non-state players (lawyers, defendants, 
witnesses, civil parties, juries, media, even members of the public) come 
into direct discursive contact within the rules of engagement set by the 
law, by judicial procedure and process, and by the cultural organization 
of participation in this process. And as we have seen, it is also a site of the 
production of meaning in other senses, including of political challenge, and 
of the interplay of rational-legal justice with the “natural” justice of the jury.
We aim to stimulate further interest in the relationships between social 
movements and criminal justice, arguing that it is a vital area of collective 
action which has been curiously neglected in the literature until now. As 
readers will have noticed, our focus here is very much on Western democra-
cies, and we recognize that this does not address the major gap in the study 
of prosecutions of activists in other political and judicial systems. Clearly, 
to take perhaps the most high-profile trial of activists of recent times, the 
enormous international attention given to the Pussy Riot trial in Russia in 
2012 indicates the potential for taking the study of trials of direct action 
into non-Western and authoritarian settings. We hope this lacuna will 
rapidly be addressed.
Beyond this general goal, we make two specif ic arguments. The f irst 
is that, for criminal justice systems, we can identify stable, long-term, 
predictable terms of engagement set by formal rules of procedure which 
are different from system to system; that these rules are the subject of 
political and discursive engagement between players aiming to secure the 
most favorable terms within this arena; that the outcomes of this engage-
ment will be central to our understanding of the outcomes of criminal 
prosecutions, in terms of both their judicial impacts (the verdicts handed 
down) and their political impacts (crucially, setting the terms of meaning 
of the criminal prosecution).
The second argument is that criminal trials are complex processes which 
cannot a priori be reduced the simple imposition of authority by a unif ied 
state. We know that arrest and trial “can energize and elevate movements, 
increasing their support and chances of success” (Goldstone, 2004: 356; see 
also Koopmans, 2004: 29); we should at the very least note how prosecution 
enables solidarity and collective identity reinforcement processes. This is 
not to say that the courthouse is not also a theater of symbolic state power: 
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the rules of the game are set by state players, activists are rarely able to 
master the terms of engagement, arrest and trial are stressful events which 
impose f inancial, psychological, and emotional costs, irrespective of the 
court’s verdict, and can have strong negative as well as positive effects 
on both intra-group solidarities and the capacity of movement players 
to wage campaigns, and we should certainly be wary of casting them as 
necessarily beneficial or productive episodes for challenging actors. As one 
Belgian anti-GMO activist put it to us à propos of being taken to court in 
2004 for crop-trashing, “it’s heavy, it’s tiring, it destroys your life for years,” 
“it’s only when you’re in it that you begin to realize what the consequences 
are,” “you end up on the stand when you should be in a f ield.” Yet the same 
activist also described the trial as “a miracle”; “we won, and sparked off a 
public debate.”26 Beyond the multiple anecdotes provided by particular 
cases, criminal prosecutions hold our attention because they are normative 
crucibles in which the challenge to the dominant social and political order 
can be made by collective social actors. These players make tactical choices 
to use the possibilities presented by the arena of the courthouse to level 
political as well as legal challenge. Occasionally, they even succeed.
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2 Political Parties and Legislators
A Latin American Perspective1
Hélène Combes
In 1997 the coca-leaf growers movement, with Evo Morales at its head, 
became a political party: the Movement for Socialism – Political Instrument 
for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP). This development was in 
keeping with the heritage of miners unions and the indigenous mobiliza-
tions of the 1990s in Bolivia. (Do Alto and Stefanoni, 2006)2
While Brazil was still under dictatorship, trade unionists (particularly from 
the metallurgical sector), the urban movement in working-class neighbor-
hoods, student activists, academics and so on came together to form the 
Workers’ Party (PT), the great promoter of participatory budgeting in the 
1990s and the spearhead of the Latin American left and the World Social 
Forum. (Keck, 1992; Rocha, 2011)
In 1988, three years after the Mexico City earthquake, the Asamblea de Bar-
rios housing rights association decided to symbolically f ield a candidate in 
the presidential elections. It chose “Superbarrio,” the movement’s champion 
and mascot (Cadena-Roa, 2002; Sánchez, 2004), a wrestler who defends 
those living in sub-standard housing and f ights the IMF, the World Bank, 
government credit agencies, and so on. As the left slowly united behind 
Cuauthémoc Cárdenas, “Superbarrio” withdrew from the campaign and 
supported his candidacy. In 1989, “Superbarrio” and his activists partici-
pated in the foundation of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). 
The leaders of the Asamblea de Barrios played a fundamental role there 
throughout the 1990s. (Combes, 2011)
“Though her eldest son will soon turn 20, Rosa is a still young woman. White, 
with a long chestnut braid and a lively sense of humor, Rosa could be any 
other Paraguayan peasant. But Rosa presented herself as a candidate in the 
1 Translated from the French by Ethan Rundell. I would like to thank James Jasper and the 
anonymous reviewers of this article for their commentaries and suggestions for further reading.
2 In their typology of Latin American left-wing parties, Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts 
classify the MAS as a “Movement Left” party (2011: 13).
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elections… Rosa is a leader of the Land Rights Organization, the country’s 
leading peasant movement, and a member of Frente Guazú, under whose 
banner she ran for off ice.” (Macías, 2012: 82)
So many different scenarios3: social movements and trade unions transform-
ing themselves into parties, social movement activists and leaders creating 
parties or joining already existing ones.4 In the countries of Latin America, 
the cycles of mobilization against dictators and, later, for indigenous rights 
and against neoliberalism (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011; Almeida, 2010) re-
drew the partisan political landscape. In European countries, many “new 
social movement” activists joined the ranks of left-wing parties over the 
course of the 1970s. Later, ecological movements transformed themselves 
into political parties. These phenomena can help us to see the emergence 
of new party machines as the outcome of a cycle of mobilization or the 
transformation of parties under the impact of the mass entry of activists 
formed in social movements. In other cases, multi-positioned activists 
remain in the minority and have little or no impact on a party’s internal 
operation.
Despite the extensive interaction between parties and social move-
ments, few scholars have directly addressed the question of their relations 
and mutual entanglements (cf. Combes, 2011; Luck and Dechezelles, 2011; 
Goldstone, 2003; Van Cott, 2005). More often, research on particular ac-
tors mentions this interaction in passing (Gunter and Montero, 2002: 6). 
This absence of global analysis may be partly attributed to disciplinary 
compartmentalization (Sawicki and Siméant, 2010). While the party is 
a canonical object of political science, social movements were until the 
1990s the almost exclusive preserve of sociology. These two actors were 
thus studied separately5 and gave rise to multiple approaches within each 
discipline.6 In his introduction to a book on the interaction between social 
movements, political parties, and states, Jack Goldstone (2003) thus did 
3 See also the cases studied by Paul Almeida (2010) of movements in the cycle of mobilization 
against neoliberalism: Bolivia, Salvador, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Ecuador. Almeida author 
speaks of “social movement partyism.”
4 The guerillas who transformed themselves into parties could also be mentioned in this 
connection. Yet I will leave this case aside as it seems to raise different empirical and theoretical 
issues. Similarly, I will not here address the role of social movements in def ining public policy, 
a conf iguration in which parties play the de facto role of intermediary. 
5 For a good overview of the relationship between parties and social movements, see Van 
Cott (2005), as well as Goldstone (2003) and McAdam and Tarrow (2010).
6 Evidence of this compartmentalization can be found in an overview of two journals of 
reference, both of which f irst appeared in the mid-1990s: Party Politics and Mobilization. Across 
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not hesitate to write that the former had been little studied even though 
political parties and social movements cannot be understood independently 
of their intimate relationship.
How have scholars described the interactions between these multiple 
actors? Too often in the literature on parties, the interaction between parties 
and other activist organizations is presented as a one-way relationship of 
dependence. For Angelo Panebianco (1988), in analyzing a political party one 
must take its interactions with the “organizations of its environment” into 
account as these constitute one of two explanatory variables of “the map of 
organizational power.”7 Panebianco identif ies three types of interaction: (1) 
The party controls the organization; (2) The exchange is well-balanced: party 
and organization leaders alike profit, with each group needing resources from 
the other to maintain their respective organization; (3) The organization con-
trols the party. The party needs the resources supplied by the organization in 
order to stay alive. Panebianco’s extremely schematic typology was developed 
to analyze the interactions between a single party and type of organization 
(trade unions in the case of the British Labour Party, for example) and does 
not take complex relations between multiple actors into account.
Katz and Mair’s (1994, 1995) classic work on the “cartel party” suggests 
that parties are disconnected from civil society, with the relationship 
between parties and SMOs presented as a thing of the past. For many 
authors, a party has been institutionalized when it is no longer open to “its 
environment.” Beginning in the 1960s, Huntington presented autonomy 
as a condition of an organization’s institutionalization: that is, the degree 
of differentiation from other social groupings and methods of behavior. 
Together with systematicity (the degree of interdependence among differ-
ent sectors), autonomy is one of two criteria identif ied by Panebianco for 
def ining political party institutionalization.8 Later def initions of political 
party institutionalization tend to be in line with this dual heritage and thus 
present autonomy as a central criterion of institutionalization. However, 
specialists of political parties consider institutionalization to be a positive 
development (with non-institutionalized parties seen as inchoate or at 
this period, one f inds only about f ive articles addressing social movements in Party Politics and 
about ten addressing parties in Mobilization.
7 The other being the relationship between the various off ices and bodies existing in the 
organization (Panebianco, 1988).
8 One of the few authors to hold that autonomy is not a necessary condition of institutionaliza-
tion is Steven Levitsky, an expert on the Latin American Peronist Party. Levitsky (2003, pp.25-26) 
shows how an under-institutionalized party hierarchy and strong, yet informal, linkages to the 
“mass base” encourage a “combination of f lexibility and endurance.”
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risk). This particularly holds for countries, such as those of Latin America, 
undergoing a return to democratic rule: there is a “strong assumption in 
the democratization literature that party institutionalization is a vital 
ingredient of democratic consolidation” (Randall and Svåsand, 2002: 24) . 
Indeed, the institutionalization of parties – and, as a consequence, party 
systems – is seen as an essential element in the consolidation or stability of 
democracies. In this context, continued ties with SMOs, taken to be a sign 
of instability, are more often condemned than studied.
In the literature on social movements, it is important to differentiate 
between schools. For “new social movements theory,” autonomy f igures in 
the very def inition of the social movement: autonomy, vis-à-vis the state 
but also vis-à-vis parties, is at the heart of the capacity to construct oneself 
as an actor. Much of the work on social movements in Latin America in the 
1980s and 90s, when this theory was hegemonic, also conceived of these rela-
tions in terms of instrumentalization (Calderón, 1995: 27) and co-optation 
(Alvarez and Escobar, 1992; Alvarez, et al., 1998) and was characterized by 
a normative vision: simplifying things somewhat, parties were presented 
as the “bad guys,” agents of co-optation that encouraged the demobilization 
of social movements.
For the “political process model,” the relationship between parties and 
social movements is more or less directly factored into the framework of the 
structure of political opportunities (Tarrow, 1994). Kriesi et al. (1995) present 
the configuration of power in the political system as a decisive element in 
the development of social movements. Studying the democratizations of the 
Southern Cone, Patricia Hipsher (1998) holds that the relationship between 
parties and movements is one of two key factors that shape movements’ 
capacity to put their demands on the agenda.
Kitschelt addressed the emergence of new parties from the perspective 
of the structure of political opportunities (1989). Van Cott (2005), who has 
worked on the transformation of Indian movements into political parties 
in South America, also draws upon an opportunity structure approach, in 
a systematic comparative analysis of the conditions of possibility for the 
transformation of social movements into political parties.9 By studying six 
national configurations, characterized by different ethnic cleavages, she 
sought to determine the factors that explain the transformation of indig-
enous movements into political parties in several Latin American countries 
during the 1990s. Though Van Cott’s analysis concerns the specif ic case of 
ethnic movements, it offers more general perspectives for understanding 
9 Herbert Kitschelt (1989) was one of the f irst to systematically study this question.
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the emergence of parties from social movements. Yet, despite the wealth 
of her analysis, which can in many respects be extended to other national 
configurations, Van Cott hardly mentions factors internal to movements 
or the transmission of activist know-how. As many critics have pointed out 
(Goodwin and Jasper, 1999), studying the structure of opportunities does not 
suff ice for understanding the emergence of a movement or political party.
Another way of understanding relations between parties and social 
movements is to attend to the very large body of work produced by the 
resource mobilization and political process school concerning social move-
ment institutionalization.10 Doowon Suh defines this as “a process of social 
movements traversing the off icial terrain of formal politics and engaging 
with authoritative institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the state 
and political parties to enhance their collective ability to achieve the move-
ment’s goals” (Suh, 2011: 442). For her, it is a matter of a “collective strategic 
choice of an SMO” (443). For authors who study a particular mobilization 
cycle or movement, social movement institutionalization can also allow a 
movement to achieve its chosen objectives in pursuit of social and political 
change (Meyer, 2007) despite the fact that its co-optation or preemption 
by political elites can bring the cycle to an end (Piven and Cloward, 1977; 
Tarrow, 1994).11 The authors cited nevertheless insist on the consequences in 
terms of demobilization, the deradicalization of demands, a loss of identity 
or solidarity for the movement, and so on.
To sum up, the manner in which the relationship between political 
parties and social movements is discussed (presented here in necessarily 
incomplete and schematic form) suffers from two drawbacks. The f irst 
concerns the normative reading of “autonomy.” For specialists of parties, 
the party/SMO relationship prevents institutionalization and, ultimately, 
democratic stability. For new social movements theory and, in a more 
qualif ied way, the resource mobilization and political process school, this 
relationship is linked to co-optation and demobilization: it endangers the 
movement itself since autonomy is part of the latter’s def inition. In both 
cases, their condemnations prevent scholars from properly analyzing the 
phenomena at play. The movements’ players often individually or col-
lectively interact with a variety of other players. These interactions mold 
some players. Indeed, players who belonged to different arenas and/or were 
opposed to one another can develop common interests and worldviews as 
10 For a recent overview, see Suh (2011).
11 See the large body of feminist work on this aspect.
58 hélène comBeS 
well as relations of trust and friendship. These sometimes lead individual 
players to join an organization in another arena.
The second drawback stems from the methods employed and the macro-
sociological level of analysis. Mainstream scholarship on parties favors 
quantitative and comparative methods, with the object of investigation 
constructed in an a priori manner. For example, f ield work and ethnography 
are almost entirely absent from the articles published by the journal Party 
Politics since its creation in 1996. Moreover, relations between categories of 
actors are sometimes conceived without taking into account the multiplicity 
of interactions among players. The actors are not homogenous in geographic 
terms or in terms of their respective levels (local, regional, national).12
Research on institutionalization does not take suff icient account of the 
variety of arenas that are involved (e.g., issues of geography as well as the 
types of administration with which collaboration is established). Even 
if a party is in power at the local or national level, it is also important to 
understand the differences between the party as an organization and the 
administrative logics in interactions with social movements. But the main 
analytical problem with this approach is that it considers the movement 
as a collective and homogenous entity and institutionalization the result 
of a collective choice.
This is particularly true of the political process school. As Michel Offerlé 
has underscored, activist collectives are invested by actors capable of mak-
ing very differentiated use of them. Such collectives are “the result of the 
multiple random improvisations by which political entrepreneurs f inding 
themselves there for no doubt very diverse reasons produce themselves as 
politicians while simultaneously producing the groups they bring together” 
(Offerlé, 2010, 40). The relationship between party and SMO is not a f ixed 
given but rather closely depends on practical and symbolic confrontations 
within various arenas and the multiple social and activist stances taken 
by its players. As a result, one must enlarge one’s f ield of vision and at-
tend, not only to the “party tout court,” but also to the interactions that 
the party, SMOs, and their players maintain, forge, activate, or reactivate 
with social movements, social organizations, trade unions, NGOs, and so 
on. It is therefore essential to combine an analysis at the micro-sociological 
level (individual involvement, local situational interactions, etc.) with a 
macro-sociological analysis at the scale of activist networks – that is, of 
the players engaged in the protest arena.
12 Some authors are more attentive to the play between parties and social movements, matters 
of “alliance, cooperation, competition, open conflict” (Luck and Deschezelles, 2011: 13).
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In order to do this, we must move beyond monographic works focused on 
a single party or movement. Instead, we must examine the flux of players at 
work in the protest arena over the medium and long-term and the dynamics 
of activist reconversions and multi-positioning.13 By multi-positioned play-
ers, I mean individuals who occupy leadership positions within one or more 
SMO organizations and simultaneously pursue a political career within a 
party. By activist reconversion, I am referring to the fact that former SMO 
leaders, at the moment of a party’s creation or over the course of its exist-
ence, abandon their activism in an SMO to devote themselves to engagement 
within the party. These two phenomena will be grouped together under 
the term multi-engagement. Such an approach implies varying the levels 
of observation by analyzing the individual activism of players (Auyero, 
2003), “microscopically” observing (Auyero et al., 2008) actors in context (at 
party and SMO meetings, protests, etc.) and understanding the collective 
dynamics that thus emerge at the scale of the protest arena.
The Latin American continent and, in particular, Mexico will serve as 
my terrain of investigation. The argument I develop nevertheless appears 
to be applicable to other conf igurations, particularly those marked by 
processes of political change, as in Arab countries. The nature of relations 
between parties and movements is always complicated. I now turn to an 
example drawn from f ield work conducted in Mexico: an analysis of the 
multi-engagement of leaders of the Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(PRD), a left-wing party created in 1989 in the context of a “democratic 
transition.”
Episodes of Protest and the Construction of Networks of Multi-
Positioned Players
On the basis of data collected by Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman for 
the period 1968-1990 (2000: 12) and consultation of activist sources from 
the 1990s, f ive phases may be identif ied: a long phase starting in the early 
1970s and ending in 1978, during which the main actors were peasants; a 
second phase between 1979 and 1984 focused on economic questions, during 
which the main players were trade unions and independent coordinating 
committees; the 1985-1986 phase concerning the housing question; that of 
1988 on electoral issues; and, f inally, a last phase centered on the Zapatistas 
13 I prefer this term to doble militancia for, as we shall see, players are often engaged in multiple 
arenas. The latter is thus much too narrow.
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and the 1994 economic crisis. I have reconstructed the collective activist 
careers of the leaders of the PRD who held off ice during these phases in 
order to identify variations in themes and arena of engagement via statisti-
cal analysis and the reconstruction of individual career paths (Combes, 
2011).14 In this part of the chapter, I will give attention to the effects of phases 
of mobilization on multi-engagement and thus on the players’ arenas of 
engagement. By way of several examples, I will sketch the trajectory of the 
leaders who entered the PRD following a period of SMO activism.
Guerillas and the Urban Popular Movement
Like nearly everywhere else in the world, 1968 was a watershed year for 
Mexico. As the country prepared to host the Olympic Games, the student 
protest movement seemed a threat to the ruling party. On 2 October 1968, 
the army killed more than 200 students at Mexico City’s Tlatelolco Square. 
Other student demonstrations were violently repressed in the early 1970s. 
In response to the fragmentation and atomization of the 1968 movement, 
guerilla groups flourished across the nation’s territory (Okión Solano and 
García Ugarte, 2006) in rural communities and the outlying neighborhoods 
of the country’s major cities (Eckstein, 1989; Haber, 2006; Tamayo, 1999; 
Bennett, 1998). More generally, activists who went into hiding worked with 
disadvantaged populations, offering literacy courses, free medical attention, 
assistance in land occupation, and help in formulating demands for basic 
services (water, electricity, sewer mains). These efforts helped establish a 
vast oppositional network. Gradually, guerilla operations gave way to efforts 
at aid and politicization. With the legalization of the left and the amnesty 
of the late 1970s, many groups chose to come out of hiding and sometimes 
joined the political game. These players thus switched arenas.
After the 1985 earthquake in Mexico, the process of “democratic transi-
tion” accelerated. Indeed, faced with the government’s inability to assume 
its responsibilities in an emergency situation, requests by victims for imme-
diate aid rapidly transformed into a vast protest movement. Some players, 
many of whom were drawn from the guerilla movement, mobilized the 
SMO networks they had forged during their years underground, becoming 
the main actors of what is known as the Urban Popular Movement (MUP). 
14 In the f irst two chapters of my book, the effects of interactions with the various sectors 
of the state (various agencies and territorial levels) are procedurally analyzed for each of the 
period’s movements. 
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Thanks to them, this movement shifted from a focus on material demands 
to f ighting the single-party state.
Portrait 1
As a student leader in the 1970s in northern Mexico, Marco Rascón15 be-
came involved in the guerilla movement. He participated in multiple land 
occupations and was then imprisoned for having robbed a bank. After 
being freed, he left the north for Mexico City, where he contributed to 
the Point Critique review and began to work in the capital’s working-class 
neighborhoods. After the 1985 earthquake, he created the Asamblea de 
Barrios (Neighborhood Assemblies)16 with other members of the review. 
This became the foremost organization of the Urban Popular Movement 
(MUP). Its spokesman, Superbarrio (Super Neighborhood), a masked 
wrestler (Cadena-Roa, 2002) for whom Rascón served as the intellectual 
inspiration, was the defender of the poor and democracy. He marched at 
the head of the massive protests organized in support of disaster victims, 
led meetings of Asamblea de Barrios and “confronted” the leaders of the PRI 
and the state itself in parody wrestling matches. And of course he always 
got the best of them! He even stated that he would be a candidate in the 
1988 presidential elections but ceded his place to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. 
Rascón actively participated in the candidate’s campaign. When the PRD 
was created, he was a member of the f irst national executive committee. 
While continuing to act as the leader of Asamblea de Barrios, he became 
president of Mexico City’s PRD in 1991. In 1994, he was elected as a federal 
deputy and continued to use the art of parody as a political weapon in 
Congress. In 1997, he was named advisor to Cárdenas. After losing a 1999 
primary bid in Mexico City to become party leader, he withdrew from the 
party’s governing bodies.
The 1986 Student Movement
For the f irst time since the massacres of 1968, students took to the streets 
in 1986 to demonstrate against government measures seeking to establish 
fees and entrance exams at Mexico City’s National Autonomous University 
(UNAM), the breeding ground of politicians and elites since the 1910 Revolu-
tion. The University Students Council (CEU) was born. Broadly supported 
15 Interviews with the author in Mexico City, 1997, 1999, 2000.
16 In particular, with several members of a former guerilla group from the state of Guerrero 
(the ANCR).
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within UNAM by middle- and working-class students alike, the CEU did its 
part to further undermine the legitimacy of the PRI. When Cárdenas an-
nounced his candidacy in the 1988 election, the most prominent CEU leaders 
threw their support behind him and brought an army of activists with them.
Portrait 2
Marti Batres’s engagement17 in the student movement coincided with his 
involvement in a MUP housing rights organization – the Popular Union 
of New Tenochtitlán (UPNT) – whose leader, René Berajano, was a trade 
unionist teacher. As the latter’s heir apparent, Batres quickly became one 
of this influential organization’s leading f igures and created his own move-
ment in the capital. Besides his activism in the domain of housing, he kept a 
foot in the student movement and became PRD president for Benito Juarez, 
Mexico City’s most “middle class” district. He was elected as a local deputy 
in the aftermath of Cárdenas’s victory in 1997. His “organization-movement” 
was the largest parliamentary group of the PRD, which itself held a large 
majority in the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District. Batres became 
its president at the age of 32. Elected as a federal deputy, he became head of 
the PRD’s parliamentary group three years later. In 2005, he was elected to 
the head of the PRD in Mexico City and, from 2006, was “secretary of social 
development,” one of the most important “ministries” of the Government 
of the Federal District (GDF). In 2012, he left the PRD with a number of the 
historical leaders who had come from the social movements and followed 
López Obrador in the creation of a “party-movement,” MORENA, which 
holds more oppositional positions than the PRD (Combes, 2012).
The tentative beginnings of the “democratic transition” in the late 1970s 
and the politicization of social struggles in the 1980s thus helped create 
favorable conditions for the partisan engagement of certain SMO players 
during the creation of the PRD, increasing the number of arenas in which 
they were active.
Comings and Goings between Party and Movements
As illustrated by the career of Gerardo Fernández Noroña, several move-
ments that emerged after the creation of the PRD also gave rise to comings 
and goings between arenas.
17 Interviews with the author in Mexico City, January 1999.
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Portrait 3
Born in Mexico City in 1960, Gerardo Fernández Noroña18 def ines himself 
as a “social and political leader driven by great passions and a controversial 
f igure.”19 A graduate in political sociology from the Metropolitan Autono-
mous University, he worked for several years at the Mexican Social Security 
Institute (1985-1992). In 1988, he was “noticed” (in his words) by the Mexican 
Socialist Party for his work at the head of a neighborhood SMO. Though 
he did not belong to the party, he became its candidate in his district’s 
legislative elections. Gerardo joined the PRD upon its creation a year later. 
He rapidly climbed the rungs of the party’s regional leadership and, in 
1992, became president of the PRD for the State of Mexico. In 1994, though 
only 34 years old, he launched a primary campaign for the Senate, winning 
the internal party elections, which were challenged and then nullif ied. 
Gerardo persisted and became persona non grata in the PRD. A professional 
politician since 1992, he found himself without resources: he separated from 
his companion, herself a member of the PRD. The latter kept their beautiful 
apartment and gave him a taxi, which, according to him, became his only 
resource. Indebted, he found himself caught, like many Mexicans, in the 
spiral of increasing interest rates. Gerardo then decided to create his own 
organization for debtors’ insurgency (Williams, 2001): the Citizen Assembly 
of Bank Debtors.
While the scale of his organization remained small, it quickly acquired 
some notoriety and benef ited from large-scale media coverage thanks 
to the spectacular nature and varied repertory of the actions it carried 
out: activists intentionally throwing themselves under the wheels of the 
presidential car, festive happenings, theater plays based on the popular 
myths and rumors of the moment20 and so on. Gerardo Fernández Noroña 
adopted and transformed the heritage of the Urban Popular Movement 
(Haber, 2006). Starting in 1998, he also created a taxi union and, once again, 
organized a series of spectacular actions, including the total occupation 
of Mexico City’s central square by taxis. On the strength of his success in 
organizing protest action, Gerardo Fernández Noroña once again set off to 
conquer the PRD. Thanks to the legitimacy he had re-acquired through his 
protest activity, Gerardo regained his place in the PRD. For several years, he 
occupied various posts of responsibility in party bodies before once again 
resigning from the party in December 2007 to become more fully involved 
18 Interviews with Gerardo Fernández Noroña, Mexico City, 1999 and 2000.
19 CV of Gerardo Fernández Noroña, archives of the PRD.
20 Personal archives of Gerardo Fernández Noroña.
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in the “Popular Economy Defense Movement.” In 2012, he, like Marti Batres, 
joined the López Obrador “party-movement” MORENA (Combes, 2012).
This example of an individual career shows that, in addition to multi-
positioning and the redeployment of social leaders within the party, players 
come and go between the PRD and SMOs. Yet, as we shall see later, these 
comings and goings are only viable to the degree that access to the party 
remains open. More generally, these trajectories also show that interactions 
between SMOs and parties depend on the conjunction of a multiplicity 
of factors: variables proper to the activist careers of actors (biographical 
considerations including private life, age or diff iculties of the activist life, 
etc.) (Fillieule, 2001); global conjunctural variables, such as the emergence 
of a large-scale social movement or, as we have seen above, the reactions 
of particular state sectors at the local level as well as those of federal and 
national states; and, f inally, considerations proper to particular domains 
(electoral, economic, social policies, etc.). The mobilization or reactivation 
of networks that we observe does not arise mechanically but depends on 
the convergence of these conjunctural factors. It is thus only by means 
of a precise analysis of the players’ goals that one may understand their 
involvement in one or more arenas.
The Networks of the “Partisan Milieu”
What’s more, the PRD leaders’ involvement in multiple arenas of protest 
allows us to understand the formation of a “partisan milieu”: that is, “the 
collection of consolidated relations between groups whose members’ prin-
cipal aim is not necessarily to participate in the construction of a party, 
though they in fact contribute to it by their activity” (Sawicki, 1997: 24).
The shift from social movement engagement to partisan engagement 
clearly does not result from the simple co-optation of players but rather from 
the completion of an activist phase that is reflected in the demobilization 
of the movement’s members and, as a consequence, the “migration” of a 
generation of players toward a given arena or new structure (in this case, a 
party). Yet very often leaders or activists continue their campaigns, though 
less actively, in SMOs or at least maintain ties with these organizations. 
They are thus multi-engaged, as shown by the three portraits above of 
social movement leaders. In order to grasp this phenomenon, we must 
consider, not a given movement in isolation, but rather long-term episodes 
in order to understand the passage of entire generations of players from one 
arena to another. What remains to be understood is the manner in which 
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the presence of social movement players affects a party: How did players 
coming from SMOs shape the organizations they captured or constructed?
Table 2.1  The Non-Partisan Engagements of National, Regional, and Local Leaders 
of the PRD between 1968 and 199721
phase 
1968-1977 
(pop. = 93)
phase 
1978-1984 
(pop. = 198)
phase 
1985-1988 
(pop. = 293)
phase 
1989-1993 
(pop. = 313)
phase 
1994-1997 
(pop. = 223)
Student rights 59% 9% 7% 11% 11.5%
peasant rights 24% 17% 12% 12% 9.5%
teacher trade 
unionism
8.5% 15% 9% 8% 9.5%
private sector 
trade unionism
8.5% 7.5% 4% 3% 2.5%
housing rights 9.5% 14.5% 16% 21% 27%
human rights – – – 6% 4%
Gender 
equality 
– – – 4% 8.5%
electoral fraud 
reduction
– – – 13% 16%
Indigenous 
rights
– – – 5% 14.5%
Zapatism – – – – 27%
others* 38.5% 28% 26% 28.5% 4%
none 6.5% 36.5% 41.5% 34% 4%
Source: Database established on the basis of the cVs of primary candidates for parliamentary 
election (proportional) and a survey conducted at the april 2001 congress of Zacatecas
Partisan Arenas Shaped by SMO Players
The Supervision of Activists
Depending on the circumstances, the activities promoted by SMOs take 
either an SMO or partisan form. While SMO activists do not directly 
participate in the activities of the party’s local committees, their meetings 
are largely devoted to the activities of the PRD. The conduct of meetings of 
the Asamblea de Barrios (Marco Rascón’s organization – Portrait 1) nicely 
21 The analysis of activism has been carried out in terms of the f ive principal phases of 
mobilization identif ied for this period.
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illustrates the imbrication of the life of the movement with partisan life, 
as indicated by the following ethnographic description:
It is 4 p.m. on a Saturday in January. Many activists are unable to enter 
the conference room of the Asamblea de Barrios of the Romero Rubio 
neighborhood: the room is full, with around 200 people in attendance. 
Several families have come but most there are women accompanied by 
their children. The women are between 25 and 50 years old and talk in 
small groups. Very quickly, my presence draws attention and an off icial 
asks me to join her at a table at the back of the room facing the activists. The 
meeting begins. I am asked to say a few words to explain my presence to the 
activists. Then the heads of a series of committees give updates regarding 
their activities. There are as many committees as there are problems in 
the neighborhood and these are discussed one after the next: childcare in 
vacation periods, free access to eyeglasses for old people, gender relation 
workshops and of course issues of security. Once the committees have 
f inished their reports, the follow up on housing requests is addressed. 
Several leaders detail the progress of case f iles, the activists concerned, 
meetings with creditors. Then nearly 45 minutes are devoted to PRD 
news: there is an update on its positions concerning political reform and 
important elections in several states of the federation, relations with the 
PAN are mentioned as well as the legislative agenda. Several words are 
then said concerning the municipal council of Mexico City, which was won 
by the PRD a year and a half earlier: the speaker focuses his intervention 
on “the media’s campaign of harassment” against the Government of the 
Federal District (GDF – municipal council of Mexico City), calls upon the 
activists of Asamblea de Barrios to not let themselves be fooled and asks 
them to explain the real situation to their neighbors. Several minutes follow 
on the internal life of the party: the internal elections that will soon take 
place and the possibilities of alliance for Asamblea de Barrios. Finally, 
the activists are encouraged to participate in activities – participation 
in a demonstration, the dispatch of supplies – intended to support the 
Zapatistas (January 1999).
In the course of their internal meetings, social organizations thus see to 
tasks that traditionally fall to lower-level party committees. The PRD ap-
paratus can thus carry out its more routine activities with a reduced number 
of off icials and call upon PRD activists within the NSO – kept abreast of the 
party’s agenda – when the need arises. As one leader remarked, “without 
strong participation in demonstrations [organized by the PRD] on the part 
of social organization activists, we would have been unable to maintain the 
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pace of mobilization.”22 As Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg (2002: 
266) note, “the task of the party organization does not require that each 
member is heavily active and the activity of those who remain [active] has 
increased signif icantly. Political parties have clearly adapted to the greater 
volatility of their environment by enlarging their grassroots organizations, 
even if the foundations of their membership base have shrunk.” The SMOs 
of the PRD’s “partisan milieu” offer a f lexible and “enlarged base.” This 
mode of operation allows rapid adjustment to changing circumstances. For 
example, social organizations with leaders such as Marco Rascón, Marti 
Batres, or Genaro Fernández Noroña can rapidly mobilize hundreds of 
activists for demonstrations.
SMOs thus play a fundamental role in supervising the PRD’s “base.” This 
phenomenon can be observed in many Latin American countries. In its 
f irst years of existence, for example, Bolivia’s MAS Party did not develop a 
party infrastructure and used associative and trade union premises for its 
activities (Do Alto and Stefanoni, 2006).
Party Operation
Does the activist origin of its members affect the internal organization 
of a political party? How does it influence party operation? As some au-
thors have underscored, parties issued from social movements have often 
imported the latter’s organizational models. European green parties, for 
example, have insisted on the place accorded their movement’s heritage in 
internal party organization, with a strong emphasis on the forms of direct 
or “discursive” democracy present in the “new social movements” (Faucher, 
1999: 215-242). Heavily influenced by the experience of these movements, 
they have also often developed a discourse concerning verticality, consen-
sus, and the struggle against the leadership. And, as in the movements, the 
effort to put such principles into practice has obviously come up against 
many diff iculties. Moreover, these parties place little emphasis on internal 
discipline – no doubt a reflection of the institution’s relatively weak control 
over activists – and institutional loyalty is weak within them. Repeated (and 
often widely reported) episodes of internal conflict are the result. Does this 
hold for Mexico’s PRD as well?
As was the case of European green parties, a discussion regarding demo-
cratic procedures took place within the PRD. In 1993, or four years after 
22 Series of interviews with Agustín Guerrero, Secretary General of the PRD-DF, off ice of the 
PRD-DF, May 2000.
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the birth of the PRD, the party decided to adopt “open” internal elections 
to select candidates for elected off ice and party leaders at all levels (from 
municipal to national). All members of the PRD were allowed to participate 
in these elections, which took place, not in party premises, but rather in 
public spaces (squares, parks, on the street). While such an approach is 
today commonplace, this was not so in the 1990s (Pennings and Hazan, 
2001). In 1996, this procedure was expanded to all Mexican citizens with 
voter identif ication, with participating voters automatically considered as 
aff iliated with the PRD. In 1996, for example, 358,244 activists / voters par-
ticipated in elections for the party’s national leadership. In 1999, that f igure 
had risen to 650,000 and, in 2002, 900,000 turned out to vote. In the debates 
that accompanied the implementation of these elections, multi-positioned 
players such as Marco Rascón, Marti Batres, and Genaro Fernández Noroña 
seem to have played a decisive role in the choice of this mode of opera-
tion. This is shown by the archives of the party governing bodies (national 
council, national executive committee) and the texts of the congress that 
approved these reforms. My attention was focused on the then emerging 
party norm (and so as much on the debates, negotiations, adjustments 
between players as on the texts that were f inally adopted). These players 
perceived internal elections as a way of maintaining the ties between the 
PRD and the SMOs of the party milieu. Indeed, the internal operation of 
the SMOs allowed them to mobilize resources that could be reinvested in 
the internal workings of the party. Most SMOs have ways to strongly inspire 
voting by their members. For example, SMOs that receive state credits for 
the construction of social housing (Haber, 2006) use a points system to 
establish an order of priority for access to these highly coveted resources, 
with points attributed on the basis of member participation in party events, 
such as protests, meetings, and some of the PRD’s internal elections, as I 
observed by following the SMO activities of Marco Rascón (Portrait 1) and 
Marti Batres (Portrait 2). I cannot here enter into the complex debate over 
clientelism, which I have addressed elsewhere (Combes and Bey, 2010). Very 
schematically, it can be said that I share Javier Auyero and Pablo Lapegna’s 
concern to avoid contrasting clientelism with collective action (Auyero et 
al., 2009), as is often the case in the literature. Going beyond Javier Auyero’s 
position (Auyero, 2000), which in particular analyzes clientelism in terms 
of symbolic domination, I subscribe to the position staked out by Julieta 
Quirós in her excellent book El porque de los que van (2011), which calls for 
“an anthropology of politics as it is experienced.”
This mode of selection favored multi-positioned players in the competition 
to become a candidate for elected off ice: faced with the leader of a housing 
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rights association such as Marti Batres (Portrait 2), who enjoys a strong 
foothold in his district and is capable of mobilizing association activists, even 
a nationally recognized intellectual who played a fundamental role in the 
debate over democratization has no chance of winning an internal election. 
In 1997, for example, 90 percent of the PRD’s local Mexico City deputies 
came from SMOs. The significant place occupied by Marti Batres’s SMO and 
its status as a powerful current in the party partly explains how the latter 
became president of Mexico City’s local legislature when only 32 years old. 
These players, however, do not have the same social and gender profiles as 
other PRD leaders: most have a working-class background (sons of workers 
or peasants) and have very often benefited from significant social promotion 
thanks to the expansion of university access in the 1960s and 70s.23 Women 
also generally became involved in activism by way of SMOs (particularly 
those associated with the urban movement), which explains the relatively 
important representation of women in the PRD compared to other parties.
Transferring Resources and Know-How
Internal struggles over party construction can sometimes advantage the 
resources and activist know-how specif ic to SMOs over more traditional 
party resources (legislative knowledge, negotiation experience, national 
and sometimes international standing in the f ields of politics and the 
media, bureaucratic competence, and so on). The leaders’ origin in protest 
movements explains their recourse to a repertory originating in the social 
movement tradition. Paul Almeida presents this as one of the criteria of 
partyism: the use of social movement-type strategies (e.g., disruptive actions 
and street demonstrations) to mobilize party members and other groups 
to achieve social movement goals (2010, 174).
In the Mexican case, the SMOs’ presence in working-class neighborhoods, 
strong capacity for mobilizing activists and sympathizers, and experi-
ence organizing protests (demonstrations, various forms of resisting the 
“repression” of local authorities, etc.) all contribute to the influence they 
enjoy within parties in these struggles. In the hands of leaders who are 
less well-equipped in social and academic terms, however, these resources 
are the object of a permanent campaign of delegitimization, with political 
opponents accusing them of incompetence and, above all, clientelism. 
Many SMO leaders who enter the political arena experience this form 
23 I devote a chapter of my work to the specif ic question of social capital by activist origin 
(Combes, 2011: ch. 5).
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of delegitimization. As in the Mexican case, they generally come from a 
working-class background, unlike other politicians. As an example, one 
may here cite the leaders of Bolivia’s MAS Party. After becoming deputies, 
they were criticized as incompetent due to their low level of educational 
attainment and their failure to master the Spanish language. Yet despite 
this stigmatization, a new political generation issued from SMOs sometimes 
succeeds in asserting itself in the political arena.
Table 2.2  Arenas and the Resource Transfers of Multi-Positioned Players
Arena Type of Exchange
From social movement to party activists
protest experiences
territorial presence
material resources
From party to movement advice
Jobs
Symbolic remuneration
material resources
This table summarizes the various exchanges that can take place between 
parties and social movements by way of multi-positioned leaders. These 
exchanges are generally local, one-off and strongly depend on the fluctuat-
ing ties between collective players and individuals and sometimes even 
interpersonal relations. These ties also show signif icant variation over 
time. For example, during periods of electoral victory, parties distribute 
jobs and resources (material, pamphlets, posters, etc.) sporadically or en 
masse to multi-positioned players. In periods of electoral retreat, the latter 
can once again become paid SMO employees. Every evolution of the context 
entails a repositioning of players within the various arena and sometimes 
renegotiation of the terms of the relationship.
Yet, it should be specif ied that, in order to understand the implantation 
of social movement leaders in the party, I have chosen to take an approach 
that differs from the social movement institutionalization one. In this sense, 
my analysis allows us to move beyond certain limits inherent to the analysis 
of social movement institutionalization by showing how activists, despite 
(or because of) the institutionalization of their movement, experience very 
diverse trajectories24: some become involved in another movement; others 
24 See, for example, the case of the Freedom Summer (McAdam, 1988).
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become party or administrative personnel; for yet others, a more or less 
extended period in formal politics is at some point followed by renewed 
involvement in protest. By shifting our focus from the movement to activists 
and by placing their activism in a long-term context – that of an entire 
career of activism rather than solely the period of participation in a single 
movement – the institutionalization of a mobilization no longer appears as 
the end of activism but instead as a transformation of involvement opening 
the way to a wide variety of individual trajectories.
By Way of Conclusion: Conceiving Multi-Engagement in Terms of 
Cycles
To emphasize interactions between SMOs and parties and insist on the 
importance of multi-positioned actors is to swim, in part, against the 
current. At a time when some authors see a disconnect between political 
parties and “civil society” (Katz and Mair, 1994; 1995), it is tempting to study 
parties independently of their social and activist environments. The issue 
at stake is thus to conceive of the party-movement relationship in its full 
continuum. This can be done by bringing the contributions of two particular 
approaches to bear on the question: what are known as the contentious 
politics approach and the societal approach to political parties. These are 
attentive to the social and activist characteristics of the players and their 
interactions on the ground.
We must also break with the approach that consists of focusing on 
organizations (whether social movement or party) in order to attend to 
the long-term trajectories of multi-positioned players. The value of doing 
so is only revealed once we have moved beyond monographic studies on 
a given movement or party taken in isolation and revealed the dynamics 
at work in the political and protest arenas and the complex multiplicity of 
exchanges that take place there according to the various episodes of protest 
and arenas (political, protest, local, national, etc.).
Multi-engagement develops through episodes of protest, interaction 
with certain state sectors and the political reconfiguration of relations be-
tween institutional spheres and protest spaces. In order to achieve a global 
understanding of these phenomena, we must not stop at some arbitrary 
moment or in the midst of a sequence of mobilization. Rather, we must 
focus on “long” periods corresponding, at the very least, to the duration of 
an activist career. Such an approach profits from being combined with an 
ethnographic analysis of engagement, that is, the observation of players 
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on the ground in order to understand how their games and experiences 
(Quirós, 2011) vary according to the places in which they f ind themselves, 
their emotions, and the actors with whom they interact.
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3 Political Parties and Legislators
An American Perspective
Katherine Krimmel
“I have a vision and you are a part of it.” On 18 May 1992 at the Palace 
Theatre in Los Angeles, then-Governor Bill Clinton memorialized an 
enormous success for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) 
movement. Clinton was the f irst presidential candidate ever to openly 
support the LGBT community and actively seek their votes, and his cam-
paign marked the beginning of what has become a high-prof ile alliance 
between the LGBT movement and the Democratic Party. In exchange for 
this historic support, LGBT voters donated almost $4 million to Clinton’s 
1992 campaign and favored him 80 percent to 20 percent on election day. 
Within a year, however, the vision appeared to fade, as Clinton receded 
from his campaign promise to issue an executive order lifting the ban on 
military service for LGBT individuals. His “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t 
Pursue” proposal, offered as a “compromise” between the LGBT movement 
and its opponents, was lambasted by movement leaders, journalists, 
and grassroots activists who expected more from their White House 
ally. Torrie Osborn, Executive Director of the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force, characterized the alleged compromise as a “repackaging of 
discrimination,” and Tim McFeeley of the Human Rights Campaign Fund 
publicly lamented the “shattering disappointment for millions of gay, 
lesbian and bisexual Americans” (Rimmerman, 1996: 119; Los Angeles 
Times, 1993).
From one angle, this story is banal – a presidential candidate winks and 
smiles to gain support, and then fails to honor a campaign promise once 
in off ice. From another angle, though, it raises important questions about 
the relationship between political parties and social movements. Social 
movement scholars often explain policy outcomes with reference to “elite 
allies.” That is, movements are more likely to succeed when they have allies 
in powerful positions. According to the strong version of this argument, elite 
allies are necessary for movements to achieve policy change. According to 
weaker versions, elite allies merely increase the possibility of policy change 
(Soule and King, 2006: 1882). This intuition makes sense – movements 
should be more likely to achieve their policy goals when they have friends 
in high places. But, how do they acquire such allies? If we think about social 
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movements as political outsiders attempting to influence political insiders, 
then an elite ally is as much a consequence as a cause of movement success.
To understand how and why movements might develop elite allies, we 
must examine lawmakers’ goals and strategies. What do they want, and how 
might movements appeal to them? A simple and pessimistic answer to this 
question would be that politicians care primarily about raising money for 
their campaigns. This would not be good news for most social movements, 
which generally cannot compete f inancially with other special interest 
groups. But money is not the only thing that matters. Movements can ap-
peal to lawmakers directly by offering other resources, like information 
and assistance with electoral mobilization, and indirectly by influencing 
their constituents’ views on issues. These kinds of actions can heighten 
lawmakers’ incentives to become movement allies.
Forging relationships is not the end of the story, since elite allies are not 
guaranteed to support any particular bill. As the LGBT case demonstrates, 
the relationship between movements and their “allies” can be complicated. 
In popular and scholarly discourse, social movement battles are often 
depicted as f ights between movements and countermovements (e.g., pro-
life versus pro-choice, gun rights versus gun control, etc.). I argue that 
these conflicts, while certainly not meaningless, are often secondary to 
the battles between movements and their own allies. This is true even 
if the movement has “picked sides” in party politics, giving them a more 
politically homogenous coalition of allies. From a policy perspective, the 
position of a movement in relation to its party and other movements within 
the same partisan camp matters at least as much as its position vis-à-vis its 
opposition. Even the most liberal government can only produce so much 
liberal policy. It would be very diff icult, for example, for the Democratic 
Party in the United States to enact pro-environment, pro-women’s rights, 
pro-worker’s rights, and pro-LGBT rights laws in one presidential term, let 
alone one session of Congress. Gathering support for any one bill requires 
lawmakers to spend political capital. Each progressive policy also makes 
the government appear more liberal in the eyes of voters. To avoid running 
out of capital and moving too far from the median voter, even a Democratic 
Party highly committed to all of its progressive allies’ causes will need to 
pick and choose which issues to prioritize.
Hence, it is not especially surprising that movements’ ability to negotiate 
with their allies seems to vary over time. Most if not all social movements 
experience ups and downs in their relationships with elected off icials, even 
those with whom they have relatively strong alliances. Once a movement ac-
quires an ally, it faces the separate task of getting its ally to act on its behalf. 
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This challenge has an additional dimension in a collective decision-making 
body, like a legislature. If the movement’s ally is an individual or small group 
of legislators, then she (or they) face the additional task of persuading her 
(or their) colleagues to support the cause. This helps to explain why social 
movements often do not get what they want, even during the seemingly 
auspicious periods when their ally party controls the government.
To better understand these dynamics, I will discuss parties and legisla-
tures as sites of political decision making. What kinds of arenas are they? 
How do their rules and norms empower and constrain their own members, 
as well as their movement allies? Addressing these questions will provide a 
sense of the opportunities and challenges facing movements with legislative 
goals. This analysis is based primarily on observations about American 
parties and the United States Congress, a bicameral legislature in a two-
party system with single-member districts and winner-take-all elections. 
Some of the dynamics described herein may be different for systems with 
other characteristics. Nevertheless, this can serve as a starting point for 
thinking about the kinds of dilemmas social movements may face in their 
interactions with parties and lawmakers.
Parties (and Movements) in Government, as Organizations, and 
in the Electorate
Key (1964) argues that parties are not single entities. In other words, there 
is not simply one arena called “the party.” Rather, there is the party in gov-
ernment, the party as organization, and the party in the electorate. When 
people claim parties have become weak in the United States, they are often 
referring to parties in the electorate. More people identify as independents 
today than earlier in American history. When people claim parties are too 
strong in the United States, they are often referring to parties in government, 
as party line voting has reached historic levels. Aldrich (1995) reinforces 
the utility of this tripartite framework in his highly influential book, Why 
Parties?, though he prefers a third category of parties in elections to parties 
in the electorate. Either way, parties are better understood by distinguishing 
the arenas in which they operate. Each has its own set of norms, routines, 
and players.
The same is true for social movements. Just as Key and Aldrich note that 
parties are complex organizations that cannot be understood fully on one 
plane, so are movements. Indeed, I have argued that we can use the same 
tripartite framework commonly used to study parties to analyze social 
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movements and other special interest groups (Krimmel 2013). Like parties, 
many movements want to appeal to some portion of the electorate for 
support. This aid could be f inancial (e.g., donating money to the organiza-
tion) or non-f inancial (e.g., joining a protest or becoming a member). If we 
wanted to measure movement strength in the electorate, we could look to 
see what percentage of the electorate belongs to the movement or has ever 
participated in one of the movement’s efforts. At the broadest level, we could 
even use survey data to see how many people sympathize with the move-
ment’s positions. To measure social movement strength in government, 
we could consider how many movement actors occupy positions of power, 
or how often movement leaders are invited to decision-making tables in 
the legislative or executive branches. From another angle, we could also 
consider the extent to which government off icials support the movement’s 
goals. To measure organizational strength, we could look at the movement’s 
f inancial resources, as well as its level of professionalization (e.g., staff size, 
number of off ices, etc.).
Just as with parties, we may get very different pictures of movement 
strength in these three arenas. The challenges that movements face in each 
of these arenas will also differ. To fully understand movements’ relation-
ships to parties, it would be valuable to analyze their interaction within 
and between all three spheres. They may have overlapping goals and/or 
resources in one or more spheres. For example, both may want to convince 
the electorate of a certain policy position, or f igure out how to reach a 
particular group of voters, or tackle a specif ic policy problem. The size of 
the overlap between parties and groups will vary across groups, over time, 
and between arenas.
This piece will focus primarily on parties in government, and even more 
specifically on parties in the legislature. To understand movements’ interac-
tions with parties in this arena, we need to consider lawmakers’ goals, the 
strategies they typically employ, and the means available to them in these 
pursuits.
Legislators’ Goals, Strategies, and Means
We can begin with the obvious but still critical observation that politi-
cians care very much about winning elections. David Mayhew’s classic 
1974 book, Congress: The Electoral Connection, starts with the assumption 
that Congressmen are motivated solely by re-election. While this may be 
an exaggeration, it turns out to be a useful one. For, even if politicians 
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have other aims, like the enactment of particular policies, electoral success 
is a proximate goal. Aldrich seconds the importance of this observation, 
claiming that we must understand the re-election goals of party members 
in order to understand their behavior.
Despite the unquestionable importance of elections, other goals deserve 
some attention as well. Key, among others, notes that while re-election may 
be parties’ main concern, they often have policy goals as well (Key, 1942: 
244). Policy interests may stem from personal or constituent policy prefer-
ences, or both. Member of Congress also care about reputations – both their 
own, and their institution’s. Mayhew (1974) argues that members of Congress 
value the legislative branch’s status and work to protect it (though not 
always successfully, as deteriorating public approval of Congress indicates). 
One might also hope that off iceholders care about effective governance. 
Here, however, I will focus on electioneering and policy making because 
they are the two most widely accepted goals in the American Congress 
literature. Moreover, pursuing the goals of reputation maintenance and 
good governance would require many of the same strategies and resources 
as the goals of re-election and policy making.
Members of Congress tend to employ three strategies to achieve their 
goals: advertising, position-taking, and credit-claiming (Mayhew 1974). 
Advertising is meant to increase name recognition and build a positive 
image for a candidate. These kinds of efforts are very general, and do not 
involve substance (i.e., issues). Examples include appearing on television, 
shaking hands with constituents outside grocery stores, and attending 
community parades and other events. These types of activities get (or keep) 
the candidate on people’s radar, and can make them more likely to support 
her on election day.
More substantive efforts fall into the second and third categories of 
position-taking and credit-claiming. As its name indicates, position-taking 
involves public statements on issues. These can be rhetorical (e.g., giving a 
speech at a town hall meeting, debating an issue on the floor of Congress, 
etc.) or behavioral (e.g., casting a roll-call vote in support of the issue). 
While these strategies may seem obvious, they are not costless. Indeed, 
researching what issues their constituents want them to address in speeches 
and what positions they should take on roll-call votes can require a great 
deal of time and resources (Krehbiel, 1991).
Credit-claiming, as its name suggests, involves taking credit for “particular-
ized benefits” secured for constituents (Mayhew, 1974). This requires many of 
the same resources as position-taking, since members of Congress will need 
to know what their constituents want. However, it also requires a certain 
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degree of successful action beyond simply casting a roll-call vote. They 
might need to add something to the budget or pass a piece of legislation. This 
requires skills in coalition-building and navigating Congress’s labyrinthine 
rules, norms, and routines. Building coalitions on controversial issues may 
require particularly intense persuasion. In this pursuit, it can be valuable for 
members of Congress to have incentives (e.g., campaign donations, endorse-
ments, and so on) to offer their colleagues in exchange for their support.
Coalition-building is also important outside the halls of Congress. To win 
elections, lawmakers need to undertake the additional strategy of mobiliza-
tion. Of course, the three strategies outlined above (advertising, position-
taking, and credit-claiming) may indirectly contribute to electioneering 
efforts; however, candidates still need to intensify their direct mobilization 
activities leading up to an election. Approval is worthless if the candidate’s 
constituents do not go to the polls. Campaigning requires money, volunteers, 
and communication networks to promote the candidate and get out the vote.
Social movements can appeal to parties’ electoral interests by helping 
them carry out these strategies. Mass-based membership organizations 
should be especially adept at mobilization. They can also aid parties by 
gathering information about their members and helping parties understand 
how to appeal to them. These are signif icant non-monetary resources that 
groups can offer parties. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that their 
value may vary over time as electoral contexts change. They are likely to 
be especially precious when elections are very competitive. This helps to 
explain how movements might acquire elite allies, especially those who are 
not ideologically predisposed to support the movement’s cause.
The need for movement resources may vary across countries and over 
time. Highly professionalized legislatures, like the United States Congress, 
can gather more of their own information than less professionalized 
legislatures, for example. When they are more self-suff icient, their need 
for assistance from social movements may be reduced. There are many 
ways to evaluate professionalization. One key measure is staff size. A large 
staff can assist a legislator in reading bills and researching their potential 
consequences for constituents. Two other important measures of profes-
sionalization are compensation and number of days in session. These are 
often related. Today, salaries are high enough that legislators in many na-
tions (and even subnational units) can devote themselves full-time to their 
positions. If compensation is meager, however, lawmakers may maintain 
others jobs in the public or private sector during their terms. Historically, 
this was often the case for American state legislators. Part-time legislators 
may need to rely more on informational shortcuts and outside assistance, 
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which may provide opportunities for movements to build relationships 
with them. Legislatures whose members are part-time may also meet for 
shorter sessions than legislatures comprised of full-time members. With 
more intense time constraints, part-time legislators may be more likely to 
turn to social movements and others outside the state for assistance.
Providing resources that could assist lawmakers with the tasks of 
advertising, position-taking, credit-claiming, and mobilizing voters can 
help movements acquire and maintain allies in the legislature. The next 
important question is, if lawmakers are willing to support a social move-
ment’s goals, what means do they have to do so? There are many options 
available to lawmakers, and they require different levels of commitment. At 
the simplest level, they could vote in favor of a movement’s bill (or against 
a bill the movement opposes, depending on the situation). This does not 
require much effort, though it could be used against the lawmaker in a 
campaign. That someone caters to “special interests” is a common charge 
raised against incumbents by electoral challengers. Lawmakers could also 
introduce a bill on behalf of a movement. This requires a greater commit-
ment, since it more closely identif ies the lawmaker with the movement’s 
goals, and also involves some work in drafting or at least reviewing the 
movement’s bill. As discussed below, however, introducing a bill is only the 
f irst step in a long policy process. Most bills introduced in Congress never 
even reach a vote, let alone pass. The third and arguably strongest means 
at a lawmaker’s disposal is his power to persuade his colleagues to support 
the movement’s bill. He might offer his support for another bill of interest to 
his colleagues in exchange for their support on the movement’s bill. In lieu 
of, or in addition to, support on another bill, the lawmaker could also offer 
campaign assistance. If she is a well-known, senior member of Congress, 
she could offer to endorse a lesser-known member or provide fundraising 
assistance. She might also deliver a speech on the f loor of Congress to 
persuade others to support the movement’s bill. These actions require more 
investment from lawmakers, so they are likely to be employed only by 
strongly committed allies.
Challenges to Movements’ Success in the Legislative Arena
Even the most dedicated allies encounter major hurdles in achieving legisla-
tive goals, however. I will review some of the most signif icant constraints 
faced by parties and legislators, which can turn into challenges for social 
movements as well. The f irst is related to time, which is always scarce in a 
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busy legislature like the United States Congress. Members, and the issues 
for which they advocate, must compete with one another for access to the 
agenda. Other limitations stem from hierarchy. That is, newer members of 
Congress typically have less power than more senior members of Congress. 
Still other limitations are inherent to deliberative bodies like legislatures. 
Unlike in the executive branch, where the president can make many deci-
sions unilaterally, legislatures engage in collective decision making. Policy 
success requires considerable coordination and cooperation, and there 
are many opportunities for obstruction. An important factor influencing 
social movements’ legislative success will be the number and nature of veto 
players in the system. This can vary from legislature to legislature. Even if 
a majority of lawmakers support a social movement’s goal (or any bill, for 
that matter), a small minority of their colleagues – or, in some cases, even 
a single member – may be able to obstruct efforts to achieve that goal. 
Navigating these different constraints can be frustrating, since the best 
strategy for overcoming one of them may not work well for another. This 
tension can create dilemmas for social movements.
We can begin with time constraints. Collecting “yays” and “nays” is not 
the biggest challenge facing social movements in a busy legislature. Rather, 
the most formidable hurdle for most bills involves getting through House 
committees to reach a vote in the f irst place. After someone introduces 
a bill in the House of Representatives, the Speaker directs it to one of the 
chamber’s many committees for review. To receive consideration from 
the full body, the bill must be reported back to the floor from its assigned 
committee. An overwhelming majority of bills never reach this stage. With 
many bills to consider, committees cannot even hold hearings on all of 
them, let alone revise or vote to send them all to the f loor. Of the 2,967 
bills introduced in the House of Representatives in 2012, for example, only 
335 were reported from committees to the floor (US Senate, 2013). Thus, 
movements face powerful gatekeepers at this stage of the legislative process. 
Committees’ ability to stymie progress gives them leverage in negotiations 
over bills’ substance as well.
Committee leadership was a key factor leading to what Katznelson has 
called the Southern “structural veto” in Congress, which frustrated gains 
for labor and civil rights activists in the early to mid-twentieth century 
(Katznelson, 2005; Farhang and Katznelson, 2005). Because one-party rule 
and disenfranchisement of African-Americans led to non-competitive 
elections in the South, members of Congress from this region had longer 
tenures than their non-Southern brethren, who faced more competitive 
elections. Because seniority is a key factor inf luencing the selection of 
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committee leaders, Southern legislators controlled a signif icant percentage 
of the committee system before the civil rights revolution and Republican 
realignment of the region. This gave Southerners power to shape as well as 
obstruct the progression of legislation. Though Southern Democrats agreed 
to support some labor legislation, they would not approve anything that 
could threaten the region’s racial hierarchy. Farhang and Katznelson note, 
“In light of their racialized, low-wage, mostly agrarian political economy, 
they insisted on occupational exclusions, leaving agricultural and domestic 
labor, the most widespread black categories of employment, outside the 
ken of legislative protection and empowerment” (Farhang and Katznelson, 
2005: 6-7). Powerful committee leadership both slowed the enactment of 
progressive legislation, and also limited its breadth.
As the nation has become larger and more complex, legislative workload 
has increased, and competition for agenda space has become even more 
f ierce. Figure 3.1 uses data from Adler and Wilkerson’s Congressional Bills 
Project to show the percentage of bills introduced in each year from 1947 to 
2002 that get reported out of committee, and, secondarily, the percentage 
that pass.1 It is fairly clear from this graph that reaching the f loor is the 
primary challenge in contemporary American politics; the gap between bills 
introduced and reported is much larger than the gap between bills reported 
and passed. The challenge has intensif ied over time, as the percentage of 
bills reported from committee fell from a little under 20 percent in the late 
1940s to roughly 8 to 12 percent in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Of course, 
the perceived chance of passage may influence the decision to release a 
bill from committee. Nevertheless, getting on the agenda appears to be 
the foremost challenge; once a bill reaches a vote, it has a good chance of 
passing the House.
The question, then, is how movements can motivate legislators to prior-
itize their issues. In the United States House of Representatives and other 
legislative chambers with strong committee systems, having allies on key 
committees of interest to the movement is very important. A majority 
of the House might support a particular farm bill, for example; but, the 
committee to which the bill was sent could prevent them from expressing 
their support by refusing to release the bill from committee. A farming 
movement pushing this bill would benef it greatly from having allies on 
the House Committee on Agriculture, the most likely destination for this 
kind of bill.
1 Occasionally, an unusually high number of bills will not be assigned to a committee. In 
these years, the percentage of bills passed may exceed the percentage reported from committee. 
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However, allies’ value may change when party control of Congress 
changes. This is part of the dilemma of party alliance. Reaching the floor 
can be very diff icult for members of the minority party in the House of 
Representatives because majority party leaders can use committees to mo-
nopolize the agenda. Cox and McCubbins argue in their highly influential 
2005 book, Setting the Agenda, that the majority party is like a “cartel” with 
signif icant control over the House agenda and, by extension, legislative 
politics generally. To illustrate their theory, Cox and McCubbins develop 
the “roll rate.” A party gets “rolled” if a majority of its members vote against 
a bill, and it passes anyway. They f ind that the majority party almost never 
gets rolled, the minority party gets rolled much more frequently, and most 
bills that reach the agenda propose to move policy toward the majority’s 
ideal point.
This has a few implications for social movements, which may pull in dif-
ferent directions. First, it suggests that movements will need support from 
members of the majority party on key committees to reach a vote. Thus, 
it might be wise for movements to focus their efforts on a few individuals 
on these committees. However, this strategy could lead to problems in 
Figure 3.1  Percentage of Bills Introduced in the US House Reported from 
Committee and Passed
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other ways. It is, essentially, committees’ job to assure that bills that could 
potentially roll the majority party do not reach the floor. To receive support 
from members of the majority party on key committees, then, movements 
will need broader support from the majority party. This tension could strain 
a movement with limited resources. Gathering this kind of support in one 
party would be diff icult; building it in two might be impossible for many 
movements. Even if they could appeal ideologically to both parties, move-
ments might benefit from focusing their efforts on one party. However, this 
will make it much more diff icult for them to reach the agenda when the 
opposing party controls Congress.
Fortunately for movements, the party cartel does not always get its way. 
While the majority rarely gets rolled, it is not immune to this phenomenon. 
Movements cannot change the rules and norms granting majority leaders’ 
monopoly power, but they could limit the party’s ability to use this power. 
Acknowledging that presidents, interest groups, and the public can increase 
the costs of exercising gatekeeping power, Cox and McCubbins claim the 
majority party may choose not to use it. Instead of holding a bill up in com-
mittee, leaders might attempt to package “sour pills” with “sweeteners” (i.e., 
put it in an omnibus bill with other items), or allow the party to get rolled 
and hope the president or the Senate stops the bill from being enacted. This 
more nuanced theory demonstrates how social movements could, by raising 
the costs of agenda control, gain some leverage over the majority party.
How might they do this? There are a number of possibilities. If the move-
ment has strong minority party allies on the committee, they might be able 
to bargain with their majority party colleagues. They could also raise a bill’s 
visibility through protests and other activities. The public cannot possibly 
keep track of all bills before Congress, even those for which there would be 
signif icant support in the electorate. While it might look bad for the party 
to defeat a popular bill in a vote, a committee could obstruct its passage 
quietly by bottling it up in committee. Grassroots movements could make 
this more diff icult by raising a bill’s salience.
Discharge petitions have provided another way for social movements to 
circumvent the majority party’s monopoly power since the enactment of a 
new rule in 1924. With signatures from a simple majority of House members 
(218), petitioners can force a bill out of committee and onto the floor for a 
vote. This is not an easy task, however. Not all members of Congress who 
would be willing to vote for a bill on the floor will necessarily be willing 
to sign a discharge petition, an action that would most likely be viewed 
as hostile by the same majority party leaders who distribute committee 
assignments and other rewards and punishments. Of the 597 petitions 
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f iled between 1931 and 2006, only 48 (8 percent) reached the 218 signature 
threshold. This may not be as dire as it seems at f irst, however; even if a peti-
tion does not reach this threshold, it can make its way to the floor through 
other channels. Indeed, Beth (2003) f inds that 16 percent of discharge efforts 
ultimately achieved floor attention. This suggests that highly motivated 
allies can make a difference for movements in the House.
Unsurprisingly, legislators’ willingness to sign petitions today depends 
on their party’s status in the chamber. This has not always been the case. 
Pearson and Schickler (2009) f ind that “for much of the twentieth century, 
majority party members demonstrated little reluctance to sign discharge 
petitions” (Pearson and Schickler, 2009: 1253). This was due largely to the 
split between Northern Democrats and their Southern colleagues, whose 
seniority granted them disproportionate power in the committee system. 
Many of the petitions signed by Northern Democrats during this time were 
on subjects of particular interest to social movements, like labor, civil rights, 
housing, and social security. This trend did not last, however. Pearson and 
Schickler note that majority party members now rarely support discharge 
petitions. In 2006, they f ind that only 11 of 235 Republicans in the House 
signed even one petition, and only 8 of these 11 supported more than one. 
Democrats, on the other hand, supported more than half of the discharge 
petitions f iled in the same year (13 of 18, on average).
Despite this resistance from the majority party today, discharge petitions 
remain a potentially useful tool for movements. As Pearson and Schickler 
note, “discharge petition politics in today’s era of strong parties should 
not be confused with absolute majority party gatekeeping power: as the 
successful Shays-Meehan/McCain-Feingold campaign f inance example 
from the 107th Congress makes clear, the discharge procedure remains a 
viable option for cross-party coalitions when an issue is salient enough for 
dissident majority party members to buck their leadership” (Pearson and 
Schickler, 2009: 1254). Movements may be able to influence a bill’s salience 
through protests, marches, and other highly visible activities. Of course, 
this option will be most viable for movements whose goals are supported 
by at least some members of both parties. Movements with strong party 
identif ications, like those concerned with abortion, are less likely to benefit 
from discharge petitions.
Even bills that are successfully discharged from the committee to 
which they were originally assigned need to pass through the House Rules 
Committee before reaching the floor, however. The danger here is not ob-
struction, but the assignment of an unfavorable rule. The Rules Committee 
sets parameters for consideration of each bill in the House. It decides, for 
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instance, how much time the floor will have to debate the bill, and whether 
or not amendments will be allowed. Under an “open rule,” members of 
the House may offer an unlimited number of amendments. In contrast, a 
“closed rule” bars all amendments – the floor must approve or reject the 
bill as written. Though this may sound benign, it can and often does have 
great consequences for bills’ fate. From a movement’s perspective, an open 
rule could allow members of the House to amend its preferred bill beyond 
recognition. It could also lead to an avalanche of alternatives that ultimately 
delay progress. In sum, the Rules Committee has powerful means to subtly 
doom bills they dislike. Having allies on this seemingly unglamorous, but 
important committee would be extremely useful for movements. Not all 
legislatures will have a committee exactly like this. However, in studying 
movements’ interactions with legislatures, it is important to investigate how 
the chambers of interest determine the rules governing bill consideration, 
and pay close attention to any players in the legislative arena who have 
special decision-making authority in this area. If a movement appears 
to be underperforming, relative to its apparent support in a legislature, 
rulemakers – sitting under the radar with powerful tools – could be to 
blame. Courting their support could have subtle but signif icant payoffs 
for movements.
Movements are also likely to benefit from having allies in key chamber 
leadership positions. Even once a bill gets to the floor in the House of Rep-
resentatives, it does not automatically fall into the hands of a supportive 
coalition of lawmakers. It still has to clear more gatekeepers. Party leaders, 
particularly the Speaker of the House, have powers and responsibilities that 
can strongly influence the fate of bills of interest to social movements. The 
Speaker of the House has more formal power than any other member of the 
chamber, and this power has increased since the 1970s. The Speaker’s power 
comes from their influence over the flow of the legislative process (e.g., refer-
ring bills to committees, presiding over roll-call votes, etc.). Importantly, the 
Speaker also has and can grant recognition within the chamber. Members 
of the floor must wait to be “called on.” This means that the Speaker could 
stop someone from introducing an amendment by refusing to recognize 
that person. Thus, it would be very diff icult for a social movement to get a 
bill past a hostile Speaker.
Of course, not all legislative chambers grant these kinds of powers to their 
leaders. The House of Representatives is a special type of institution with 
strongly centralized leadership. In this context, even social movement bills 
that have widespread support among lawmakers may fail to make progress. 
Indeed, because of leaders’ power to bottle up bills at multiple stages in the 
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legislative process, lawmakers may not even have an opportunity to demon-
strate their support in a roll-call vote. More egalitarian chambers, like the 
Senate, are not necessarily easier for social movements to navigate, however. 
They come with their own set of hurdles. Scholars studying movements in 
countries with relatively egalitarian legislatures may observe challenges 
similar to those faced by movements attempting to influence the Senate.
Historically, the Senate has tended to be more collegial than the House, 
owing largely to its relatively small size. With fewer members, there is less 
of a need for centralized leadership to control access to the agenda. Thus, 
committees and majority party leaders are far less powerful in the Senate 
than the House. Every Senator has the “right of recognition” (i.e., they can 
talk for as long as they want) and the chamber lacks a “germaneness rule” 
(i.e., its members can talk about anything, even if it is not related to the 
bill on which they asked to be recognized) and a “previous question” rule 
(i.e., the rest of the chamber cannot vote on the question until the person 
on the floor is done speaking).
This has a few implications for movements. While the chamber’s egalitar-
ian nature may make majority party allies less valuable, it heightens the 
utility of minority party allies. Whether it offers individual movement 
allies more or less power is not necessarily clear, however. In one sense, it 
makes individual Senators more influential because they can make sure 
the movement’s bill receives recognition on the floor. In the absence of a 
germaneness rule, an ally could even discuss the movement’s bill in a debate 
about another issue. However, the Senate’s egalitarian ethos also enables its 
members to employ damaging dilatory tactics like the f ilibuster. Through 
their right of recognition, one member can theoretically hold the floor and 
delay a vote indef initely. This processes derailed many civil rights bills 
that passed the House in the f irst half of the twentieth century. Since 1917, 
Senators have been able to end a f ilibuster through a motion for cloture, 
but this requires support from three-f ifths of the chamber (60 votes in the 
contemporary Senate).2
One might question the importance of f ilibusters, since we rarely see 
such spectacles in contemporary American politics. Gone are the days when 
Senators would hold the floor for hours on end, reading from cookbooks and 
dictionaries to delay consideration of bills they disliked (often civil rights 
measures). Given Congress’s enormous workload, such dramatic obstruction 
2 Cloture initially required support from two-thirds of the chamber, but a 1975 amendment 
reduced the burden to three-f ifths. After a successful cloture motion, debate is typically limited 
to 30 hours and all amendments must be germane. 
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would create a prohibitively costly logjam today. Just because we see very 
few f ilibusters does not mean they no longer matter, however. It is simply 
accepted that almost all bills will require supermajority support to pass the 
Senate, and few reach the floor if they are not expected to meet the 60-vote 
threshold. Though bills still technically need a majority to pass the Senate, 
Wawro and Schickler (2010) argue that the chamber has essentially become 
a supermajoritarian institution.
What does this mean for movements? If they want to pass new legislation, 
they are likely to need more allies today than they did in the past. This 
increases the diff iculty of legislative success, since collecting more allies 
often requires more work. It can also influence the substance of legisla-
tion, as building a larger coalition generally requires more compromise. 
Movements that are unwilling or unable to move off strong positions will 
have a very diff icult time pushing new legislation through today’s Senate. 
If the movement’s goal is to stop legislation from being enacted, however, 
obstruction can be very useful. A relatively small minority of allies within 
the Senate can reduce the chances that a bill will reach a vote. By signaling 
to party leaders that they are prepared to f ight against the bill, they might 
convince those leaders that consideration would be too costly.
The tricky thing is, these two scenarios require very different arrange-
ments of allies. This dilemma is not unique to the Senate. Having many 
casual allies may benef it the movement in some situations (i.e., gaining 
supermajority support in the Senate for cloture, discharging a bill from 
committee in the House, passing a bill in either chamber, etc.), while a 
few highly committed allies may benef it the movement in others (i.e., 
obstructing an unfavorable bill in the Senate, getting favorable rules for 
bill consideration, etc.). While it is not impossible to have both, movements 
with limited resources may need to prioritize. Whether it is more beneficial 
to have a few close allies or many casual sympathizers will depend on the 
movement’s goals. And, of course, the nature of the movement’s aims – how 
extreme its preferences are in comparison to the median voter’s – will 
strongly influence the feasibility of gaining widespread support in Congress.
Navigating a Polarized Legislature
It would be impossible to write a full analysis of parties and legislators 
without reference to political polarization, one of the most remarkable 
phenomena in contemporary American politics. In 1950, the American 
Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties released a 
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report criticizing the parties for being too similar. If the parties do not offer 
voters clear policy alternatives, the report argued, the electorate does not 
have a meaningful choice in elections, and democracy cannot function 
properly. This is not a complaint we hear very often today. Since the early 
1970s, the parties have become more internally homogenous and externally 
distinct (McCarty et al., 2006). More votes break on party lines, and bipar-
tisan coalitions are less common today than in the mid-twentieth century.
Whether this is good or bad for movements is not necessarily straight-
forward. On the one hand, party line voting eases coalition building within 
parties. This kind of eff iciency is especially valuable for groups without 
many resources. On the other hand, it makes constructing bipartisan coali-
tions extremely diff icult. Polarization’s implications for movements also 
depend on their goals. Movements wishing to block new legislation may 
welcome the gridlock caused by parties’ inability to f ind common ground. 
For those seeking to enact new legislation, however, polarization can pose 
a signif icant burden. Indeed, over the past few years, it has been diff icult 
for Republicans and Democrats to negotiate successfully, even when the 
stakes have been high.
Just because movements face diff iculties in convincing members of the 
opposing party in Congress to support their goals does not mean they will 
be unable to influence their constituents, however. Polarization has caused 
tension between the party in government and the party in the electorate, as 
many scholars argue that polarization has not increased at the mass level 
(DiMaggio et al., 1996; Fiorina, 2005). The alleged “culture war” is vastly 
overblown, despite the media’s enthusiastic attention thereto, they argue. 
While parties may have clear menus of issue positions (i.e., opposition to 
legislation on climate change “goes with” opposition to abortion in the 
Republican camp), people do not have such clearly correlated issue positions 
(Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). This is signif icant for social movements 
because it means they have a chance to persuade people of both parties to 
support their positions, at least on some issues.
Of course, legislators will not necessarily respond to rising public sup-
port for movement goals. Recent work on gay rights issues suggests that 
polarization depresses responsiveness to public opinion (Krimmel et al., 
2013). Public support for gay rights has increased signif icantly over the 
past 20 years, to the point where there are now majorities in support of 
many gay rights policies. On some issues, the support is overwhelming. 
For example, majorities favor a law protecting gays and lesbians against 
employment discrimination in almost every district in the nation. Yet, 
support in Congress has been much less strong. There is a signif icant 
polItIcal partIeS anD leGISlatorS 91
partisan dimension to this gap between opinion and legislative behavior, 
as Democrats have increasingly supported gay rights as public support has 
grown, while Republicans have not. Instead of following the median voter 
in their state or district, Republican members of Congress appear to be 
voting in accordance with their party’s conservative position. This suggests 
that gains in public support, even in conservative districts, will not lead 
immediately to commensurate policy gains for the LGBT movement. That 
said, more legislative successes have come as public support has risen. 
Working to influence the public may not bring quick legislative gains, but 
it is unlikely to hurt and may help the movement in the long run.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the players and arenas associated with politi-
cal parties in legislatures, based primarily on observations about the US 
Congress. Scholars studying other nations may f ind some parts of this 
analysis more relevant to their cases than others. Even if one is examining 
a legislature with very different properties than the Congress, this analysis 
suggests some important questions to consider. Specif ically: Who controls 
access to the agenda? How many people have the authority to unilaterally 
obstruct a bill’s progress? What rules govern debate and amendment on the 
floor? Are rules set, or does a body like the House Rules Committee tailor 
them to each bill? How centralized is the leadership? What size coalition is 
necessary to reach a vote and/or pass a bill? Are bipartisan or multi-partisan 
coalitions possible? Answering these questions will help to map the arenas 
that movements and their allies must navigate and provide insight into the 
number and nature of allies necessary to achieve legislative success.
If there is one bottom line in the United States, it is that pressing bills 
through Congress is very diff icult, even for a movement with elite allies. So-
cial movements with legislative goals face signif icant hurdles, particularly 
if they aim to enact new legislation. While elite allies are certainly helpful, 
even those most committed to the movement cannot guarantee success 
in a deliberative body like a legislature. Some will face more diff iculties 
than others, however. All elite allies are not equal, especially in chambers 
with strongly centralized leadership, like the House of Representatives. 
Lawmakers in leadership positions will have more powerful means to 
pursue movement goals than members with less authority. However, even 
leaders’ influence will vary over time, as political contexts change. On the 
whole, allies’ utility depends very much on their position within Congress 
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and the balance of power in government at the time. A sympathetic Speaker 
of the House can be immensely valuable; but, even they cannot curb the 
threat of f ilibuster in the Senate.
One of the great dilemmas facing social movements is that different 
types of elite allies are useful in different situations. Given the tremendous 
competition for agenda space in the modern Congress, having a few highly 
motivated allies can be useful. A small cadre of committed allies can also 
help movements block unfavorable legislation in the Senate. In other 
situations, having a broader base of support is more helpful. To achieve 
consideration from today’s supermajoritarian Senate, a movement’s bill 
will most likely need a coalition of 60 allies. It is diff icult – though certainly 
not impossible – to inspire f ierce commitment from a few allies and diffuse 
support from a broader group. Stringent positions will most likely motivate 
the former, while more moderate positions will probably be necessary to 
recruit the latter.
Movements face another critical dilemma in choosing a party identif ica-
tion strategy. Should they try to build a bipartisan network of supportive 
allies or develop a more exclusive relationship with one party? Attempting 
to maintain relationships with both parties can be diff icult. If their allies 
face pressure from party leaders to vote a certain way, their coalition could 
crumble in a vote. Building a bipartisan coalition is especially difficult when 
political polarization is high, as it is in the United States today. However, 
party aff iliation comes with its own challenges. Studying the relationship 
between African-Americans and the Democratic Party, Frymer (1999) 
argues that party aff iliation can lead to “electoral capture.” When a group 
throws its support behind one party, and is also rejected by the opposing 
party, its ally has little incentive to act on its behalf. With limited political 
mobility, a captured movement cannot credibly threaten to defect from 
its ally party.
The barriers discussed in this chapter are not necessarily f ixed. Aldrich 
(1995) argues that parties are endogenous institutions, which evolve in 
response to changing historical conditions. Rules, norms, and routines 
may be parametric for individual legislators, especially in the short term, 
but they are ultimately endogenous for the collective, and in the long run. 
Even if movements cannot easily influence these rules, norms, and routines, 
it is certainly in their interest to be aware of them. This will help them 
determine how to use resources most eff iciently and to identify when 
political conditions will be most auspicious for legislative gains.
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4 Contentious Governance
Local Governmental Players as Social Movement Actors
Imrat Verhoeven and Christian Bröer
Over the past decades the role of government in policy making and im-
plementation has changed in many countries. Incited by reforms toward 
new public management, marketization and privatization coupled to 
participatory democracy, centralized bureaucracies have given way to 
loosely structured, sometimes fragmented, governance networks (Bevir, 
2010: ch. 4). These networks do not appear in every f ield of policy: they are, 
for example, more pronounced in social and environmental policies in 
the Global North and around aid-dependent policies in the Global South. 
As a counter tendency, securitization policies tend to strengthen central 
governments.
Depending on the f ield, policy conflicts are often embedded in networks, 
a process we propose to call “contentious governance.” Analytically, the 
idea of contentious governance unhinges mainstream social movement 
theorizing on the role of government in processes of contestation. The 
dominant political process perspective assumes that government is a more 
or less unif ied actor to mobilize against, to seek support of or to be seen 
as the “context” that provides opportunities for or threats to mobilization 
(Jasper, 2011: 5). From a contentious governance perspective, there is no 
“government” as such that engages with protestors; instead we encounter 
a plethora of governmental players in contentious interactions with each 
other and with other players.
The idea of contentious governance also problematizes Charles Tilly’s 
(1978) inf luential distinction between state and movements that situ-
ates movements outside of the state. Many cases can be found in which 
governmental players together with movements and other civil society 
organizations f ight for the same cause. We encounter governmental players 
that behave “social movement-like” by mobilizing citizens to support their 
claims in policy conflicts with other governmental players. In these cases 
governmental players become movements, at least for a while, thus blurring 
Tilly’s distinction between state and movements.
In this chapter we will focus on episodes of contentious governance in 
which governmental players behave social movement-like, because these 
cases push our understanding of contentious governance the furthest. 
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More specif ically, we analyze mobilization by governmental players during 
policy conflicts with other governmental players. Examples of this are the 
protests against aircraft noise in the UK (Griggs and Howarth, 2004) and 
Switzerland (Bröer, 2007); some cases of opposition to energy projects in 
the United States (McAdam and Boudet, 2012); and f ierce conflicts about 
nuclear waste storage in Germany (Gorleben), where local governmental 
players sometimes oppose storage.
Our analysis will build on the strategic perspective suggested by Jasper 
(2015) and the introduction to this volume. We will analyze the strategic 
interactions between governmental players in policy conflicts and the 
opportunities and constraints that these interactions impose on the so-
cial movement-like behavior of the opposing governmental players. Our 
focus lies on how governmental players seize and create these, sometimes 
discursive (Bröer and Duyvendak, 2009), opportunities during strategic 
interactions with their governmental opponents.
We analyze two cases of contentious governance in the Netherlands to 
show how governmental claimants strategically interact with governmental 
proponents of contested policies, with bystanders, and with publics they 
seek to mobilize. An abundance of cases is to be found in the Netherlands 
where lower tiers of government mobilize against policy plans advanced 
by regional or national authorities. The Dutch context is very interesting 
to study such cases because of the tension between a strong tradition of 
consensus-building through negotiations (Hendriks, 2009; Lijphart, 1968) 
and contentious behavior that pushes the boundaries of governance 
practices.
The f irst case to be analyzed is a process of municipal amalgamation 
researched by Verhoeven in his doctoral thesis (2009). Municipal amalgama-
tion, merging municipalities by the redrawing of polity boundaries, is itself 
part of a restructuring of governance relations. We will show how attempts 
to concentrate political power are opposed by governmental players. The 
second case focuses on local protests against the siting of mobile phone 
antennas (Bröer et al., 2012). Here, the conflicts over mast siting involve 
national and local government and the telecom industry. We will show 
how local governments rally for a stakeholder position, thereby enacting 
governance, even in the absence of legal rights.
Before we dig into the cases we will elaborate on the idea of contentious 
governmental players and various empirical manifestations that can be 
found in the literature related to this topic.
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Contentious Governance and Governmental Players
Research on mobilization has been social movement centric, obscuring 
the role of other players in recruiting activists and framing issues (Mc-
Adam and Boudet, 2012: 2; see also Jasper, 2015). The active involvement of 
governmental actors to mobilization seems understudied. This needs to 
be addressed particularly in a situation of conflicts within dispersed and 
displaced policy networks or contentious governance, as we call it. To better 
understand governmental players in this respect we f irst need to be more 
precise on what we mean by contentious governance.
Contention is commonly understood to be a process of claims making 
by non-state actors in which the state is either the target of or a third party 
to claims. Often overlooked is the suggestion in the contentious politics 
literature of governmental players performing as “initiators of claims,” 
seeking to alter or redress a problematic situation (McAdam et al., 2001: 
5; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 4; Tilly, 2008: 5). Of course initiating claims is 
part of the core business for governmental players and politicians. This is 
suff iciently demonstrated in social problem research (Spector and Kitsuse, 
1987; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). However, claims making in those cases is 
a strategy for seeking legitimacy. In this article, we look at governmental 
actors that mobilize discontent.
Initiating claims in a social movement-like manner is a process that 
we relate to the increasing prominence of governance. We suggest that 
the dispersion of governance networks since the 1980s has increased the 
number of actors involved in policy making (Bevir, 2010), decreased power 
imbalances, and increased the number of arenas. While the f iguration as 
a whole might have become more complex, the network structure allows 
for more room to maneuver for every single actor. The network structure 
also increases the potential for conflicts of interest because there is no 
clear hierarchy and no single compound player is powerful enough to 
make authoritative decisions on its own (Hajer, 2009). Lastly, governance 
networks are coordinated foremost by “language” or shared symbols and 
assumptions (Hajer, 2009).
The social movement literature provides some cues how to relate these 
developments in governance to mobilization by governmental players. 
According to Amenta and Zylan (1991: 252), the agency of governmental 
players largely depends on their autonomy: “The greater their autonomy, 
the more likely that state actors will pursue their own agendas, including 
the support of like-minded challenges. As bureaucrats try to expand the 
powers of state institutions, they may encourage movements with similar 
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goals.” In a governance context, governmental players experience more 
autonomy due to processes of decentralization, devolution of power, and 
deregulation. Governmental players may spur challenges that help their 
cause: “State civil servants can be seen as members of the polity interested 
in expanding their own power as well as advancing their ideas of the public 
interest. To promote their goals, state actors may selectively spur chal-
lenges” (Amenta and Zylan, 1991: 263). Here we clearly see the suggestion 
of governmental players performing as claims makers with the potential to 
mobilize bystanders to support their claims vis-à-vis governmental or other 
players. This potential may materialize whenever governmental players get 
stuck in policy controversies dominated by frame pluralism and stalemate 
(Rein and Schön, 1993: 147-150; Laws and Rein, 2003: 174; Meyer, 2005: 7). 
Instead of trying to reframe the situation (Rein and Schön, 1993) they can 
choose to behave social movement-like.
To put social movement-like behavior by governmental players in 
perspective we may see it as one manifestation of contentious governance 
next to institutional activism and facilitation through issue coalitions. 
Institutional activism can be found in what Lee Ann Banaszak (2005) has 
called “state movement intersections,” consisting of overlapping member-
ships. State off icials may also be movement activists participating in social 
movement organizations or participants in unorganized or spontaneous 
activities by these organizations. Likewise, movement activists may become 
state off icials while retaining their movement connections. These institu-
tional or insider activists, Banaszak argues, influence the development, 
strategies, and outcomes of movements because they most often employ 
insider tactics. Her empirical analysis of the intersections between state 
off icials and the women’s movement in the United States indeed indicates 
that institutional feminist activists focused on non-protest activities such as 
taking legal action and informing the movement about political opportuni-
ties, although many also participated in protest activities (Banaszak, 2005: 
167-168). In addition, David Pettinicchio (2012: 502) identifies other activities 
of institutional activists, such as framing the problem or possible remedies; 
creating policies, programs or even agencies to support movement claims; 
creating new political opportunities for movement actors; and encouraging 
activism within the government. In all these actions we clearly see that 
institutional activists are quite proactive, that they use their access to 
resources and employ their influence on policy making to help the good 
cause (Pettinicchio, 2012: 502).
A more collective way for governmental players to become involved in 
contentious governance is to facilitate mobilization by and participate in 
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issue coalitions. Many examples can be found in the wide spread of commu-
nity coalitions against substance abuse in the United States since the 1990s 
(McCarthy, 2005: 90-93). Governmental, corporate, and civil society elites, 
involved in the US “War on Drugs,” facilitate and participate in community 
coalitions that press for substance abuse reduction. The governmental 
players are either individual government off icials or compound players 
such as law enforcement agencies or alcohol and drug prevention agencies 
(McCarthy, 2005: 93). Governmental facilitation takes the form of extensive 
funding, of moral resources such as endorsement by public f igures, or of 
informational resources such as strategic and technical support (McCarthy, 
2005: 104-105).
An early example of government-social movement coalitions can be 
found in Japanese anti-pollution politics between 1956 and 1976, includ-
ing state agencies, opposition political parties, local governments, and 
the courts (Brewster Stearns and Almeida, 2004). Other examples are the 
aff iliations between oppositional political parties and the anti-nuclear 
weapons movement in the Netherlands during the mid-1980s (Kriesi et 
al., 1995). The direct involvement of governmental players in coalitions 
with social movements indicates that the boundaries between government 
and movements sometimes become very fuzzy: working toward the same 
goals has led to interpenetration of governmental players and movements 
(Wolfson, 2001; compare Sampson et al., 2005, on hybrid events).
Compared to institutional activism and the facilitation of coalitions with 
movements, social movement-like behavior by governmental players is the 
most extreme form of contentious governance. With social movement-like 
behavior it does not make sense anymore to talk about a state-movement 
dichotomy that is bridged by state movement intersections provided by 
institutional activists, nor do we need to discuss the fuzziness of the bound-
ary between governmental players and movements. Instead governmental 
players become social movement-like, at least for a while, by directly 
mobilizing bystanders to support their cause in a policy conflict. How this 
form of governmental activism works will be analyzed in the Dutch cases 
of municipal amalgamation and cell-phone mast siting.
Municipal Amalgamation of the Hague’s Vicinity
Processes of municipal amalgamation entail that smaller municipalities 
are merged partly or entirely with bigger municipalities. One of the most 
controversial and extensive Dutch processes of municipal amalgamation 
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was that of the city of The Hague and its vicinity in the period 1997-2001 
(Verhoeven, 2009). In the late 1990s the city of The Hague, home to the 
Netherlands’ national political institutions, found itself in deep f inancial 
problems due to the flight of the middle class to neighboring municipalities 
and a sharp decline in tax revenues. The suggested solution was to build 
new homes to attract middle-class residents and develop infrastructure to 
support “creative industries.” The Hague needed space to implement these 
plans but had none within the city limits.
After several attempts to address this problem, the issue became so 
highly politicized that the national government and parliament intervened. 
In the end, in May 1997, the Dutch parliament decided that municipal amal-
gamation would be the best solution. In this case the f ive municipalities 
of Rijswijk, Leidschendam, Voorburg, Pijnacker, and Nootdorp would have 
to give up parts of their territory to The Hague. The main target of the 
amalgamation process consisted of new housing estates (Leidschenveen and 
Ypenburg), (post)industrial sites and office locations that were developed by 
some of these municipalities and a corridor to connect these sites with The 
Hague’s territory, which was planned to pass through established neighbor-
hoods in Rijswijk, Voorburg, and Leidschendam. Over the whole 1997-2001 
time period 1998 and 2000 proved to be the years in which contentious 
governance between proponents and opponents reached it peaks.
1998: Intense Governmental Contestation
From the summer of 1997 onward into the early spring of 1998 two oppos-
ing governmental coalitions were formed. The strong block of proponents 
consisted of the provincial authorities of Zuid-Holland (a regional tier of 
government), mandated by the Minister of the Interior to take charge of 
the planning process, and the city of The Hague lobbying for maximum 
territorial gains. The governmental claimants opposing the plans were the 
f ive municipalities of Rijswijk, Leidschendam, Voorburg, Pijnacker, and 
Nootdorp, later on joined by ad hoc citizen action groups, and achieving 
significant discursive resonance through an influential regional newspaper 
De Haagsche Courant. Before the provincial authority announced its initial 
plans for municipal amalgamation in April 1998, the governmental claim-
ants had shifted gears from negotiations and lobbying to a collective action 
strategy, leading to the f irst peak in contentious governance. To legitimize 
their social movement-like behavior they had developed the political slogan 
“Cooperation yes, annexation no,” which was consequently employed to 
communicate their anti-annexation frame. Thus they created a discursive 
contentIouS GoVernance 101
opening for themselves reacting to the proponents’ “Give The Hague space” 
frame. Working from their anti-annexation frame the governmental claim-
ants started out by creating opportunities for mobilization that f itted into 
the ongoing stream of strategic interactions with the proponents.
As soon as the provincial plan became clear, the f ive municipalities 
organized information evenings to explain what was about to happen and 
for citizens to voice their opinions. An estimated 2,000 citizens (from all 
f ive municipalities) attended. These meetings also functioned to mobilize 
citizens to start up their own local ad hoc anti-annexation action groups (in 
Dutch: Anti-Annexatie Comités, AACs). The municipalities stated that they 
would provide each AAC with resources like money and advice by public 
relations consultants. By doing so, they created an opportunity for citizens 
to become active. Citizens quickly responded, and within a very short time 
frame of up to three weeks AACs were established in all f ive municipalities. 
The AACs tried to operate as independently as possible from the governmen-
tal claimants as they thought that their fellow citizens might otherwise not 
trust them. Interestingly, this strategic distancing did not diminish the AACs 
importance as collaborators for the governmental claimants.
The governmental claimants created another opportunity for protest in 
June 1998. A survey from that period indicated that 98 percent of the total 
population in the f ive municipalities knew about the plan and 93 percent 
were against it. A massive poster campaign against the plan of the provincial 
authority visualized and further stimulated discontent. A grand total of 
100,000 anti-annexation posters were printed for an estimated population of 
152,000 inhabitants of the five municipalities. The AACs helped to distribute 
the posters practically door-to-door, just before the summer holiday. Many 
of the posters were indeed put up behind windows; pictures from that period 
show that in some areas, every house had the poster on display.
During the summer of 1998 the provincial authority had to fulf ill pro-
cedural requirements concerning their plan. They had to organize open 
information evenings and offer the possibility for citizens to send in notices 
of objection. The governmental claimants reacted strategically by suggest-
ing to the AACs that these were opportunities for protest. The AACs picked 
up on these suggestions very quickly. The f irst information evening of the 
provincial authority in late June was turned into a demonstration of 4,500 
people, where the provincial authority had expected a maximum of 1,500 at-
tendees. A second meeting was organized in early July, which was attended 
by yet another 1,500 people. The opportunity to f ile notices of objection 
against the provincial plan from June to the beginning of September was 
also seized by the AACs. They started an intensive campaign that lasted 
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three months, and succeeded in getting 23,500 notices of objection by 
individual citizens (roughly one-sixth of the population) over the summer 
holiday. By mobilizing citizens during the summer of 1998, the AACs helped 
the governmental claimants to retain their distance from organizing forms 
of protest that could easily alienate them from the powerful proponents of 
municipal amalgamation.
The governmental claimants were in a powerful position to create an op-
portunity for mobilization. In October 1998, they organized a non-binding 
referendum for which they did the mobilization themselves, with some help 
from the AACs. They organized an intensive information campaign publish-
ing newsletters (75,000 copies per edition) alongside advertisements, posters, 
and letters delivered to each household. The day before the referendum they 
organized the largest instance of mobilization during the whole process 
of contention. All municipal politicians and civil servants went out on the 
street, together with volunteers from the AACs, to literally go door-to-door, 
asking people whether they would come out to vote. They were rewarded by 
a massive turnout on referendum day. Of the 122,000 citizens older than 18 
called upon, 90,000 came to vote and 98 percent voted against the plan by the 
provincial authority. These turnout numbers confirmed the support for the 
anti-annexation frame and the claims making by the governmental opponents.
In December 1998, the odds turned against the provincial authority. 
After losing a legal battle on a procedural technicality provincial politicians 
feared losing too many votes during upcoming elections if they would pro-
ceed with the amalgamation process. Before the year ended, they returned 
their mandate to the Minister of the Interior. He had to take charge of the 
municipal amalgamation procedure and develop a tangible plan to reach 
closure in this contentious governance process.
2000: Walking the Thin Line between Contestation and Negotiation
The peak in contentious governance from the spring to December 1998 was 
followed by a quiet period, which ended when the Minister of the Interior 
revealed his plans for municipal amalgamation in April 2000. With the 
minister in charge, the governmental claimants sensed that they had to be 
more careful in their claims making because the minister’s plan would be 
f inalized in a law regulating the municipal amalgamation process.
The minister’s unveiling of his plan in April 2000 shocked three of the 
f ive municipalities: they would now have to cede much more territory 
than under the provincial plan of 1998. Two out of the f ive organized open 
information evenings for their citizens; one was attended by 2,000 people 
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and from the other no numbers are available. The governmental claimants 
did not organize much collective action themselves in this phase of the 
strategic interactions; they pinned their hopes on the local citizen action 
groups to mobilize citizens once again. Although there were actually numer-
ous procedural steps the minister had to follow, the AACs did not seize 
them as opportunities for mobilization, except for one they were already 
familiar with from the summer of 1998. From the end of April until mid-July 
2000, the minister’s plan was disclosed for public scrutiny and citizens 
could send in notices of objection. The AACs managed to mobilize 28,000 
citizens from four of the municipalities to do so, which was one-f ifth of 
their population at the time.
The public pressure made the minister decide to alter his plan in such 
ways that signif icant parts of the territory of old neighborhoods required 
for the corridor connecting the new housing estates to The Hague’s terri-
tory were no longer at stake. From this moment onward the governmental 
claimants deserted their strategy of contention and completely switched 
to lobbying and negotiations geared toward altering details of the plan 
during parliamentary debate on the proposed law. In the end the whole 
amalgamation process took almost f ive years and was off icially completed 
on 1 January 2002. The new housing estates became part of The Hague, but 
the rest of the territory of the f ive municipalities remained unaffected.
Protesting Mast Siting
The siting of mobile phone technology – base stations and antennas – is 
contested in many countries and locales worldwide. Protests in Europe and 
the United States are documented quite well (Borraz, 2011; Burgess, 2004; 
Drake, 2006; Stilgoe, 2005). But also outside these countries we f ind action 
against mobile phone technology, for example, in the Philippines and in 
Ghana. It is safe to say that global mobile phone technology has a different 
footprint locally, partly because of local contestation. A point of discussion 
is the question if these protests testify to NIMBY-ism and irrationality (Law 
and McNeish, 2007; Soneryd, 2007). In the Netherlands the GSM, UMTS, and 
LTE (fourth generation) network use about 25,000 base stations at present.
1975-1999: Stopping the Roll-out
From 1975 onward the siting of radio towers has been an object of debate and 
incidentally of contention in the Netherlands. Land use, interference with 
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household appliances or health effects were mentioned in these cases. The 
advent of the second-generation – GSM – cellular network beginning in the 
1990s initiated protracted conflicts in about 15 percent of all municipalities. 
Councils and aldermen played a signif icant role in these conflicts.
The siting of GSM antennas in most cases fell within the jurisdiction of 
municipalities. As part of spatial planning policy, a building permit was 
required. Local governments adapted this opportunity to oppose the roll-out 
of GSM technology. From 1994 onward, we witness the f irst local protests, in 
about ten municipalities. One of them turned out to be crucial: Haarlemmer-
meer, a medium-sized municipality close to Amsterdam. There, a handful of 
citizens objected to the installation of a base station on the top of their rental 
apartment building. They mainly reported increasing health complaints 
and started to survey health conditions. While the aldermen initially did 
not want to interfere with the roll-out, the municipal council embraced 
citizens’ concerns and pressured the aldermen to adopt a different policy. 
The main argument was uncertainty about health effects. In that sense, 
local politicians adopted the national political and scientific discourse about 
health effects of mobile phone technology – no proof of adverse effects but 
no conclusive research in the other direction either – and turned it to their 
advantage. They started making antenna policy. Part of this was to look at 
the current sites and their legal basis. It turned out that the local planning 
authorities had not approved most of the base stations. The municipality 
adapted to this opportunity and filed a lawsuit against “illegal” base stations 
– which they won. Moreover, they did not hand out any permits for new 
stations and threatened to remove the illegal ones. Haarlemmermeer used 
the legal framework at its disposal, thus having a huge impact on national 
technology implementation: several other municipalities followed their 
example and the roll-out of GSM technology came under serious pressure.
At that point, the national government changed spatial planning law. 
Antennas were largely exempted from building permit requirements. This 
was approved by the national organization of municipalities, after f ierce 
internal struggle. Effectively, municipalities lost their basis for antenna 
policy and therefore were excluded from the governance network. In sum, 
municipalities adapted legal opportunities to their local agendas and 
opposed mast siting in cooperation with citizens. They created new op-
portunities for social movement-like behavior by other municipalities and 
legitimated their own actions by defining scientif ic uncertainty as a reason 
to stop the roll-out.
While municipal rights were curbed, their dispersed opposition delayed 
the roll-out of the second- and later the third-generation technology. The 
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national government devised mast siting policy and coupled this to health 
effects, health risk research and risk communication. In that sense, the 
issue of the health risk of mobile phone technology was not off but f irmly 
on the agenda. Although municipalities were no longer legally part of the 
governance network, citizens could enter it directly: as tenants they got a 
veto right if base stations were placed on an apartment building. Scientif ic 
expertise got a more pronounced role through a large funding program for 
mobile phone health risk research and the industry started searching for non-
contentious building sites like churches or off ices. In general, the industry 
became more dependent on other actors as well. The second phase shows 
how municipalities capitalized on this in a social movement-like fashion.
2000-2012: Regaining Power
Most municipalities followed the new national policy and left base sta-
tion siting to national authorities, the telecom industry, and the owners 
or inhabitants of buildings. Other municipalities played a more activist 
role. Precisely because they had fewer legal opportunities to be seized, 
they created opportunities and adapted less obvious national discourses 
to their cause.
Among the municipalities that oppose mast siting we see different 
strategies. In rare cases, local politicians actively approach citizens to start 
thinking about and acting on base station siting. They organize meetings for 
citizens, invite critical scientists and activists from other cities and mobilize 
citizens explicitly. In Amsterdam for example, members of the local council 
invited citizens to commonly devise alternative siting plans and, even 
broader, to scrutinize the necessity of mobile phone technology in general. 
Here, local politicians were able to capitalize on two existing discourses: 
f irst the widespread claim of citizens’ participation in politics. Similar to 
the case of amalgamation described above, local politicians reasoned that 
they were “closest to the citizens.” This legitimated their involvement in 
mast siting decisions. Second, local politicians used common risk thinking 
to establish their position. As local government, they have a right to “care” 
about “their” citizens.
These claims are also visible where municipalities are a bit less activist. 
In these cases, municipal claimants hitch on to existing citizen protest and 
create new opportunities for them. Municipalities organize “informational 
meetings” or hearings. They commission survey research to chart public 
opinion and propose alternative sites for base stations following objections 
to a particular site. In one case, local politicians point citizens to the planned 
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erection of a mast and the procedural terms under which this might be op-
posed. Municipalities support lawsuits, organize media attention, or invite 
other stakeholders within the governance network. For example, in the city 
of Hengelo, following citizens’ concerns, the municipality urged the telecom 
provider to search for a different base station site. This was not exactly what 
the local action group wanted. They urged the right to think about the spot 
themselves. But it put the municipality back at the negotiation and policy 
table with telecom providers, health researchers, and national authorities.
Regarding the cases of mast siting, the onset and development of local 
activism happened in two steps: f irst, triggered by citizens concerns, social 
movement-like behavior of some municipalities opposing mast siting led to 
new restrictive national policy and legislation. Municipal rights concerning 
base station siting were severely reduced. Still, in the second step we see that 
municipalities claim a position in decision making and reclaim entry into 
the governance network. Here, they act social movement-like by cooperating 
with local action groups (for a more detailed analysis, see Bröer et al., 2012).
Local protests also made telecom providers search for non-contentious 
sites. Among other measures, the industry attracted liaison managers and 
site-acquisition specialists and made wholesale arrangements with large 
institutions to get around localized opposition. While most of the base 
stations are in place now, the remaining spots are highly contested and the 
upcoming fourth generation of mobile phone communication technology 
(LTE) might need new sites for base stations.
Finally, although mobile phone technology and base stations can be 
scrutinized in several ways – land use policy, real estate value, participation, 
necessity – discussions tend to focus on possible health effects. Although 
evidence of adverse health effects is rare, it cannot be convincingly ex-
cluded. The World Health Organization (WHO) reclassif ied mobile phones 
as a “possible carcinogenic” on 31  May 2011. The Council of Europe in 
May 2011 advised banning the use of cell phones and wireless networks 
in schools, and it recommended adherence to the “as low as reasonably 
achievable” (ALARA) principles for EMF exposure. Municipalities can seize 
these opportunities if it f its their strategic interactions with higher tiers of 
government and corporations.
Conclusion
This chapter can be read as an attempt to bring together several lines of in-
quiry and point to a pattern: under the condition of governance, contention 
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is more likely to see governmental players in many roles: as “the enemy 
formerly known as the state,” as institutional activist, as a partner in a 
coalition, or even as social movement-like actor. A governance structure 
favors coordination and conflicts through symbols, language, and discourse. 
This points to forms of mobilization more pronounced in advanced liberal 
democracies; it does not address upheavals like “the Arab Spring” equally 
well.
Indeed, in the two Dutch cases discussed here, the traditional dividing 
lines between state and social movements or between government and 
citizens no longer apply to policy conflicts. Within a governance context 
governmental organizations can become embroiled in processes of conten-
tion, acting as claimants who behave “social movement-like.” However, this 
does not imply that they become social movement organizations. Contrary 
to many social movements, governmental claimants are not single-issue 
organizations. They are always involved in many policy domains and thus 
have to reckon with several ongoing governance relations even with their 
opponents in any specif ic issue. Strategically, cognitively and emotionally, 
governance network actors depend on each other in multiple ways.
The movement-like behavior by governmental claimants is constrained 
by variable degrees of freedom. In the municipal amalgamation case there 
were stronger restrictions because the claimants always had to consider 
making a deal that altered the plan instead of redressing it. Protesting mast 
siting is less restricted by this dynamic because so many masts are required 
and so many sites can be considered within the municipal boundaries. The 
degrees of freedom for movement-like behavior also vary overtime. In the 
municipal amalgamation case the governmental claimants became less 
activist in the second episode of contention because they realized that 
closure had to be reached with the Minister of the Interior. In the mast 
protest cases we see the opposite dynamic. After they had become closed 
out from decision making in governance networks, various municipalities 
became more openly activist by adapting and creating opportunities for 
their citizens to protest mast siting. They reclaimed the right to make policy 
concerning base station siting and used contention to achieve this.
Both cases show that governmental claimants strategically react to pro-
ponents’ discourses and political actions by turning them into opportunities 
for direct mobilization by themselves or to provide local action groups 
with arguments to frame their grievances and start a process of consensus 
mobilization (Klandermans, 1997). Using and interpreting the rules of the 
game is also part and parcel of governmental claimant’s movement-like 
behavior, sometimes to facilitate their own protest – as was the case in the 
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f irst phase of mobile phone protests – but most often to enable bystanders 
to use them for their own actions. Again the degrees of freedom within 
ongoing governance relationships seem to be the critical factor determining 
whether governmental actors use opportunities themselves or mediate 
them to local supporters of their claims. In cases with less freedom, such as 
the municipal amalgamation process, governmental claimants try to avoid 
critique from the proponents on abusing the rules of the game for behavior 
that may be perceived as too “unconventional.”
Most movement-like behavior of governmental claimants remains rather 
conventional: organizing information evenings, organizing referenda or 
poster campaigns for the expression of protest. In both case studies they 
rely on a “division of oppositional labor” with local action groups and other 
bystanders. Often cued by governmental claimants, action groups organ-
ize forms of protest such as demonstrations or using legal procedures for 
protest that are perhaps too “unconventional” for governmental claimants 
to employ. In that sense governmental claimants seem to rely on a restricted 
political repertoire for their movement-like behavior. The concept of conten-
tious governance allows us to the better understand these ubiquitous forms 
of protests.
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Part 2
The Forces of Order

5 The Police
Donatella della Porta and Kıvanç Atak
Diyarbakır, Turkey, 15 February 2009. The tenth anniversary of the capture 
of the PKK leader Abduallah Öcalan. Early hours in the morning, silent 
and empty streets left by many shopkeepers who did not open their stores 
contrast to snowballing crowds on several other streets where hundreds of 
people are fevering for the demonstration. MPs from the pro-Kurdish Peace 
and Democracy Party (BDP) and the municipal authorities of the same party 
are rushing to the police to convince them to permit a peaceful march with 
promises of no public order disruptions. Mayor Osman Baydemir talks to 
the chief off icers:
OB: We def initely do not want anything like disorder.
Off icer: Neither do we.
OB: I wish to share the same feelings with you.
Off icer: Of course.
OB: Thus we need to behave with a shared mind… I believe that if all the 
people could express themselves through dialogue, no problems would 
occur. My suggestion is this: we will use one line of the avenue. As we 
did before, we will walk on this line to the front of the Fatih High School. 
From there on, we’d like to make our press declaration in front of the 
Human Rights Statue. Then we will disperse quietly.
Off icer: I want to ask you this: Who is making this event? What is this 
event?
OB: This is an event by our provincial organization. It is not an illegal 
event. The vehicle of our party is here, our provincial party chief is here, 
and our mayor [himself] is here.
Off icer: OK, but now explain to me: Do human rights in Diyarbakır only 
belong to the 1,500 people gathered here? What about the human rights 
of the one million and f ifty thousand people remaining?
OB: Even if there are f ive people, we should let them express themselves 
so that they will say, “They are showing respect to us.”
Off icer: You could have made an application, we would have provided 
the security…
OB: The country will not collapse with slogans, my dear… Without 
any problems people will go back to their homes. Thus, with utmost 
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sincerity, with utmost effort, we will do our best together with our MPs, 
our provincial chief, our mayors.
Off icer (talking on the radio to another off icer): There is another group 
on the Sakarya Avenue, right? OK, do what’s necessary.1
This is a typical anecdote about protest policing as an arena. The police as 
one player of the state negotiate with another player on the street before 
forcefully dispersing the crowd that supposedly gathered illegally. The short 
scene presented above is familiar to any political activist who may have 
run into a similar encounter with the police elsewhere in the world. That 
day, Diyarbakır turned into a city of urban warfare given the clashes with 
the police. It could have been different if both players, the police and the 
protesters, had employed different strategies toward each other. Or perhaps 
it would not. Actually, it all depended on how those different strategies 
interacted with each other.
When we talk about protest policing, we tend to understand the police 
as a single player. Yet, they are not. The police, in fact, are made up of a 
multiplicity of players who have their own agency, norms and purposes, 
who interact with each other and with external players within the state and 
society. The outcomes of these interactions reflect the policing arena as a 
constellation of strategies that vary across time and space. What remains 
constant is the political embeddedness of the police, which is revealed 
through their continuous encounters with contentious players.
In this chapter, we conceptualize the police as players and protest polic-
ing as an arena. We f ind such a conceptualization useful in grasping the 
relationship between the state and social movements with respect to the 
centrality of the police as one of the main actors of the state. Although we 
keep the discussion primarily on an abstract level, we make use of some 
empirical illustrations. Along these lines, the chapter has f ive parts. First, 
it opens with a brief debate on the goals, means, and constraints that the 
police face in controlling protest. It continues with an emphasis on the 
multi-agency nature of the organization where we address the internal 
dynamics of decision making by the police. Then, the chapter touches 
upon one of the central themes, policing strategies, distinguishing between 
conflictual and consensual interactions with protesters, which need not be 
1 Taken from “Diyarbakır’da Demokratik Bir Hak Talebi Nasıl Sonuçlanır? [How does a de-
mand for a democratic right result in Diyarbakır?]” posted by the off icial social media channel 
of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Is
4kQC71u78&feature=plcp, accessed on 4 September 2012.
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considered as mutually exclusive. This section is followed by a discussion 
of police cognitive schemes about protesting groups. Finally, we mention 
the presence of other players that the police interact with while handling 
protest events.
Police Functions: Goals, Means, and Constraints
At the moment we are drafting the chapter, protests are occurring in hun-
dreds of cities all over the world. Chanting slogans, marching or dancing on 
the streets, carrying banners, and maybe performing theatrical scenes, the 
demonstrators around the globe are being patrolled by the police in (mainly) 
blue uniforms. Some of them perhaps covered in riot gear, the constables 
of town X may soon end up in a forceful dispersion of the crowd, taking 
a few activists under custody, and leaving curious journalists behind in 
their attempt to collect photographic evidence for the news to be published 
tomorrow.
Just as protest is a regular mundane practice, albeit for some, so is its 
policing. Indeed, the police are the primary interlocutors for social move-
ments’ conflictual yet generally routinized relationship with the state. Thus, 
and especially under authoritarian settings, the police serve as a core, if not 
the only, player to control and suppress multiple manifestations of social 
opposition and dissent. In that respect, the interactive patterns the police 
engage with contentious actors in the society are emblematic for the police 
organization being “inherently and inescapably political because it is at the 
heart of the state’s functioning” (Neocleous, 2000: 117).
Nowadays, the operational terrain that was traditionally monopolized 
by the public police has been turning into a gateway for a variety of private 
actors under the label of security and social control (Bayley and Shear-
ing, 1996; Garland, 2001). Although this police-transformation thesis is 
constantly being challenged (Jones and Newburn, 2002; White and Gill, 
2012), some prominent criminologists go as far as to argue that the police 
“are marginal to the control of crime and the maintenance of order, and 
always have been” (Reiner, 2010: 19). Underlying this claim is not merely 
the proliferation of diverse agents within the expanding security sector, 
but also the broader picture that “[p]ublic peace and security are primarily 
a function of deeper processes in political economy and culture” (Reiner, 
2010: 22). Yet, once we think of the police beyond an amalgamation of men 
(and women, though to a signif icantly lesser extent) in blue uniforms, and 
contemplate it as an institution, it is hard to consider its functions marginal. 
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Marxist theorists such as Neocleous, for instance, point to a continuum in 
policing tasks over centuries, which are – more than the preservation and 
reproduction – the “fabrication” of social order (Neocleous, 2000). In this 
perspective, the essential role of the police is not the prevention of crime 
as such; rather it is concerned with potential threats to the existing social 
order, particularly materialized in the class-based society. Neocleous also 
opposes the equation of law enforcement with justice-seeking supposedly 
carried out by the police since, he maintains, it is not necessarily justice, 
but order that the police seek to achieve.
These theoretical considerations are useful for imagining the arena in 
which the police encounter the protesters. What is referred to by both 
academic circles and the police departments themselves as public “order” 
policing thus rightfully catches the fundamental task of the police rooted in 
its modern historical foundations. Far from being a neutral term, securing 
order implies the state’s “interest in suppressing mass dissent that threatens 
insurrection” which is carried out “under the guise of neutrally enforcing 
the law and keeping the peace” (Waddington, 1999: 65).
For that matter, the police may resort to a variety of instruments in 
discharging their duty of handling public protests. Arguably, the f irst 
thing that comes to mind is the means of coercion over which the “state” 
enjoys a monopoly. Thanks to the technological advancements in the arms 
industry and governments’ generosity in allocating resources for security, 
the depositories of police departments today have turned into a rich arsenal 
of supposedly less-than-lethal weapons, gas bombs, and pepper sprays 
which at times cause serious injuries and even deaths, just to remember 
Carlo Giuliani in Genoa 2001, Alexandros Grigoropoulos in Athens 2008, 
Ian Tomlison in London 2009, Metin Lokumcu in Hopa (Turkey) 2011, and 
numerous others.
Nevertheless, coercive means of violence are just one piece in the large 
repertory with which the police try to control dissident activity. Perhaps 
they are even marginal. For instance, police departments increasingly 
utilize surveillance methods as an effective strategy of social control. 
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras have existed for decades, yet 
contemporary forms of video surveillance are not conf ined to stationary 
devices. The introduction of mobile footage in the hands of policemen 
or deployed on their vans, drones, and what are called “Sensocopters” 
markedly enhanced the police’s capacity to monitor demonstrations. In 
Foucauldian terms, surveillance through videotaping is “a situational 
disciplinary strategy” that is “not only based on the asymmetry of vis-
ibility, but also comprises extensive classif ication, identif ication as well as 
the polIce 117
the occasional direct disciplining of individuals” (Ullrich and Wollinger, 
2011: 27).
A technique which is even less transparent and less open to public 
scrutiny is intelligence. Students of political repression may easily recall the 
infamous COINTELPRO launched to spot and disrupt “subversive” political 
activity in the post-World War II United States (Cunningham, 2003). In 
retrospect, scholars may trace such practices of state inf iltration to the 
political contingencies of the Cold War era. Yet, novel versions of intelligence 
spread even in the most allegedly democratic and liberal countries of today. 
Usually, the intelligence branches of the police collaborate with other intel-
ligence agencies of the state, whereby information from different sources is 
collated, and “categories of suspicion” are created. These categories enshrine 
“vague characteristics of supposed criminality presented in intelligence 
reports and off icer training, which are then represented as evidence and 
grounds for detention” (Monaghan and Walby, 2012: 12). Especially under the 
pervasive climate of the War on Terror, “the centralization of intelligence 
has resulted in a new framework for anti-terror policing where subversive 
and simply suspicious conduct is lumped under the categories of terrorism 
and extremism” (Monaghan and Walby, 2011: 146). From a different angle, 
the intelligence practices can be framed within the broader scheme of coun-
terinsurgency; that is to say, of governments’ effort to reclaim legitimacy 
jeopardized by deepening social opposition (Williams, 2011).
The arena of policing protests is not limited to a solely repressive logic 
of containing social movement actors and contentious groups. Both the 
conduct of the police and the right to protest are constrained by a number 
of rules and regulations. Albeit conflictual in nature, the exercise of public 
demonstration and assembly also entails a certain degree of cooperation 
between the police and the organizers of a protest. It is one of the central 
tasks of the police to communicate, negotiate, and establish dialogue 
with protest groups before, during, and after the events. As street-level 
bureaucrats, on a wider scale, they also attempt “to deal with people whose 
support appears to the police to be weak or non-existent” (Gordon, 1984: 39). 
This interactive endeavor is commonly referred as “community policing,” 
which is by and large undertaken by “liaison off icers.” At any rate, the scope 
and effectiveness of the communication depends on a series of interrelated 
factors. The prevalent policing “philosophy” in a particular country which 
may prioritize or else disfavor dialogue with citizens, the history of past 
conflict with particular groups as well as their willingness to cooperate 
with the police determine what kind of negotiation, if any, is played out 
(della Porta, 1998; Winter, 1998).
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In this chapter, we do not make an exhaustive claim that the police do 
not use any other means in combating social dissent. Whatever additional 
instruments they utilize, the police enjoy a certain level of discretion on 
the street. Yet, police behavior is also constrained by a large spectrum of 
written and unwritten codes of conduct that differ from one country to 
another. On a legislative level, these are prescribed by laws that regulate 
police competences and responsibilities on local, regional and state levels, 
as well as other legal documents such as public order and terrorism acts 
that encapsulate a wider range of law enforcement agencies including the 
judiciary. Two things are worth mentioning. First, the police do not always 
feel obliged to abide by the law; on many occasions they step into the grey 
zones of the legal sphere. Second, in several old and new democracies there 
is a recent trend toward empowering the police with greater authority while 
introducing more stringent regulations on the right to protest.
Besides legal considerations, the police also face troubles emanating 
from the very performance of their activities on the street. For one thing, 
these can thwart the police’s public legitimacy, yet for another they may 
risk investigations against their own personnel. What P.A.J. Waddington 
(1994) labeled as “on-the-job trouble” thus refers to the potential dangers 
for the lives of protest participants, constables, and bystanders as well as 
potential damage to property in the course of the event. “In-the-job trouble,” 
on the other hand, can emerge as a consequence of a heavy-handed policing 
together with allegations of over-enforcement of the law. This may result in 
judicial and administrative proceedings which are obviously not the most 
desirable outcome for the policemen. The police are inclined to avoid such 
troubles, yet in real-life occasions situational and psychological factors may 
override their conflict-averse inclinations.
Protest Policing as Arenas: Internal Dynamics and Decision 
Making
The police are not a single agency, but a multiplicity of players, both 
horizontally and vertically distributed along the professional axes of the 
institution. In horizontal terms, police off icers specialize in different 
subjects (homicide, narcotics, organized crime, traff ic, public order, etc.) 
and usually do not interrupt each others’ area of specialization. Still, the 
boundaries between police branches are permeable, and depending on 
the nature of criminal investigation they frequently exchange expertise 
and information, sometimes delegating criminal f iles to a neighboring 
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off ice. Vertically, distinctions between rank-and-f ile versus senior off icers 
as well as between “gold,” “silver,” and “bronze” commanders under more 
paramilitary settings suggests the differentiation of tasks, responsibilities, 
and professional views within the organization.
Police departments in different nations vary on all these dimensions, from 
the division of labor between several branches, to the level of autonomy in 
relation with the competent ministry and provincial authorities, to the cen-
tralization versus decentralization of decision-making structures, and to the 
extent of militarization of the departments. The domain of protest policing is 
also a blueprint of this organizational diversity (della Porta and Reiter, 1998). 
For instance, the policing record of the LAPD may differ considerably from 
that of the NYPD, the same for the contrasts between police departments 
of, say, Quebec and Toronto, Zurich and Geneva, let alone across countries.
Yet the police share common features in different geographies that 
reflect the multi-agency of the dynamics of decision making. Imagine a 
sizeable group of university students in country Y willing to demonstrate 
against an increase in educational fees. Prior to the event, they may want 
to avoid notifying public authorities and the police concerning the spatial 
and temporal details of the planned protest. Once they start gathering in 
the urban center, they will most probably come across physically equipped 
police squads cordoned and prepared for a forceful dispersion. What may 
escape media and public attention in the meanwhile is a handful of public 
order off icers, most likely in plainclothes, trying to convince group leaders 
of protesters to disperse by themselves, reminding them of legal provisions 
and criminal offenses. Of course, this can take an authoritatively patron-
izing or even threatening fashion rather than being conducted through a 
facilitative language. Now, further imagine that the bargaining fails and 
violence erupts between riot squads or “special patrol groups,” however you 
call them, and the protesters.
As usual, the footage of the event is analyzed by video surveillance 
experts at the central bureau. Suppose they detect a number of individual 
demonstrators with covered faces throwing missiles at the police. According 
to legislation in many countries, such acts fall in the cluster of offenses 
foreseen in anti-terrorism laws. From then onward, the criminal proceed-
ings may engage the terrorism branch within the police department to carry 
out the investigation. Later on, the arena will shift toward external players 
such as public prosecutors whereby the control of protest is handed to the 
workings of the judicial arena.
Of course, this is just a caricaturized illustration of what is at stake in 
the arena of protest policing where the police interact with the protesters. 
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Throughout the whole process, information and orders f low constantly 
between superior and inferior off icers. The next question is; what sort 
of references do these multiple players have in making decisions in the 
protest policing arena? Citing Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984), David Wad-
dington (2007: 18) talks about three types of audiences with respect to 
which chief constables plan on particular policies to be implemented. 
These are “legal audiences (the courts, police authorities and the Home 
Secretary); democratic audiences (politicians and the community at large); 
and occupational audiences (their immediate colleagues of all ranks 
and the wider police community).” These different audiences may turn 
into formidable sources of pressure which can hardly be avoided. For 
example, sometimes the police feel political pressure to “die in a ditch,” 
i.e., show off tough and intolerant policing styles especially when events 
or persons of symbolic value are protested (Waddington, 1993). After the 
planning phase, such pressures from the audiences of reference to which 
the police feel accountable help explain the “on-the-spot decisions made 
by commanding off icers caught up in the heat of public order events” 
(Waddington, 2007: 20).
From the lowest rank-and-f ile to the chief constable, individual off icers 
exercise discretion in their decisions. Interestingly, “the police department 
has the special property … that within it discretion increases as one moves 
down the hierarchy” (James Q. Wilson, 1968, quoted in Reiner, 1982: 165). For 
Reiner, this relative autonomy of the lower ranks “derives from the neces-
sarily dispersed, low visibility natures of his task rather than any failures of 
organizational control” (Reiner, 1982: 165). In the arena of protest policing 
the business is, by def inition, visible at times wrapping into an urban war-
fare, and concentrated rather than dispersed. The aforementioned troubles 
in and on the job also pose negative incentives for lower-rank policemen 
to rely heavily on their own discretion. Still, the warfare analogy entails 
a lot of discretion to be given to lower ones in the hierarchy: this was the 
traditional difference between strategy (of commanders, taken before the 
battle) and tactics, of those lower down who implemented the strategy 
during the battle. Particularly in the contexts where public accountability 
and transparency of police conduct is low, namely where off icial channels 
of review and interrogation are not eff icient; these negative incentives 
will surely be not so strong. It is also remarkable that the social science 
literature has talked of “police riots” to indicate moments in which rank-
and-file policemen disregard orders, and engage in violent interactions with 
protestors (Peterson, 2006).
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Interaction with Protest Groups: Cooperation, Conflicts and 
Dilemmas
So far, we have provided an overview of the means that the police use in 
dealing with protest mobilization, and a brief account of the multi-agency 
of internal decision-making dynamics. The outcome of these two param-
eters is mirrored in the patterns of interaction with protest groups, which 
“ref lect some more general characteristics of state power” (della Porta, 
forthcoming). The means available to the police, the constraints on them, 
and particular decisions implemented accordingly, are all influenced by 
the political regime.
More than a decade ago, della Porta and Reiter (1998) suggested a 
framework of protest policing styles which summarized the types of police 
interaction with protesters along several dimensions (Table 5.1). Arguably, 
it is possible to open up additional dimensions to further detail the styles 
of policing in the course of protest events, although the ones presented here 
still retain their analytical purchase.
Table 5.1 Styles of Policing, or “Interaction”
Dimension of Interaction Policing Style
Degree of force Brutal Soft
number of prohibited behaviors repressive tolerant
number of repressed groups Diffuse Selective
respect for law Illegal legal
timing of intervention reactive preventive
communication confrontational consensual
adaptability rigid Flexible
rules of the game Informal Formal
preparation artisanal professional
Source: della porta and reiter (1998)
The specif ic styles of policing add up to policing strategies. More or less 
until the beginning of the 2000s, the two dominant paradigms in describing 
policing strategies were “escalated force” and “negotiated management.” 
The former designates a strategy that does not tolerate citizens’ right to 
protest and often displays immediate recourse to the excessive use of force, 
giving precedence to brutal and repressive tactics. The latter, by contrast, 
is characterized by “a more tolerant approach to community disruption, 
closer cooperation and communication with the public, a reduced tendency 
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to make arrests (particularly as a tactic of f irst resort), and application of 
only the minimum force” (Waddington, 2007: 10). The basic argument was 
that in Western democracies, the dominant paradigm throughout 1960s and 
1970s was escalated force, which gradually began to be replaced by a general 
acceptance of negotiated management in the 1980s and 1990s.
Albeit marked by a more dialogical approach by the police, negotiated 
management embodies a different version of a statist mentality, especially 
seen from the activists’ side. Jarret S. Lovell reminds us of the marginal-
izing role of the public order management systems (POMS) for groups 
“working for radical change.” The manner in which protest is regulated 
through negotiation, he claims, is reminiscent of a Foucauldian disciplinary 
mechanism aimed at pacifying dissent. “For example, the requirement that 
protesters obtain a permit specifying the time, manner, and location of 
protest embodies precisely the disciplinary devices of observation, enclo-
sure, and timetables, … thus providing the State with leverage over protest 
groups to enact limitations and restrictions on certain forms of political 
speech” (Lovell, 2009: 114). Protest policing is also selectively applied to 
different social and political groups: in Italy in the 1980s, while protest by 
workers tended to be tolerated, the young squatters centers were more often 
repressed (della Porta, 1998).
The transition to negotiated management has not been a linear process, 
nor was the experience identical in each and every country. In the UK, for 
instance, the inner-city riots in the early 1980s and the miners’ strike of 
1984-1985 signaled a backlash of tough law-and-order police tactics under 
the reign of the Thatcher government. The stringent provisions of the 1986 
Public Order Act followed suit (McCabe et al., 1988).
But the real challenge came from the policing of the newly emerg-
ing social movements, particularly oriented toward the transnational 
space. Among others, the well-studied global justice movement(s) gave 
birth to innovative contentious strategies. Social movement scholars 
unanimously refer to the WTO events in Seattle in 1999 as the milestone 
for a new era of transnational activism. The strategy of countersummit, 
in the f irst place, brought together activists from various nationalities 
with militant but carnivalesque, disruptive but not necessarily violent 
tactics that surprised police authorities. For them, the heterogeneous 
and unpredictable background of the protesters posed a resilient threat 
in securing public order during these events (della Porta, Peterson, and 
Reiter, 2006).
As protesters developed new strategies and expanded their action rep-
ertoires, national police departments felt obliged to revise their techniques 
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of policing. In other words, the police “adapted their strategies to each 
move by the demonstrators” in an interactive process of diffusion whereby 
those new strategies are “promoted,” “assessed,” and “theorized” (della 
Porta and Tarrow, 2012: 138-142). To be more precise, each encounter with 
protesters provides the police with f irsthand material that contributes 
to the innovation of new tactics promoted through manuals, trainings, 
and conferences at national and international levels. Episodes of failure 
characterized by the police’s inability to contain demonstrators peacefully, 
as was the case in Seattle in 1999 or Gothenburg in 2001 (Wahlström, 2007), 
are critically assessed for future policing practices. Furthermore, theoreti-
cal approaches to policing such as community policing, intelligence-led 
policing, preemptive policing, and so forth, are also adjusted to the new 
challenges posed by the changing dynamics of protest. The same holds true 
for the protesters, too. Concerning countersummits, for instance, activists 
facing mass deployment of highly equipped anti-riot squads develop tactics 
such as “social disobedience” (e.g., White Overalls in Italy) whereby they 
refuse engagement in violence but “wear masks and other instruments – to 
protect themselves from police weapons – but do not carry any offensive 
arms” (della Porta and Tarrow, 2012: 134). Such innovations also entail 
prior meetings and assemblies illustrated by social forums and Internet 
exchanges, where previous experiences with the police are assessed and 
new tactics are promoted.
In this regard, ongoing research reveals the resurgence of coercive polic-
ing during several episodes of mass demonstrations, transnational protest 
events in particular. The notorious political rhetoric of the global War on 
Terror contributed to this more exclusive turn. Scholars started to pinpoint 
the distinctive properties of police control of transnational mobilization. 
John A. Noakes and his colleagues (2005) singled out these properties in 
the following order:
the establishment of extensive no protest zones, often by installing 
large concrete and metal fence barriers; the disruption of safe spaces, 
such as convergence centers where protesters would congregate to 
sleep, eat and acquire information; the use of less-lethal weapons to 
temporarily incapacitate protesters so police could retake control of 
spaces of contention; the use of electronic surveillance technology to 
increase the transparency of spaces of contention and provide real-time 
information on demonstrators activities to police; pre-emptive arrests 
to reorganize leaders and large numbers of protesters. (Noakes et al., 
2005: 241)
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What they call “strategic incapacitation,” in a nutshell, comprises an incremen-
tal resort to “surveillance and information sharing, proactive policing, and the 
elaborate control of space” (Gillham and Noakes, 2007: 350). In fact, strategic 
incapacitation is not a rupture from previous policing strategies, nor does it 
mean that they are completely dropped in particular situations. Rather, it 
selectively aims at “transgressive” demonstrators who are not willing to comply 
with the police. Nevertheless, the common problem is that despite its selective 
logic, incapacitation affects not only the targeted participants but all partici-
pant, and often the surrounding population as well. Indeed, this translates into 
the primordial dilemma of protest policing, “how to control members of those 
crowds who intend to act illegally without alienating members of those that 
have legitimate aims” (Reicher et al., 2004: 562). On many occasions,
the police respond to early signs of conflict from the crowd – either the 
presence of certain groups or else actual acts of violence by some crowd 
members – by clamping down on the crowd as a whole… Hence undif-
ferentiated police constraint can cause groups that were not originally 
intent to conflict to become more willing to countenance confrontation, 
to become closer to other more conflictual groupings in the crowd and 
to become more hostile to the police. (Reicher et al., 2004: 563)
Table 5.2 Protest Policing Strategies
Dimension Escalated Force Negotiated 
Management
Selective Incapacitation
toleration of 
disruption
low high Selective
communication low high Selective & one-way
use of arrests Frequent last resort Selective & proactive
use of force high last resort Selective & less lethal
Surveillance moderate low extensive & real time
Information 
sharing
moderate low extensive, cross-agencies, 
and media-conscious
controlling space localized & 
reactive
localized & 
proactive
Selective, extensive, and 
proactive
Source: Gillham (2011) 
note: the original version designates the strategies in the united States. thus, the dimension on 
the First amendment rights is dropped here.
Actually, as it is also true for escalated force and negotiated management, 
strategic incapacitation involves measures that usually extend the scope of 
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authority of the police and entail the engagement of additional players from 
the government and public administration. These measures range from 
stricter border controls (such as declining activists’ entry to the country, 
temporary lifting of Schengen provisions) to extra-legal regulations or city 
ordinances that are superimposed on the existing police-driven methods. 
These recent trends in controlling demonstrations are not confined to the 
realm of transnational protest. On the contrary, the police employ strategic 
incapacitation during many domestically rooted outbursts of mobilization 
which may have received less scholarly attention. Subsequent research 
should provide more stories on native repercussions of the recent policing 
trends to enrich our comparativist agenda.
Police Cognitive Schemas about Protesters
The ways in which police interact with protesting groups are also influ-
enced by their cognitive schemas, which are discernibly cultivated within 
the police (occupational) culture and subculture.2 Classical accounts drew 
attention to overriding features such as propensity to violence, search for 
action, conservatism, and lack of tolerance embedded in police behavior. 
As early as 1960s, Jerome Skolnick singled out the “working personality” of 
policemen as “shaped by constant exposure to danger and the need to use 
force and authority to reduce and control threatening situations” (Dempsey 
and Forst, 2009: 154). As a consequence, it is widely accepted, policemen 
tend to nurture a “suspicious” attitude toward their environment. That is 
also why their socialization processes are largely insulated from the rest 
of society. Later qualitative studies confirmed the propensity among the 
police to locate themselves at the right of the political spectrum (Baker, 
1985).
The predominantly negative portrayal of police cultural traits was chal-
lenged on a number of grounds. Critiques, for instance, highlighted the 
loose usage of the term culture within the literature because it is “rarely 
embedded in any sort of def inition or notion of culture” while “the broader 
notion of culture is unaddressed or taken for granted” (Crank, 2004: 14). 
2 Our usage of the terms police culture and subculture derives separately from their distinction 
put forward by Crank (2004). Citing a previous work he co-authored with Roy R. Roberg and 
Jack L. Kuykendall (2000), Crank refers to police culture as a universe of “occupational beliefs 
and values” adhered by police off icers, whereas by police subculture he means the system of 
values adopted from the society they are part of (2004: 30).
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Others point out that cultural analyses of the police fail to recognize 
“the interpretive and creative aspects of culture” which have to do with 
“the interaction between the socio-political context of police work and 
various dimensions of police organizational knowledge” (Chan, 1996). 
Others indicate the role of “normative orders” such as bureaucratic and 
legal frames in shaping those attributes (Herbert, 1998). Still others prob-
lematize the monolithic descriptions of the police personalities as if they 
were a homogeneous entity, and underscore sources of variation such as 
“organizations, rank, and individual off icer styles” (Paoline, 2003: 204). The 
plausibility of these criticisms notwithstanding, most recent statements 
conf irm the endurance of conventional representations of police cultural 
traits despite transformative attempts in the organization (Loftus, 2010; 
Skolnick, 2008).
Under these circumstances, it seems hard to imagine that the police 
strongly empathize with protesters who are particularly contentious, at 
times disruptive, and militant if radicalized. However, it is just as diff icult 
to assume that the police share the same cognitive attributes regarding 
different protest groups due to the variation within the personnel across 
ranks, branches, and location. In that sense, police “knowledge” that 
refers to police’s perception of their own and the external reality, as della 
Porta and Reiter formulated, looks like a more elaborated conception 
which is “not limited to f leeting images, stereotypes, and prejudices, but 
extends to the core problems of protest policing” (della Porta and Reiter, 
1998: 23). Beyond cultural dispositions, knowledge joins information and 
past experiences of the police who, in turn, hold different schemes with 
regard to protesters. Studies have found a juxtaposition of “good” versus 
“bad,” “genuine” versus “professional,” “contained” versus “transgressive” 
protesters in the eyes of the police. All these different articulations share in 
common a notion of the legitimacy of protest which becomes undermined 
as demonstrators lean toward non-compliance, radicalization, and illegal 
action in content and form. To be more precise, hooligans or groups like 
“black bloc” are typical examples of the problematic category, whereas 
more institutionalized activists such as labor unions are perceived less 
as “troublemakers.” On top of everything else, police knowledge tends 
to vary with the specif ic individual policeperson careers, training, age, 
gender, and so on. Police knowledge extends beyond the protesters, to 
include different actors who – such as the government or public opinion 
(often identif ied with the press) – are expected to react to police behaviors, 
successes, and failures.
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Expanding the Arena: Bringing Other Players In
While interacting with protesters, the police never act alone. Above all, 
they are politically influenced by governmental authorities. They are in 
constant exchange and collaboration with the judiciary. Sometimes military 
actors step in. Relations with civil society and media also entail frequent 
communication. Under different regime settings the engagement of these 
additional players will vary considerably; the arena of protest policing 
always contains several players so that the police do not remain the only 
sovereign player in the arena.
To begin with, the control of protests is “calculated” according to a certain 
logic of political economy. What we observe during protest events, e.g. 
deployment of personnel, equipment and vehicles, construction of fences, 
cameras and so forth, requires serious budgetary allocations, especially 
when it comes to big transnational events:
Some of this money is spent on overtime salaries, extra personnel 
(including private police), city services such as transportation and 
waste management, and federal services, such as special deployments 
of military and border agencies. Some of the money is invested in new 
technologies, which are left behind with local police agencies long after 
the event. This arsenal of new technologies and weapons includes new 
surveillance technologies, … “less-than-lethal” weapons, … and the latest 
riot gear. (Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl, 2011: 49)
Here, what is at stake is a political question with the police at the very center 
of it. The expenditures allotted to the control of protest shed light on the 
contemporary orientations of governance that is very much marked by the 
fetish of security. To illustrate, for securing the G8 summit in Heiligendamm 
in 2007 from “dangerous” protesters, it has been noted that “[t]he money 
spent on renting buildings for the police operations amounted to €1,074,600” 
(Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl, 2011: 53). Likewise, the costs for the G8 and G20 
meetings in Toronto in 2010 totaled $929 million, of which $507 million were 
spent by the Royal Canadian Military Police (RCMP). This money was spent 
to safeguard political leaders from the “threat” posed by the protesters. Actu-
ally, these examples suggest that the political economy of dissent control 
stipulates excessive policing strategies that are not decided upon merely by 
the police themselves. There is a political story, backed by political players.
A similar process of extra-police player involvement is seen in the spatial 
dynamics of protest policing. “Physical control of space,” Luis Fernandez 
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argues, “refers to ways in which police departments carefully select and 
map out the material environment before and during a protest” (Fernandez, 
2008: 93). These may also include determining the marching routes and 
assembly places in the urban centers, or imposing stricter border controls as 
we have mentioned before. The point is that the police do not take decisions 
in isolation, but rely on a set of external actors during the planning of the 
events. A commanding off icer in Washington, DC, aptly summarizes the 
point:
Every city agency has a part in it, whether it’s the Department of Public 
Works for removal of things that could be used as projectiles, through 
the Department of Transportation to help us with the control of traff ic 
in the outskirts of one of these things; through the f ire department who 
may provide for medical services for protestors and police off icers; all 
the way up to include the federal government, the FBI and all sorts of 
intelligence networks. (Fernandez, 2008: 96)
The police also develop tight relations with the military as a player. Presum-
ably, in authoritarian contexts, or where the capabilities of the police are 
relatively weak due to a low level of professionalization, resource allocation, 
and so on, military assistance of the police should be a more widespread 
phenomenon. But the question is valid for democracies as well, where a 
non-military police developed. Previously, military aid to the police dur-
ing tough public order incidents was more frequent and broadly accepted 
(Johansen, 2005; Palmer, 1988). The police in many established democracies 
have been investing in their own specially trained, highly equipped (para)
military units such as special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams in the 
United States. Some authors are alarmed by the explosion and overuse 
of such units, considered as disproportionate to the violent crime rates 
in comparison with the past (Fisher, 2010). Thus, the deployment of the 
military is generally considered as a last resort in worst-case scenarios, and 
“when it is done,” as Alice Hills (1995: 454) states about the UK, “as in the 
1926 general strike, they operate at the request of the police, in support of 
the police, and under the general authority of the police.” Where the police 
are operationally subject to the authority of the military, by contrast, the 
relationship is the other way around.
In addition, the police may request the assistance of traditionally rooted 
military forces like the gendarmerie. Albeit military in structure, such as 
Guardia Civil in Spain or Gendarmerie Nationale in France, these forces 
undertake policing tasks in rural areas, and are supervised by both civilian 
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and military authorities. At times, the deployment of the gendarmerie may 
generate controversial situations that challenge common sense perceptions 
on the issue. Regarding the Argentinean state’s repression of the piqueteros, 
as recently documented, the gendarmerie, “respectful of protesters’ rights 
and reticent to use lethal force, clashed with the ‘popular image’ … as f ierce, 
unfeeling ‘Robocops,’ who enjoy violently ‘repressing’ the population and 
who are analogous in many ways to the dirty warriors” (Carlson, 2006: 183). 
At any rate, despite growing tendencies toward paramilitarization, the 
military’s entry into public disorder situations is definitely not an outdated 
question even in the well established democracies of the present.
While with the development of the nation-state came a process of na-
tionalization of the police, globalization – and the transnational protests 
it brings about – has seen the development of complex arrangements, with 
often police from different countries intervening in the control of the same 
events. As Reiter and Fillieule (2006) observed, these developments were 
not followed by a transnational protection of the rights to protest that have 
been more and more often (and allegedly arbitrarily) restricted.
Finally, public police interact with private police with increasingly 
permeable borders between the two. Authoritarian regimes, in particular, 
rely on the additional support of militias and voluntary citizen forces to 
control public dissent. For instance, the party militia in the GDR were 
called in by the government to repress the 1989 civil right movement 
(but refused to go). In Mubarak’s Egypt, the regime used to hire groups 
of gangs known as baltajiya to suppress protesters, most recently during 
the mass meetings on Tahrir Square. A further example is the basij in 
Iran which has been active since their establishment by Khomeini’s order 
in 1979. Even in democracies, the semi-privatization of spaces (such as 
malls or airports) has increased the role of privately engaged police in 
the control of protest.
Conclusion
This chapter has aimed at understanding the police as players and protest 
policing as an arena. Without focusing on a particular case, we have dis-
cussed the topic at a relatively abstract level along several dimensions. The 
central idea was that the police are made up of multiple players who interact 
both among each other and with various players external to the police to 
shape the dynamics of protest policing. These dynamics are enshrined in the 
means used, the decisions taken, strategies adopted, as well as the cognitive 
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schemas developed, all of which are played out through interactions with 
the protesters.
Police departments today enjoy rich repositories of policing instru-
ments that vary from supposedly less-than-lethal weapons to real-time 
surveillance and from several sources of intelligence to communicative 
skills. In making use of these means the police rely on a certain level of 
discretion, yet they are also constrained by a set of written and unwritten 
rules, potential troubles in and on the job, and the pressures from different 
audiences to whom they are (or feel they are) accountable. These multiple 
layers intermingle with the cultural dispositions of the police deriving from 
their occupational orientations. Traditionally, the police are associated with 
exposure to danger and a tendency to use force, producing a particularly 
suspicious attitude toward their environment. More specif ically, however, 
it is their “knowledge” that they accumulate through education, training, 
and past experiences that shapes their different perceptions of protesters. 
Overall, protest policing strategies are f iltered through these dimensions 
that vary across time and space. Many scholars observe a backlash of 
authoritarian methods that dominate those strategies in a neoliberal age. 
Still, the recent rise of strategic incapacitation does not preclude previ-
ous paradigms of escalated force and negotiated management as they are 
variably implemented on different national and transnational arenas of 
policing. The ultimate point is that whatever strategies are employed, the 
police never act alone in those arenas as they are backed as well as chal-
lenged by other political and bureaucratic players of the state.
We consider this is a useful conceptual framework for grasping broader 
processes of the relationship between the state and social movements. In-
deed, the centrality of the police not only lies in its being one of the founding 
institutions of the state, but also in the fact that protest policing is a mundane 
practice just as protest is. The conceptualization of this phenomenon through 
players and arenas should yield a fertile analytical ground for empirical 
research on different cases of political geographies around the world.
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6 The Military
The Mutual Determination of Strategy in Ireland, 1912-1921
Ian Roxborough
This chapter examines an extreme case of protest: the armed struggle 
of Irish nationalists between 1912 and 1921, and the efforts on the part of 
sections of the British state to defeat the rebellion by the use of armed 
force. It examines the different cognitive frames and strategies of the 
various police and military organizations of the British state (Royal Irish 
Constabulary, Dublin Metropolitan Police, the “Black and Tans” and Aux-
iliaries, and the British Army, together with the intelligence services) as 
they confronted armed insurgency in Ireland. States, as Jasper (2015) and 
Goldstone (2004) have argued, should not be treated as unitary actors. 
This is immediately apparent in the case of the British state in Ireland, 
where even the sectors where one might expect considerable policy coher-
ence – in the coercive organizations and in the Cabinet – displayed a 
high level of organizational incoherence and diff iculty in coordinating 
strategy. This was one factor, perhaps a crucial one, in the failure of British 
counterinsurgency in Ireland.
The Anglo-Irish coercive players were far from homogeneous, and ap-
proached the struggle with distinct worldviews, frames, or mental maps to 
guide them in their search for appropriate policies. These maps were not 
simply cognitive, but also deeply emotional and value-symbolic, mobilizing 
affective solidarities. Since the interests and organizational cultures of 
the various players were distinct – and often at odds with each other – the 
tensions between them must be understood if we are to understand how 
“the state” developed its response to insurgency. We can arrive at a more 
accurate analysis of state response by abandoning any notion that we are 
dealing with a unif ied actor, much less a unif ied and coherent rational 
actor.
The conf lict in Ireland was multi-dimensional: it was not simply a 
struggle for national independence against a recalcitrant empire. It was 
also a sectarian struggle between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. 
There was thus a triangular conflict between the largely Catholic south-
ern Irish nationalists, the Protestant Ulster loyalists, and the British 
government, itself deeply divided over what policy to adopt. Ulster acted 
as a “spoiler,” preventing the introduction of Home Rule in 1914, and 
134 Ian roxBorouGh 
preventing the creation of a united and independent Ireland. Much of the 
historiography of the period focuses on southern (and largely Catholic) 
nationalism and the conf lict with the coercive organizations of the 
British state. Ulster saw its share of violence, though this took a differ-
ent form, that of sectarian conflict between Protestants and Catholics. 
The importance of Ulster, however, lay not in direct conf lict but in its 
role of spoiler, precluding any easy accommodation of Irish nationalist 
aspirations. The very existence of Ulster was a factor in the calculations 
of all players. Ulster – with the specter of a large and uncontrollable 
Protestant militia and the potential of a sectarian, civil war throughout 
Ireland – was the dog that didn’t bark.
This chapter highlights three key dynamics: (1) each party to the con-
flict – the British government, the Southern nationalists, and the Ulster 
loyalists – was a congeries of organizations, movements, and powerful 
individuals. There was little organizational coherence, and principal-agent 
problems abounded, as leaders proved unable to control their rank-and-file 
or their allies. (2) Not only were the actors not unitary, they were not entirely 
“rational,” either: the frames they used to understand events were inaccurate 
schemata, and/or there was muddled thinking. (3) All actors in this conflict 
shaped their strategies, at least in part, in response to their understandings 
(accurate or otherwise) of what their adversaries (and potential allies) were 
doing. The repertoires of contention and the strategies and tactics adopted 
shifted rapidly in a series of moves and countermoves. Much social action 
and outcomes is contingent, for all sorts of reasons. In this case, a major 
source of contingency stemmed from the fact that actors were not, in any 
simple sense, “rational,” and frequently misunderstood the motives and 
intentions of other players. In what follows I will demonstrate how these 
three issues – fragmentary actors, the absence of clearly rational strategies, 
and strategic interaction – together offer a set of analytic tools with which 
to understand this conflict. I follow a narrative organization, highlighting 
the analytic issues as I proceed.
Background
The struggle for Irish independence has a long history. This chapter focuses 
only on the armed conflict between 1912 and 1921 and its immediate ante-
cedents. Following the Act of Union, Ireland became, in 1801, an integral 
part of the United Kingdom with its own MPs sitting in Westminster. 
For the next century, Ireland would remain the poorest, most rural part 
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of a multinational polity. Violent agrarian conflict was endemic, and a 
culture of organized resistance developed that pitted poor and insecure 
tenant farmers against large landowners, often of English extraction. The 
formal exclusion of Catholics from political power, from the professions, 
and from the universities – a result of earlier British dynastic and religious 
struggles – added a religious, and national dimension to the agrarian 
protest. By the late nineteenth century, these grievances had been largely 
resolved and Ireland was experiencing sustained economic growth, but 
a pernicious legacy of bitter feelings toward England and the English 
remained.
Policing was carried out by two separate bodies. In the capital, the Dublin 
Metropolitan Police was modeled after the Metropolitan Police of London. 
An unarmed body of constables and detectives, it was oriented toward 
routine crime prevention and detection. A small special branch kept track of 
political subversives. In the rest of Ireland, an armed constabulary, the Royal 
Irish Constabulary (RIC), much along the lines of the Italian Carabinieri 
or the French Gendarmerie, was equipped with rifles and was organized 
as a national, rather than a local force. Constables were housed in police 
barracks, usually in groups of eight to ten men, and could be assigned 
anywhere in the country. That said, the paramilitary aspects of the RIC at 
this time should not be exaggerated.
The end of the nineteenth century saw a flowering of cultural nationalism 
(the Gaelic revival) in Ireland, and it was this – and not agrarian discontent 
or confessional exclusion – that fed the nationalist movement that now 
emerged. There was a deliberate and self-conscious effort to “recover” a 
sense of Irishness. Classes in Gaelic were held, and Irish sports, including 
hurling, were popularized.
These efforts politicized many spheres of daily life. The result was that 
“Irishness was to be redefined and, with it, the shape of the Irish nation” 
(Townshend, 2005: 8). Like most European nationalisms of this time, the 
new Irish cultural nationalism emphasized the unity of the “people” with 
the soil in a romantic, nostalgic, and organicist image of the virtues of the 
simple rural life contrasted with the cosmopolitanism of high urbanism.
The Gaelic revival melded with an implicit (and sometimes explicit) 
assertion that Ireland was a nation defined by its adherence to Catholicism. 
This was partly in response to a sense that the oppressors were English 
Protestants, and that one of the distinctive features, therefore, of Irish 
nationhood was a widespread Catholic piety. This new definition of “Irish-
ness” in terms of Catholicism and Gaelic culture was to prove an insuperable 
obstacle to the creation of an Ireland that was both united and free of British 
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rule. The fact that 29 percent of the population of Ireland were Protestants, 
and that most of these were concentrated in the province of Ulster (thereby 
giving them great political clout) posed a central diff iculty for this line of 
thought. Nationalists could have a united Ireland or a Catholic Ireland, 
but not both.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Irish nationalists could draw on 
two distinct traditions of protest, with radically divergent strategies. On 
the one hand there was the Fenian tradition of conspiracy, terrorism, and 
insurrection. On the other hand there was a largely successful effort to use 
Irish representation in Parliament to advance the cause of independence 
by pressing for “Home Rule” legislation.
Opening Moves: Home Rule and Ulster Opposition
In 1912 the Gladstone ministry introduced the Third Home Rule Bill, which, 
unlike the preceding attempts, was not vetoed by the House of Lords. It 
was intended to come into effect in 1914. Irish independence appeared to 
be about to be advanced peacefully, and Ireland would be left to run its 
internal affairs.
Trouble began when the vast majority of Ulster Protestants simply 
refused to accept Home Rule. Half a million signed the Solemn League 
and Covenant in September 1912, the very title redolent with Protestant 
symbolism. In January 1913, an armed militia, the Ulster Volunteer Force, 
was formed and grew quickly to about 100,000 members. The Catholic 
nationalists in the south responded by creating their own militia, the Irish 
Volunteers. Both sides began to import weapons. In April 1914 the UVF ran 
nearly 50,000 rifles and three million rounds of ammunition into Ulster. 
The Liberal government dithered over what to do. British efforts to stem 
the flow of arms were ineffectual.
In August 1914, there were over a quarter of a million men enrolled in 
citizen militias in Ireland. A substantial minority of them were armed 
with modern weapons, and more of these were on their way. Ireland had 
entered a confused and volatile state that was not yet civil war, but no 
longer peace. (Townshend, 2005: 28)
Thus the conflict in Ireland, at its core a struggle over national identity and 
national independence, was transformed into a sectarian or confessional 
division. Mainstream Irish nationalism had identif ied itself as Gaelic and 
Catholic, and was thus in no position to transcend the sectarian divide by 
the mIlItary 137
offering a vision of Irishness that delinked national identity and religious 
aff iliation. Ulster Protestants elected to maintain their Protestant identity 
by reaff irming their ties with Britain, destroying the possibility of a peace-
ful, constitutional solution to Irish aspirations for independence. In the 
words of historian Charles Townshend, “‘Ulster’ had opted out of Home 
Rule, and had threatened armed rebellion to do so. It was this armed threat 
that transformed and militarized the language of Irish politics as the Home 
Rule crisis unfolded” (Townshend, 2005: 30).
The British Cabinet contemplated enforcing Home Rule over Ulster op-
position. This was politically risky: the Liberal Party was split internally 
over the Home Rule issue, and some Conservative political leaders were 
openly advocating armed resistance to Home Rule. What tipped the scale 
was the determined resistance of sections of the British off icer corps, many 
of whom identif ied with Protestant loyalism. A major crisis in civil-military 
relations ensued. The commander of the Curragh base, Sir Henry Paget, was 
ordered by the War Office to begin preparations to put down the Protestant 
resistance. Fifty-seven of the seventy off icers in the camp made it known 
that they were unwilling to take part in any action against the Protestant 
community of Northern Ireland. A series of meetings between army officers 
and the Cabinet led to the issue being brushed under the carpet (Beckett, 
1986). British civil-military relations had deteriorated to the point where 
the civilian political leaders could no longer count on the military to carry 
out their wishes.
Unsure of the reliability of its own military forces, and in any case reluc-
tant to repress its loyalist supporters, the British government backed down 
and the Ulster Protestants were allowed to continue to arm themselves. 
Here was an instance of a radical f lank setting policy.
Before the Ulster crisis could f ind a political settlement, the First World 
War erupted. The Home Rule bill received royal assent in September 1914, 
but its implementation was suspended until the end of the war, forcing Irish 
nationalists into a variant of what Jasper terms the “naughty or nice di-
lemma” (Jasper, 2006: 106- 107). The Parliamentarians, led by John Redmond, 
sought to use the war as an opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the 
Crown, hoping thereby to reap the reward of Home Rule once the conflict 
was over. Thousands of Irishmen flocked to the colors. Other nationalists, 
drawing on the old Fenian tradition, hewed to the slogan that “England’s 
diff iculty is Ireland’s opportunity.” As the war dragged on, and as its costs 
rose, the Fenian choice was to prove the winning formula.
The outbreak of war did, for a while, lead to an uneasy quiet in Ireland. 
Initially it increased pro-British sentiment as many Irishmen volunteered to 
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serve in the British Army. However, by 1916 the tradition of conspiracy and 
urban insurrection had been resuscitated. On Easter Monday, 1916, between 
1,200 and 1,600 armed troops of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the 
militia of the organized labor movement, the Citizens’ Army, took over the 
center of Dublin, to the surprise and curiosity of the local population. A 
republic was proclaimed.
Easter 1916: Catholic Martyrdom
A conspiratorial group within the Irish Republican Army, the Irish Repub-
lican Brotherhood (IRB), had planned an uprising throughout Ireland for 
Easter Sunday, 1916. Preparations were made in as much secrecy as possible. 
The cover for assembling bodies of armed men was to be a f ield exercise 
of the Irish Volunteers. As word of what was planned leaked out, divisions 
within the IRB rose to the surface. The moderate elements within the IRB 
sought to cancel the insurrection. This resulted in a postponement from the 
Sunday to the Monday and much confusion about what actually was to take 
place. In the event, the insurrection went ahead on the Monday. A Republic 
was proclaimed, and the insurgents settled down to await an uprising in the 
rest of Ireland and promised German assistance. Neither was forthcoming.
The British Army swiftly brought in reinforcements, sealing off the 
center of Dublin. They then moved onto the attack and, in several days 
of intense street f ighting, forced the surviving rebels to surrender. The 
insurrectionaries had underestimated the earnestness and strength of the 
British response, and overestimated the level of support from the general 
population in Dublin and from rebels elsewhere in Ireland.
In its revolutionary technique, the uprising was a revival of a nineteenth-
century European tradition of street f ighting. In its symbolism, the move-
ment was dominated by the Catholic Martyrdom of its leaders, most notably 
Patrick Pearse. This was new, part of the Gaelic revival.
In terms of an instrumental assault aimed at the seizure of state power, 
the rising was an unqualified failure. However, it set off a train of events that 
eventually led to a successful insurgency against British rule. The Rising, as 
it came to be known, drew on romantic notions of nationalist struggle and 
on Catholic notions of sacrif ice and martyrdom. It inspired a generation 
of nationalist radicals, legitimizing the use of mass violence, branding the 
British state more f irmly than ever as an imperialist oppressor.
The leaders of the Rising, such as Patrick Pearse, were strong believ-
ers in the potency of symbolic politics. Dramatic acts had the power to 
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galvanize public opinion. Charles Townshend notes that “[a]s he moved into 
middle age, his ‘imagery showed an almost pathological lust for violence’” 
(Townshend, 2005: 23). The redemptive violence of revolution was married 
to a Catholic pursuit of martyrdom. Such men “saw time as their enemy, 
not their ally… This would be their only chance to fulf ill the IRB’s dream 
of revolution – an opportunity elevated into a spiritual necessity by Pearse 
and others, who believed that Ireland’s soul could be saved only by an act 
of Christ-like sacrif ice” (Hart, 2005: 78-79).
As the various players monitored the actions and strategies of the others, 
there was much room for misperception. In the case of the Easter Rising, 
the British authorities in Ireland, both civil and military, were caught 
unprepared. British intelligence in Ireland during the First World War was 
focused entirely on the threat of German spies, German subversion, and 
the possibility of a German invasion of Ireland. As a result, although tipped 
off about IRB plans for an uprising on Easter Sunday, British authorities in 
Dublin made no preparations to deal with it.
Sixteen of the leaders of the Rising were shot by f iring squad. The public 
response caught the British authorities off guard: in the midst of a great 
war the execution of a handful of armed rebels seemed eminently justif i-
able. The Irish public, however, was outraged, and these men were seen as 
martyrs for the cause of Irish independence.
Another mistake was made in the battle to def ine the nature of the 
conflict. In the aftermath of the Rising, more than 3,000 suspects would 
pass through army custody. Most prisoners were sent to a vacant camp for 
German prisoners of war in Frongoch, North Wales. Here they were mostly 
left to themselves in the sort of regime that prisoners of war would experi-
ence. The more politically active among the prisoners organized the inmates 
and began a campaign of resistance to the British camp authorities. The less 
political prisoners were inducted into the nationalist cause, and Frongoch 
became the university of the revolution. A new generation of leaders and 
activists came to the fore: more pragmatic than the Easter martyrs, but 
equally willing – in their own way – to utilize martyrdom for their purposes. 
This would enable a shift in strategy from open insurrectional confrontation 
to guerrilla warfare. “Sinn Fein got the benefit of the Rising, whereas the 
Irish Volunteers and the IRB – the Rising’s vehicles – had been decapitated 
and dismembered by casualties and executions” (Hart, 2005: 136).
Meanwhile, the Great War continued. In Britain the government had 
initially relied on a volunteer army. By 1916 it came reluctantly to the deci-
sion to introduce conscription, but exempted Ireland in order not to create 
more problems for itself. Following the German offensive of March 1918, the 
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British government sought to impose more thoroughgoing conscription in 
England, Wales, and Scotland. The price it paid to do this was to remove 
the exemption Ireland had hitherto enjoyed. Irish nationalists vowed to 
resist any effort to implement conscription in Ireland. In fact, the British 
government had no serious intention of doing so, and quickly backed down 
in the face of mass protest (Gregory, 2002). However, considerable damage 
had been done. The leading nationalist organization, Sinn Féin, capitalized 
on the anxieties generated by the threat of conscription to rapidly expand 
its membership (Hart, 2005: 171-172).
The result was a rapid re-alignment of the Irish party system. The f irst 
post-war elections, in 1918, were the death knell of the old Parliamentary 
Party. They were swept aside by the new radical nationalists of Sinn Féin. 
It was time for a new strategy.
Sinn Féin Strategy
Sinn Féin’s broad strategy was to problematize the obedience given to, and 
acquiescence in, British rule. This could be achieved in a variety of ways. 
Campaigns of non-cooperation and boycotts were envisaged. Ostracism 
and intimidation of “collaborators” with British rule would play a part. If 
armed conflict were to occur, it would not take the form of a sudden urban 
uprising led by a secret organization, along the lines of Easter 1916, but 
would be guerrilla warfare.
Elections would no longer be utilized to produce a bloc in the British 
Parliament which could negotiate for better treatment for Ireland, but would 
instead serve as a referendum to demonstrate popular support for Sinn 
Féin. They would legitimate an assertion of sovereignty. In January 1919 an 
Irish parliament (Dáil Éireann) was called into being and a republic was 
declared (again.)
A central part of any revolutionary struggle, indeed in Charles Tilly’s view 
the very def inition of a revolutionary situation, is the effort to establish a 
counterstate of some kind that can directly compete with the “off icial” 
state for legitimacy and allegiance (Tilly, 1978). Remarkably, the British 
government seemed quite obtuse about this danger. They allowed the crea-
tion of Irish parliamentary institutions and they would shortly permit the 
administration of justice to collapse in rural and village Ireland.
On 21 January [1919], Dail Eireann, made up of those Sinn Fein MPs not in 
jail, met for the f irst time, in the Dublin Mansion House. A Declaration 
of Independence was issued, and a government was formed to carry out 
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Sinn Fein’s election pledges. While the occasion was public and watched by 
policemen, it was ignored by the British government as just so much hot air. 
This republic was indeed imaginary – as was its ability to govern – but those 
concerned were very serious about making it a reality. (Hart, 2005: 187)
IRA Strategy
The Irish Republican Army, secretly dominated by the IRB, was the armed 
wing of Sinn Féin. The IRA was to implement the military component of 
the strategy of making Ireland ungovernable.
The f irst sustained IRA campaign was against the police. The Royal Irish 
Constabulary was a national police force, widely scattered in the towns and 
villages of Ireland. Unmarried off icers – the majority of the force – were 
housed in small “barracks,” usually row houses indistinguishable from any 
other. The f irst step was to ostracize and harass police off icers. This was 
followed by attacks on poorly defended barracks with the aim of seizing 
weapons and increasing pressure on the RIC to abandon rural and small 
town Ireland. Attacks grew in size and frequency in the second half of 1919, 
and then rapidly escalated. It became perilous to maintain a continuous 
police presence in the countryside. Police barracks, usually physically 
vulnerable or only hastily fortif ied, came under attack and were often 
abandoned. The IRA burned evacuated barracks: this sent a clear symbolic 
message to the local population. In practical terms, police presence in many 
parts of rural Ireland became episodic and ineffectual. The British court sys-
tem was paralyzed by the unwillingness of juries to convict or of witnesses 
to testify against the IRA. RIC morale plummeted and resignations soared. 
Many constables came to a modus vivendi with their nationalist opponents, 
opting for passivity in order to survive through this time of troubles and 
live to enjoy their pensions. The Dublin Metropolitan Police, whose detec-
tive force was hit hard by IRA assassins, lapsed into political passivity. By 
intimidating and killing the police, and by preventing the operation of the 
Crown courts, the administration of justice in the countryside and small 
towns was stopped. It was replaced by the establishment of a shadow state 
with its own Dáil Courts and Sinn Féin police.
In their moral framing Sinn Féin and the IRA reached back to the themes 
of martyrdom which had been so prominent in 1916, but now subordinated 
them to a more disciplined political organization. A new tactic was intro-
duced: arrested militants now went on hunger strike (a tactic copied directly 
from the British suffragettes), and large crowds gathered outside jails to 
protest and lament. This placed the British authorities on the horns of an 
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unattractive dilemma: allowing the hunger strikers to die would paint the 
state as cruel and barbaric; releasing them would be a show of weakness. 
Funerals for IRA martyrs were incorporated into these prolonged mass 
rituals of solidarity and defiance.
Imprisonment was part of a larger set of symbolic and emotional rituals 
that bolstered rebel resolve.
Prison was one of the vital transformative experiences that made clerks 
and farmers’ sons into new men: soldiers and martyrs. The revolution had 
to be imagined before it could be enacted, and the revolutionaries had to 
imagine themselves into history to give themselves the power to change 
it. To stand in the dock and defy the Crown, to be cast into prison for being 
a patriot – these were clichéd but immensely powerful roles, endlessly 
rehearsed in nationalist songs, histories and literature. By re-enacting 
them you could become your heroes. What seemed immature or naïve 
to observers at the time, or to skeptical historians since, could have the 
force of a religious conversion to the people who were living it… Playing 
the role of the def iant rebel was far more than mere theatricality. It was 
a source of power and energy and solidarity – part of the basic chemistry 
of revolution. (Hart, 2005: 168)
The Cabinet wavered. Its initial response was to release the hunger strikers. 
This did nothing to quiet nationalist protest; and so the Cabinet shifted to a 
hard line. In October 1920, alarmed that his release might lead to a mutiny 
of police and army, the Cabinet allowed a Cork Sinn Féin leader, Terence 
MacSwiney, to die. The Cabinet’s decision worked: the IRA stopped using 
the tactic of hunger strikes.
The British Response
The British Army responded by demanding the implementation of martial 
law and summary military courts which would operate with different rules 
of evidence. This was resisted by the politicians, who held the view that 
defeating the insurgents was “a police matter.” But the RIC were in disarray 
and the army – with vastly expanded imperial commitments after the First 
World War and facing massive industrial unrest in Britain – had few men to 
spare for Ireland. This shortfall in manpower was met by efforts to augment 
the Irish police. In March 1920 the British recruited recently demobilized 
veterans of the First World War, into two new formations: the notorious 
Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries. (The Black and Tans were formed from 
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ex-soldiers; the Auxiliary Division, from ex-officers.) These men, who treated 
all Irish as alien enemies, rapidly acquired a well-deserved reputation for 
indiscriminate violence. It marked a new strategy on the part of one section 
of the British state: a “police war” of counterterror and reprisal.
The Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries were virtually independent of 
both the police and the army.
[W]hat they were actually to do, no-one said. Here, then, was a force of 
immense potential, brought into action with the minimum of planning… 
[I]t was left to work out its own salvation in conditions where experi-
ence of the Great War was of limited relevance… It lacked the military 
discipline essential to an armed force under constant stress… Some 
became f irst-class f ighting (if not police) units, but many succumbed 
to drunkenness and gained a reputation as perpetrators of the most 
calculated and destructive reprisals. (Townshend, 1978: 111-112)
The creation of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries opened up a chasm among 
British strategists. On the one hand, “it became clear that [the commanding 
off icer of the police, General Henry Tudor (with Lloyd George’s backing) 
was happy to condone, or at least turn a blind eye to, police reprisals against 
presumed Sinn Feiners” (Jeffery, 2006: 265); but the senior army generals 
were not. They were alarmed by the indiscipline of the paramilitary. Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, disliked the 
idea of an ad hoc force of ex-soldiers reinforcing the RIC. As historian Keith 
Jeffrey notes, Wilson’s
apprehensions about this “panic measure of raising 8000 scallywags” 
were remarkably prescient… “I can’t imagine what sort the men will be, 
no-one will know anybody, no discipline, no esprit de corps, no cohesion, 
no training, no musketry, no mess, no NOTHING. I don’t like the idea… 
Then to make measures worse [General Off icer Commanding in Ireland] 
Macready proposes to draft these mobs over to Ireland at once and split 
them up into lots of 25 to 50 men over the country so there would be no 
hope of forming and disciplining this crowd of unknown men. It is truly 
a desperate & hopeless expedient bound to fail.” (Jeffery, 2006: 263)
Wilson was no conciliator: he merely wanted army control over operations. 
He “wanted lists of known Sinn Féiners in each district of Ireland to be 
posted ‘on the church doors all over the country; and, whenever a policeman 
is murdered, pick f ive by lot and shoot them!’” (Jeffery, 2006: 266).
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General Neville Macready was aware of the problem, “but for him the 
honour of the army outweighed everything else, including the success 
of the Government’s policy and the survival of the Government itself” 
(Townshend, 1978: 112). It was a case of placing organizational interests over 
national ones. Behind this was a reluctance to focus on the central issue:
There was … a traditional ignorance of Irish affairs… By and large the 
Cabinet adhered to the “murder gang” theory … and based on it a dual 
policy of “crushing murder” while reconciling the “moderates.” But no 
real attempt was made to assess the strength and outlook, or even to 
prove the existence, of this moderate group on which the whole policy 
hinged. (Townshend, 1978: 203)
With the possible exception of Macready, the top generals were politically 
insensitive when it came to Ireland. Importantly, Henry Wilson was an 
Ulsterman passionately attached to the idea of Unionism, hardly the best 
qualif ications for someone whose task was to oversee the withdrawal of 
Ireland from centuries of British tutelage. As for Macready, he
was, in Asquith’s words, a man of “cool head” and “good judgment,” and 
Lloyd George was evidently attracted by his liberal sympathies, which 
set him apart from the general tendency of the British off icer corps. The 
problem was that Macready did not want the job. He professed to “loathe” 
Ireland “and its people with a depth deeper than the sea and more violent 
than that which I feel against the Boche.” (Jeffery, 2006: 260-261)
Guerrilla War and Counterinsurgency
The British military, with few exceptions, notably failed to understand 
their adversary. First, by constantly referring to the IRA as a “murder gang,” 
they suggested that it was a small, desperate minority, whereas it clearly 
enjoyed the active or passive support of the vast majority of the population. 
Little thought was given (except perhaps by Macready and some other 
senior generals) to the notion that a broad political solution was required, 
or that the elimination of existing armed bands would simply result in their 
replacement as new recruits stepped forward to take the place of those 
killed or imprisoned.
By defining the problem as one of eliminating a small hard core of active 
militants, the military fell back on their comfortable view that they were 
f ighting another regular army, and that the principal task was to identify, 
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track down, and eliminate (by arrest or by killing) small but well-def ined 
armed bands. This was a mistaken view. The IRA bore more resemblance 
to a social movement than it did to a conventional army. The IRA devel-
oped as a series of locally and regionally based organizations, loosely held 
together by commitment to a common cause. Communications between 
IRA headquarters in Dublin and the regional brigades were cumbersome 
at best, and there was no automatic discipline and following of orders.
[IRA commander] Michael Collins did not plan, start, direct or control the 
war. No one did – no one person or headquarters that is. Most Volunteer 
units outside Dublin had been formed locally, elected their own lead-
ers, funded, armed, motivated and trained themselves, planned and 
mounted their own operations, and succeeded or failed, with very little 
input from headquarters beyond demands for dues and reports… Each 
brigade operated in its own territory almost exclusively, requiring little 
coordination with neighbours… They fought their wars all on their own. 
(Hart, 2005: 242)
The diffuse and grassroots nature of the insurgency meant that British 
Army efforts to dismantle the IRA organization were unlikely to succeed. 
Exacerbating the bizarre diagnosis of a “murder gang” was the widespread, 
almost unconscious, contempt and underestimation in which the Irish were 
held by the British.
Reprisals, Unofficial and Then Official
During the opening days of the armed struggle, both the British Army 
and the IRA acted with restraint. Army off icers and soldiers walking the 
streets of Irish cities were left to go about their business unharmed, and 
even attacks on Crown forces by the IRA were generally targeted at those 
off icers who were a particular thorn in the side of the IRA. For their part, 
the army generally refrained from actions that would punish large sections 
of the population.
There were, however, limits to this mutual tolerance. The cultural norms 
that facilitated restraint eroded as tempers frayed and new repressive 
forces were recruited. Early in the guerrilla struggle, when British off icers 
or soldiers were killed, troops would break out of barracks and go on a 
rampage, uncontrolled by their off icers. Driven by the desire for revenge, 
they committed reprisals either against those they believed guilty, or more 
generally against the civilian population of the area. Houses were burnt, 
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individuals murdered, and a climate of mayhem generated. With the arrival 
of the Black and Tans, these unoff icial reprisals now became policy for the 
police. This alarmed both Macready and Wilson. They were concerned 
that army discipline might break down. Bowing before what they saw as 
the inevitable, and placing organizational goals above national ones, they 
accepted that they could not control their troops. Instead, in December 1920, 
they authorized “off icial reprisals,” whereby the local population would be 
punished for aiding and abetting the insurgents.
The top army leadership was, on the whole, unhappy with a policy of 
indiscriminate reprisals.
[T]hose generals in Ireland who had thought deeply on the use of military 
force as a means to political settlement had never shared the Cabinet’s ap-
parent faith in its eff icacy. Even apart from the style of violence employed 
by the police, which aroused their intense dislike, they believed that 
military rule in Ireland would only inflame age-old hatreds and impede 
the arrival of a lasting peace. (Townshend, 1978: 199)
Flying Squads, Active Service Units, and the Great Hunt
As the campaign of reprisals developed, the army persevered with its strat-
egy of locating and eliminating the IRA as a military formation. While this 
was unlikely to produce a meaningful political outcome, house-to-house 
searches and tip-offs from informants did yield valuable intelligence, which 
in turn produced better targeted searches. IRA activists responded by going 
“on the run,” moving constantly from place to place and staying wherever 
they could f ind shelter. Gradually, these men coalesced into “flying squads” 
and “Active Service Units.” Their principal activity continued to be one of 
ambushes of British patrols, particularly in rural areas, and the assassina-
tion of police and army personnel.
Yet, even faced with an adversary that it had now forced into more or less 
permanent armed bands, the army tactics used to locate them produced 
meager results. During May and June 1921, as noted in the British Army’s 
off icial history, Record of the Rebellion in Ireland, “it was decided to try the 
effect of ‘drives’ on a large scale over a large area, using the cavalry for the 
purpose. Every male civilian was to be interrogated, and all who could be 
identif ied as members of the I.R.A. were to be detained, and houses were 
to be searched for arms” (British Army, n.d.: 43).
Several large drives were undertaken. They failed to locate any significant 
number of rebels. According to the army’s off icial history,
the mIlItary 147
The reasons that the visible success was not greater were in the f irst place 
that the identification of individuals was very diff icult because the police, 
who had to be relied upon for this, were, in many cases, comparatively 
new to their areas, and, in any case, were men who would be compelled to 
continue living in the district after the troops had left. Secondly, a larger 
number of troops per square mile and a longer time spent in each area 
would have been necessary in order to discover hidden arms. Lastly, such 
operations could only be really effective when it was permissible to detain 
and intern every young man arrested unless he could produce satisfactory 
evidence of his loyalty. There is no doubt that a large majority of the men 
released through failure to identify them were in fact connected with the 
I.R.A. (British Army, n.d.: 44)
The f inal conclusion that all young men should be arrested unless they 
could prove that they were loyal supporters of the British administration 
in Ireland simply amounted to a charge of “guilty unless proven innocent” 
and an implicit recognition that the majority of the population were not 
active supporters of the British administration. The army now contemplated 
a war against the entire population to save it from itself – or from the sup-
posed handful of extremists who had terrorized and misled the bulk of the 
population into following them.
The War Turns Nasty
The war was always a highly personal one. IRA units were recruited on the 
basis of kinship networks, and had strong ties to local communities. The 
principal method of attack was the individual assassination of a police-
man, an informer, or someone who was suspected of opposition. Many 
more people were killed in this way than in roadside ambushes or armed 
confrontations with the security services.
In his analysis of who killed whom in Cork county, Peter Hart concludes 
that
ultimately, individual identities were irrelevant in the face of politically 
imposed labels and the ever-widening division between “us” and “them.” 
Violence was not directed at people so much as categories (…) This little 
cycle of killings reveals the runaway tit-for-tat logic of the guerrilla war 
in Cork, driven by fear and the overwhelming need to respond (…) All of 
the victims were unarmed and helpless when shot and all were killed or 
kidnapped near home (…) Murder was more common than battle. This 
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dirty war was waged largely by small bands of gunmen, young, tough, 
and barely under the control of their superiors. The “active squads” on 
both sides did what they liked, undeterred by orders or discipline further 
up the organization. Although the IRA, the RIC, and the army numbered 
in the hundreds and thousands in Cork, most of the killing was done by 
a few hard men… It was these men who forced the pace and, in a sense, 
the revolution came down to a confrontation between these groups, even 
if its victims were often innocents or outsiders. It was an intimate war, 
played out within homes and neighbourhoods, often between people 
who knew one another. (Hart, 1998: 18)
The War Ends
Throughout the period of armed conflict, the Lloyd George administra-
tion sent out, or listened to, a variety of peace feelers. However, so long as 
it seemed that the state might bring order to Ireland by suppressing the 
IRA – and David Lloyd George’s military advisers were usually optimistic 
on this score – no meeting of minds between the Irish revolutionaries 
and the government was likely. Moreover, there were always those in key 
positions in British politics who insisted that there could be no negotiations 
with rebels and murderers. For their part, Sinn Féin moderates needed to 
be careful not to be outflanked by the hard-liners in the IRA. (Indeed, this 
tension was to come to a head in the Civil War of 1922-1923.) Peace talks 
were politically risky, and all sides approached them with great hesitation 
and trepidation.
As the conflict dragged on, as tactical innovation by one actor led to 
counterinnovation by another, all sides increasingly faced a scenario of 
escalating violence, with no end in sight. By 1921, the senior leadership of 
the British Army had come around to the view that a massive reinforcement 
of the forces in Ireland was both necessary and (through a reduction in 
troop levels elsewhere in the empire) possible. They wanted a new and more 
draconian strategy: martial law extended to the entirety of the island, trade 
with Britain and the rest of the world cut off, and the population forced into 
submission. For Sinn Féin, it was unclear whether this was a bluff on the part 
of the army, or whether – if it was not a bluff – the civilian leadership would 
acquiesce to the new strategy. They could not be sure, and, with a sense of 
stalemate in the guerrilla war, turned their attention to the negotiations in 
Downing Street. Talks between the government in London and the IRA/Sinn 
Féin leadership were started (with parallel discussions between London 
and Belfast), and a truce was declared in July 1921.
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The talks produced a compromise settlement: the terms of Ireland’s new 
constitutional status were much broader than the Home Rule that had been 
on offer in 1914, but less than the full independence of an Irish Republic that 
had become the nationalist demand. Ireland was to be partitioned into two 
entities, and an oath of allegiance to the British Crown was required. An 
Irish Free State would come into existence in December 1922. Not surpris-
ingly, the IRA split over whether or not to accept the terms of the London 
negotiations. A brief, but bloody, civil war (1922-23) ensued, the moderates 
prevailed, and the Irish Free State gradually evolved into the independent 
republic of the southern part of a divided island. In Ulster there were waves 
of sectarian rioting, with the police (the Royal Ulster Constabulary) openly 
siding with the Protestant unionists against the Catholics (Parkinson, 2004). 
A militantly Protestant state was created in Ulster which was reluctantly 
accepted by the southern Nationalists, who were in no position to do much 
about it.
Analytic Reprise
Interaction of (Three Sets of) Strategies
The three sides in this conflict constantly monitored each other and at-
tempted to guess at their adversary’s next move. All players responded to 
changing circumstances and to changes in strategy on the part of their 
adversaries and allies. There were systematic slippages, as one player failed 
to accurately grasp the intentions of another player, with predictable biases 
that exacerbated the conflict.
Some strategies clearly developed as direct responses to actions of 
other players; other strategies emerged from different sources. The British 
decision to release hunger strikers was a direct response to the protests 
generated around that tactic; and the perception that giving in to the hunger 
strikers simply increased the ranks of Sinn Féin by demonstrating British 
weakness then led to a reversal of British strategy and a “get tough” policy 
with regard to hunger strikers. This worked; and the nationalists dropped 
this tactic from their repertoire. The adoption of “off icial reprisals” and the 
tit-for-tat escalation of the war of assassination were mutually reinforc-
ing spirals. Other strategies – such as the urban insurrection in Dublin 
on Easter Monday, 1916, and the targeting of the RIC in 1919 – were not 
responses to actions taken by the other side, but instead drew on shifting 
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understandings, frames, and repertoires that are best explained as largely 
endogenous developments in strategic thinking.
Because of the disaggregated nature of the various players, including 
the coercive organizations of the British state in Ireland, they sometimes 
pursued internally incompatible strategies. When this happened, as with 
the introduction of the Black and Tans into the conflict, senior leaders, 
both civilian and military, regularly demanded a re-thinking of strategy 
to produce a clear and co-ordinated response on the part of the various 
repressive organizations. Because of political disagreements within the 
Cabinet, and the limitations of the frames used by British politicians, such 
strategic clarity was seldom forthcoming.
British Framing: The Murder Gang and the Police; Rebellion and the 
Military
The British had a strong preference for def ining the Irish situation as “one 
for the police” and of using the police wherever possible. Ireland was, after 
all, part of the United Kingdom, and the kind of harsh counterinsurgency 
measures which might be employed overseas were unacceptable there 
(Muenger, 1991). When emergency formations such as the Black and Tans 
were raised, it is noticeable that they were formally attached to the RIC 
rather than to the army. Because of these cultural preferences, key players 
in the British state misjudged the impact of their measures on Irish opinion.
Its most fateful assumption was that public opinion would f ind the use of 
policemen, even though they were armed ex-soldiers, preferable to that 
of the military in the suppression of disorder. This was due in part to a 
failure to accept that the R.I.C.’s police capability had broken down and 
could not be restored by pouring in ill-disciplined recruits; and in part 
to a natural antipathy to military rule. (Townshend, 1978: 137)
In June 1921 Lloyd George was to tell the Cabinet that “the Irish job (…) 
was a policeman’s job,” and that if it became “a military job only” it would 
fail. But (…) the Government never def ined the conflict, and the issue 
was obscured by attempts to distinguish between war and insurrection, 
summed up in Lloyd George’s phrase, “You do not declare war against 
rebels.” The Government was unwilling even to admit that a rebellion 
existed which had to be countered by military methods. The roles of the 
Army and the Police were never properly understood (…) There was no 
specif ic decision, but an acquiescence in the drift of events. (Townshend, 
1978: 40)
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The British state was
placed in a dilemma by the identif ication of Sinn Fein with I.R.A. ter-
rorism and violence. The increases in attacks on the Crown Forces, and 
the breakdown of constitutionalism and justice, compelled even the 
Liberals to accept the inevitability of a forcible response. For them the 
restoration of law and order was not just a convenient slogan behind 
which to temporize, but a moral priority. (Townshend, 1978: 201)
A second consequence was closely linked to this: the British failure to ap-
preciate that once Ireland was embarked on the road to independence, the 
process would be rapid. Other cases of withdrawal from occupations suggest 
that once the process begins, popular mobilization in the occupied territory 
increases, the legitimacy of the occupation declines, and the withdrawal 
must be hastened. British withdrawal – in some form or other – was not 
only inevitable, it was urgent.
A further consequence was the failure to grasp the nettle of Ulster. When 
home rule for Ireland was announced, the Ulster Protestants mobilized to 
defeat the measure. They acted as spoilers, setting in motion the chain of 
events that would lead to armed conflict in Ireland. The British state was 
unable to produce a quick and decisive response, either with regard to Ulster 
or with regard to other aspects of the Irish crisis.
The dithering over whether the army would obey orders to suppress the 
Ulster militias (the Curragh incident) was merely the icing on the cake of a 
larger failure of political will. Of course, it can be argued that the British gov-
ernment faced objective, structural constraints. It faced a divided Ireland, 
part of which was a paranoid and sectarian Ulster; and it had to deal with 
an army heavily Anglo-Irish in sympathy and unwilling to think of itself 
as an obedient servant of the constitutionally elected civilian authorities. 
(This, in turn, owed something to the incomplete democratization of the 
British political system and the remaining importance of the monarchy 
and aristocracy in the civil-military chain of command.)
Of course the British government was also distracted by the titanic strug-
gle of waging a total war and then by the complexities of peacemaking 
and of administering vast new additions to the empire in the Middle East. 
Moreover, the specter of Bolshevism and the reality of troubled industrial 
relations and massive strikes in Britain served further to distract British 
decision makers from effective intervention in Ireland. It is hardly surpris-
ing that there was little policy coherence with regard to the insurgency in 
Ireland.
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Frames, Folk Sociology, Cultural Assumptions
Throughout English society there was a widely diffused condescension 
toward the Irish which could at times become an attitude of contempt 
and prejudice. Examples abound. Lord Garnet Wolseley thought the Irish 
incomprehensible: “A strange, illogical, and inaccurate race, with the most 
amiable qualities, garnished with the dirt and squalor which they seem to 
love almost as dearly as their religion” (Muenger, 1991: 144). As Townshend 
argues, “The British … had responded to the latent hostility of the Irish with 
a benign contempt… [There was a] common British view of the Irish as a 
quaint, childlike race, often incompetent, and easily terrorized or led by 
extremists into violent behavior” (Townshend, 1978: 200).
The result, on the part of the British, of these deep-seated attitudes to the 
Irish was a “tendency to lay down the law rather than to consult, to coerce 
public opinion rather than seek its consent” (Townshend, 1978: 201). After 
noting that “the Irish are not easy to understand” (British Army, n.d.: 30), 
the army’s off icial history went on to argue that the Irish had come to have 
little respect for law and order.
[P]erhaps the circumstance which has most influenced the character of 
the Irish is the fact that for many centuries… [T]hey have had little share 
in their own Government. There was, therefore, a general lack of respect 
for government (which was looked on as foreign) and consequently for the 
law. This has lasted for seven centuries and had bred in the Irish character 
a lack of discipline and an intolerance of restraint… There is not only no 
respect for the law; there is no common standard of public morality… 
Judged by English standards the Irish are a diff icult and unsatisfactory 
people. Their civilization is different and in many ways lower than that of 
the English. They are entirely lacking in the Englishman’s distinct respect 
for the truth… Many were of a degenerate type and their methods of wag-
ing war were in most cases barbarous, influenced by hatred and devoid 
of courage… There were undoubtedly many among the IRA who were 
moral degenerates, brutal and cruel to a degree, and there is an underlying 
cruelty in the nature of many Irishmen. (British Army, n.d.: 31-32)
British intelligence analysts and top military commanders nearly uni-
versally saw the IRA activists as coming from the lower orders of Irish 
society. The army’s off icial history asserts that the leadership of the IRA 
were “largely the riff-raff of the country, men without means or education” 
(British Army, n.d.: 53). Not only Irish, but lower class as well.
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This assessment derived largely from an assessment of the nature of 
modern democracy. Britain was still in a situation of transition from aris-
tocratic and gentry politics to mass electoral politics. Army off icers were 
largely drawn from the middle and upper classes of British society. They 
viewed the expansion of the electorate and the rise of the labor movement 
with some alarm, and felt that the traditional “governing classes” ought to 
run politics. It is not surprising, therefore, that they viewed the IRA activists 
as coming from a social stratum that was unfitted to govern.
For the nationalists, the central framing device was that of a united 
people. Because this had been def ined largely in cultural terms and in 
opposition to Protestant England, it took on a sectarian quality: Ireland 
was a Catholic nation. Class conflict was deliberately subordinated to the 
struggle for national liberation. For Ulster Protestants, the central frame 
was an uneasy juxtaposition of loyalty to the British Crown and an almost 
paranoid fear of betrayal by the British government and persecution by 
the Catholic majority in Ireland. For them, Home Rule meant Rome Rule.
Such a framing on all sides necessarily meant partition; yet for national-
ists who aspired to a united Ireland this was a bitter pill to swallow. Until 
the moment of decision, the contradiction could be suppressed by ignoring 
or underestimating the size and strength of unionist opposition in Ulster, 
with the result that no solution satisfactory to all Irish (not to mention the 
English) was to emerge.
The entire struggle was invested by all sides with great emotional and 
symbolic signif icance. This was apparent in the initial reluctance on the 
part of British state managers to negotiate with “rebels” and “murderers,” 
in the invocation of Catholic notions of martyrdom, f irst by Pearse and 
his fellow insurrectionaries in 1916 and later by Sinn Féin and the IRA, in 
the condemnation by both nationalists and the British state of “atrocities” 
committed by the other side, in the paranoid and hysterical sectarian fears 
of Protestant Ulster, in the refusal of the anti-Treaty die-hards of the IRA 
to swear any oath of loyalty to the British Crown or empire, and in many 
other ways. As D. G. Boyce has noted,
“Men do not in the long run f ight for phrases, but for realities,” remarked 
Asquith complacently in 1920. He could not have been more mistaken. 
The readiness to take up arms in defence of emotional symbols is always 
regarded as a particularly Irish characteristic, but in 1921 and 1922 a 
British administration, f irmly supported by British public opinion, was 
prepared to declare war in order to ensure that the symbol of the Crown 
was incorporated into an Irish constitution. (Boyce, 1972: 183)
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The Context of Global Revolution and Anti-Bolshevism
The struggle for Irish Independence occurred within the framework of two 
larger contexts: the First World War, and arising out of that war, a global 
wave of revolution. By the time that widespread insurgency had developed 
in Ireland, concern with social unrest and Bolshevism was acute among 
British elites. There were frames within frames, the Irish problem being 
viewed in the larger imperial context. The immediate post-war years saw 
a wave of industrial unrest in Britain, and considerable numbers of soldiers 
(soldiers who might have been used in Ireland) were posted throughout 
Britain to serve as a force to suppress rebellion in the heartland. British 
elites were also panicked by the Bolshevik revolution and saw revolutionary 
threats everywhere. There was an early effort by the British authorities 
to f ind links – there were none – between the Bolsheviks and the Irish 
nationalists.
General Sir Henry Wilson was a conservative. As the war drew to an end, 
he was increasingly alarmed by the specter of Bolshevik-inspired social 
revolution. “‘Our real danger now,’ he wrote in his diary on 10 November, ‘is 
not the Bosh but Bolshevism’” (Jeffery, 2006: 229). He thought that General 
Macready faced a global nationalist and communist challenge in Ireland. He 
wrote in his diary that Macready “is f ighting New York & Cairo & Calcutta 
& Moscow who are only using Ireland as a tool & lever against England, & 
nothing but determined shooting on our part is of any use” (Jeffery, 2006: 
263).
When it came to imperial possessions, Wilson’s “gut reaction to disorder 
or challenge was simply to ‘govern or get out’” (Jeffery, 2006: 239). Wilson 
identif ied four “storm centers”: Ireland, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India. 
The task was to def ine the troop requirements to keep all four quiet (Jef-
fery, 2006: 244). Adding domestic industrial unrest to these tasks would 
overly stress an army that in the wake of demobilization contained few 
long-term cadres and was poorly trained and motivated. The theme of too 
many challenges and not enough troops was to echo repeatedly throughout 
the course of the Irish conflict.
The Disaggregated State: Organizational Goals and Perceptions Are 
Not the Same as State Goals and Perceptions
When Sir Henry Wilson, CIGS, adopted a policy of “off icial reprisals” in 
Ireland, his principal motive was to protect the integrity of the army. It 
is fairly common for military organization to focus on narrowly def ined 
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organizational goals, to the detriment of the pursuit of the larger goals 
of state policy. There are obvious reasons for this kind of organizational 
parochialism, and it is not surprising that a central concern of state manag-
ers is to transcend the petty concerns of bureaucratic politics. That they 
often fail is equally unsurprising.
Not only were there vast differences in diagnosis and strategy between 
the police and the military, but the introduction of two largely uncontrolled 
paramilitary organizations, the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries, trig-
gered a spiral of indiscriminate violence that undermined such efforts at 
pacif ication as had been undertaken.
The central fact of British policy with regard to Ireland was that there 
simply was no coherent policy. The British government oscillated between 
concessions and coercion. Moreover, the British government employed vari-
ous coercive organizations (British Army, RIC, Black and Tans, Auxiliaries) 
which adopted contradictory approaches to the problem and never properly 
co-ordinated their strategies.
This shifting and ambivalent approach generated the worst of both 
worlds for the British government, antagonizing large sections of the Irish 
population without effectively cowing them into submission. Importantly, 
the British government was greatly constrained by its tradition of rule of law 
and respect for civil liberties, even in wartime. Harsh repression, or even 
the imposition of a state of emergency, entailed huge political costs for the 
government in Britain. In the end, a rising tide of protest in Britain, together 
with a concern not to overly antagonize the American and Dominion gov-
ernments, meant that the political costs of counterinsurgency in Ireland 
were simply more than the Lloyd George administration was willing to bear.
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7 Infiltrators
David Cunningham and Roberto Soto-Carrión1
While social movements are typically conceived as struggles between 
authorities and challengers, only analytic convenience justif ies classify-
ing all participants cleanly on one side or the other. The involvement of 
third parties with tenuous or partial loyalties to related causes, emergent 
schisms among challenging groups, and the myriad motives that def ine 
individuals’ engagement in contention all but ensure that uncertain or 
duplicitous allegiances shape at least some participants’ orientation to the 
collective struggle. Often, policing agencies – and sometimes the groups 
that challenge them – formalize this “gray area” of dual, contradictory, or 
fraudulent orientations by deploying agents to infiltrate competing parties.
Whether conceived as undercover agents, informers, informants, provo-
cateurs, tipsters, or unknowing accomplices, these inf iltrators2 exemplify 
the implicit complexities associated with players who navigate – often 
simultaneously – multiple arenas associated with contentious, political 
struggles. Here, we demonstrate the diverse ways in which infiltrators form 
and maintain complex and often contradictory relationships, given their 
interstitial position as both movement participants and representatives of 
the state. We unpack that role, demonstrating how easy assumptions about 
inf iltrators as straightforward representatives of their employing agency, 
uniformly undermining the efforts of the groups that they penetrate, give 
way to more f luid conceptions of active and passive participation, and 
authentic versus deceptive behavior.
Inf iltrators’ allegiance to both authorities and challengers provides a 
critical touch point for conceptualizing movements within this volume’s 
players-arenas framework. Drawing on the cases of three informants em-
ployed during the 1960s by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
we show how the inf iltrator role is conditioned by a set of power relations 
1 We thank Gary T. Marx, volume editors Jan Willem Duyvendak and James Jasper, and 
participants in the Mini-conference on Social Movements at the 2012 Eastern Sociological 
Society meeting for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
2 Note that we use the terms infiltrator and informant interchangeably here. The former term 
properly signals a broader range of roles, encompassing all of the terms listed in the f irst half 
of this sentence. In general terms, inf iltrators include actors who penetrate target groups for 
any purpose rather than only to “inform” by gathering intelligence. However, all of the cases 
examined here involve inf iltrators deployed as informants.
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maintained within specific arenas by key players. These players include, but 
are not limited to, the informants themselves, as well as state agents tasked 
with managing them, known within the FBI as “handlers.” We contend that 
far from straightforward “agents” of the state, inf iltrators balance ties to 
both police and activists, carving out a role relative to their state “handlers” 
and movement colleagues, toggling between passive and active participa-
tion in social movement activity to convincingly maintain their entrée 
and simultaneous allegiance both to authorities and challengers. Indeed, 
this interstitial position – between policing and activist arenas – defines 
the inf iltrator role.
More generally, the complexities associated with the actions and motives 
of inf iltrators provide a vehicle for rethinking their role as strategic players 
within contentious political arenas. Emphasizing informants’ paradoxical 
relationship to other movement players simultaneously highlights and 
problematizes perspectives on social movements that focus on interac-
tions between authority systems and activists who challenge the status 
quo. While usefully underscoring interrelationships among individual 
movement players and authorities – including police – this tradition typi-
cally overlooks the inherent dilemmas and contradictions faced by players 
whose roles do not neatly f it on one or the other side of that dichotomy. 
Conceptualizing the state as an arena comprised of multiple actors also 
speaks to players each having their own (sometimes multiple) strategic 
agendas and interests, which can at times jibe and at other times conflict 
in often unexpected ways.
As a result, we might productively conceptualize the f luidity of the 
inf iltrator role as emerging within a set of embedded arenas that interact 
both horizontally and vertically. The horizontal dimension incorporates 
strategic interactions among inf iltrators, handlers, and targets. The verti-
cal dimension places the handler-inf iltrator exchange within the broader 
context of the norms and practices of the handlers’ agency within a broader 
state apparatus, as well as the institutional features and social position of 
the contending group being inf iltrated.
A Critical Look at Infiltration
Nearly 40 years after its initial publication, Gary T. Marx’s seminal 1974 
article “Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: 
The Agent Provocateur and the Informant,” remains the most influential 
existing work on inf iltrators. Marx argued that although the use of 
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informants within protest movements had been well-documented, little 
research demonstrated the logic of infiltration. He prodded analysts to take 
seriously how informants and provocateurs operate strategically (or not; 
as with much of Marx’s work, he seeks to account for the full spectrum of 
motivations) and, in direct and sometimes indirect and often unintended 
ways, impact movement dynamics and the contours of authorities’ control 
efforts.
Subsequent work has yielded signif icant insights into the structural con-
ditions and instrumental and emotional conditions that govern movement 
participation. Other streams of research have taken seriously the processes 
through which opponents, typically but not always associated with the 
state, engage with movements. But this focus on movement players on both 
sides of the struggle tends, understandably, to assume straightforward and 
unambiguous allegiances either to challengers or authorities. Here, in con-
trast, we consider the interstitial position of inf iltrators, emphasizing their 
“betweenness” as a lens through which to examine the complexities that 
govern the multiple and shifting arenas within which contention plays out.
The role of informants becomes particularly salient to efforts to con-
ceptualize movements through the interplay of players and the arenas 
they occupy and (re)create over time. Such interactions shed light on how 
the individuals and groups that comprise “movements” interact with their 
social environment and how those milieus can at times work to control or 
accommodate action. While more recent work on the role of repression and 
social control within movements has attended to the prevalence and impact 
of state inf iltration (Cunningham, 2003, 2004; Cunningham and Noakes, 
2008; Davenport, 2005b; Earl, 2003; Marx, 1979, 1988; Noakes, 1998, 2000, 
2003; Starr et al., 2011), scholars have generally been unable to fully address 
how the presence of inf iltration or other forms of surveillance impacts the 
mobilization process or how infiltrators obfuscate the boundaries between 
seemingly oppositional movement players and the arenas within which 
they act.
A fresh conceptualization of the inf iltrator role can place attention 
squarely on how authorities can operate in diverse, dynamic, and sometimes 
contradictory ways, breaking down conceptions of the state as a unitary 
body operating to advance a single set of interests and ends. The critique 
of simple essentialist takes on the state is a common one in the recent 
literature (see, e.g., Davenport, 2005a; Earl, 2011). Our discussion here echoes 
straightforward versions of that critique, highlighting the importance 
of disaggregating the state into discrete agencies that – both singly and 
interactively, as part of a f ield of authorities – may adopt distinct means 
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and goals and operate with varying degrees of alignment and co-ordination. 
However, following Jasper’s (2015) insight into the fractal character of arenas 
comprised of compound players, we also extend that critique, emphasizing 
the embedded nature of this multi-actor f ield. This focus on the struggles 
and tensions both within and across state agencies recognizes that agents 
(just like their constituent agencies) can have their own strategic agendas 
and interests, which sometimes align and in other cases conflict with 
those of their colleagues and the off icial policy that governs their agencies 
(Åkerström, 2006; Cunningham, 2009).
Additionally, focusing on various modes of inf iltration captures repres-
sive dynamics that move beyond strict conceptual distinctions between 
“passive” and “active” informants as well as conventionally recognized 
typological distinctions associated with state repression – e.g., divisions 
between “intelligence” and “counterintelligence” (Marx, 1988; Starr et 
al., 2011), “soft” and “hard” repression (Ferree, 2005), “institutional” and 
“situational” repression (Koopmans, 1997), or various repressive “functions” 
and “forms” (Cunningham, 2004). As the impact of inf iltration – like other 
efforts to restrict or otherwise shape the actions of challengers – emerges 
alongside (and in interaction with) other forms of policing, legal action, 
media coverage, and so on, analysts can capture it most fully by examin-
ing how its constitutive arena shapes movement players’ orientations and 
perceived and actual vulnerabilities to actions emerging within “the state.”
Indeed, studying infiltrators provides a vehicle to observe how players 
interact with varied forms of what Koopmans (1997) refers to as institutional 
repression, while at the same time avoiding essentialized conceptions of what 
constitutes “repression.” Examining the role of infiltrators provides a more 
inclusive understanding of repression, as the players/arenas framework seeks 
to “push beyond the vague and often circular language of power” (Jasper 2015) 
in order to more definitively show how players attempt to attain their goals. 
Recognizing the strategic actions of movement players across multiple, and 
conflicting arenas offers greater leverage to understand a more diverse set 
of repressive actions as well as to recognize that ostensibly repressive efforts 
can have divergent or ambivalent effects on their intended targets.
Infiltrators as Interstitial Players in Embedded Arenas
Within this broad conceptual framework, how might we characterize 
inf iltrators? Unlike most players, whose moves can be understood inter-
actively as they operate within discrete arenas, the inf iltrator’s def ining 
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characteristic is its interstitial position. Existing in a dual role that mediates 
the gulf between two competing parties – typically an authority and a 
challenger (Tarrow, 1998) – the inf iltrator resides between state agencies 
and social movement organizations. Thus, the broad arena within which 
infiltrators operate encompasses both of these contending parties. However, 
as Jasper (2012) notes, arenas emerge at other levels as well. Compound 
players, including state agencies and SMOs, themselves constitute arenas, 
as their internal workings become observable through subdivision into 
their constituent actors. The inverse of this insight is that arenas themselves 
are nested – i.e., embedded within broader compound bodies that envelop 
narrower arena relationships in their organizational contexts.
The inf iltrator role typically emerges around the informant’s relation-
ship to primary alters which provides the constitutive ties that activate 
each side of the “double-agent” position. In a US policing context, in 
particular with the FBI case examined here, the salient link on the author-
ity’s side is to the “handler,” or state agent tasked with “developing” and 
“controlling” informants. On the movement side, this link centers on the 
particular activist(s) through which the inf iltrator gains primary entrée 
and develops legitimacy within the group. While these relationships clearly 
are conditioned by differential power and control, we refer to them here as 
constituting the horizontal dimension of the broad arena that subsumes 
both challengers and authorities. Within this dimension, we strive to 
identify relational features that define differential capacities, or the variety 
and effectiveness of what Jasper (2015) refers to as the strategic means 
available to each party.
A second, vertical dimension3 emerges when we take seriously the nar-
rower arenas embedded within particular compound players in a higher-
order arena such as a state agency or SMO. Such agencies and groups are 
defined by their own internal processes, with intra-organizational relations 
shaping the infiltrator’s milieu, by defining the character of the infiltrator’s 
primary ties to state handlers and movement contacts. The structure and 
orientation of both state and movement organizations shape the capacities 
that def ine the leverage held by inf iltrators vis-à-vis handlers/contacts at 
3 While our emphasis on the “vertical” character of this dimension captures the key point that 
a handler or movement colleague’s actions are conditioned by the nature of the decision-making 
structure of the body within which he or she operates, this organizational aspect also of course 
encompasses horizontal relations within the state and movement arenas. For clarity, we fold 
all of these organizational ties into the vertical dimension so as to distinguish them from the 
primary horizontal ties that constitute the inf iltrator’s interstitial role.
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any given point. This vertical dimension captures the broad arena that 
encompasses the contending bodies def ining the inf iltrator role.
One limitation of research focused on inf iltrators and covert state 
repression generally is a continued lack of available representative data. 
While particular cases involving informants and provocateurs have become 
well-known anecdotally, it remains diff icult to assess the comprehensive-
ness of those accounts, or the degree to which they might be generalized to 
any hypothetical population of informants. At minimum, the fact that the 
informants we tend to examine have, by def inition, been publicly exposed 
may mean that they differ from the broader set of infiltrators who succeeded 
in keeping their identities a secret. While still acknowledging that significant 
and vexing constraint, examining comparatively the dynamics of particular 
known cases can provide a window into the processes that govern the 
interstitial nature of the inf iltrator role. As such, we emphasize particular 
cases that reveal inf iltrators’ horizontal relationships with handlers and 
movement colleagues, as well as how those relations are conditioned by the 
organizational makeup of both state agencies and social movement groups.
The relative availability and openness of data related to informants 
associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides one 
window into how a cadre of informants operated within the context of a 
particular state agency. To assess and extend our conceptualization of the 
workings of the inf iltrator role, we begin by considering case studies of 
three informants employed by the FBI during the 1960s. Each of these cases 
involves efforts by the FBI to repress or otherwise monitor and control the 
actions of suspected threats to national security.4
Cases: Infiltrating the Civil Rights Field
The black freedom struggle has been well-documented, and many of its 
now-iconic images were captured by the prolif ic civil rights photographer 
Ernest Withers. Born in 1922 in Memphis, Tennessee, Withers experienced 
f irsthand the impact of racism and racial conflict. Though he photographed 
the everyday life of black America in the South after World War II, his most 
4 Given our focus on cases tied to a modern democratic state, we make no strong claims that 
our conclusions are generalizable to all regimes. Surely the particular dynamics described below 
would be conditioned by general political possibilities and constraints associated with broad 
political distinctions – e.g. Tilly’s (1978) emphasis on “oligarchic” vs. “egalitarian” regimes – but 
we more measuredly assert that the general characteristics of the interstitial role discussed here 
would apply across a broader range of regimes and cases.
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poignant work was of African-Americans’ struggle for equal rights. His 
photographs, such as the famous image of the 1968 Memphis Sanitation 
Strike with workers holding signs declaring “I AM A MAN,” helped docu-
ment the struggles and victories of black America.
Withers was on the scene for a number of seminal Civil Rights Movement 
campaigns. His photography has shaped resonant collective memories of 
the 1955 murder trial of Emmett Till, a 14-year-old African-American boy 
whose brutal murder for allegedly flirting with a white woman in Missis-
sippi is frequently described as a key catalyst for the mobilization of the US 
Civil Rights Movement, and the 1957 desegregation of Central High School in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, which famously required the deployment of National 
Guard troops to defuse potential mob violence. The aforementioned 1968 
Tennessee sanitation strike, in which some 1,300 black sanitation workers 
walked off of the job in protest of poor treatment, discrimination, and 
dangerous working conditions, is what ultimately brought Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. to Memphis and his untimely death.
Throughout the 1960s Withers became a close conf idant and trusted 
friend to key leaders, sitting in on some of the Movement’s most sensitive 
strategy meetings. Rather than an active driver or shaper of action, he 
was best-known as an observer, a “passive” documentarian of both the 
crucial and mundane aspects of the Movement. His aesthetic acumen and 
longstanding commitment to the cause earned him the widespread respect 
of key leaders. Withers’s insider status provided a platform for his photos 
to help create a new visual consciousness for the American public, and his 
images comprise some of that era’s most powerful narratives (Willis, 2007).
But Withers also was known in FBI circles as “ME 338-R,” his confidential 
informant number. From at least 1968 until 1970, he provided the Bureau 
with information, tips, meeting schedules, and photographs detailing his 
insider’s perspective on the black community’s f ight for equality. Given 
his close relationships with fellow civil rights activists, near-universal 
entrée into Movement circles, and the importance of the historic images 
he captured, the 2010 revelation that he occupied a more complex dual role 
as a paid FBI infiltrator was treated as a bombshell that called into question 
bedrock assumptions about the Movement and its allies.
The Withers case provides an example of how such complexities shape 
the moral terrain upon which inf iltrators tread. Rather than viewing his 
undercover actions in total conflict with his Movement efforts, Withers’s 
paradoxical relationship with the FBI ref lected his broader conflicted 
ties to law enforcement. A former police off icer himself, he had been 
f ired by the Memphis Police Department for his alleged involvement in 
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bootlegging. The department subsequently cautioned the FBI against using 
him as an informant, a warning that shaped the relatively distant and 
informal nature of his subsequent relationship to the Bureau; prior to his 
emergence as a full-f ledged informant in 1968, Withers had less formally 
received payments in exchange for information for nearly a decade (Per-
rusquia, 2010). And throughout that period, his connection to the FBI 
did not protect him from harassment by off icials from other agencies. 
Following NAACP leader Medgar Evers’s funeral in 1963, Withers was 
badly beaten by police and jailed for participating in a march outside 
the funeral home, reinforcing the sense that FBI work did not place one 
solidly on the side of the police or preclude providing aid – documentary 
or otherwise – to the Movement.
Such a balancing act also reflected the fact that “the Movement” itself 
was far from unitary, with Withers and others aff iliating with certain seg-
ments while sometimes remaining wary of other factions. These personal 
distinctions informed his strategic aims as an informant and demarcated 
Withers’s perceived allegiances between seemingly incongruous movement 
players. Many of Withers’s reports focused on militants like Lance “Sweet 
Willie Wine” Watson, the prime minister of the Invaders, a Black Panther-
styled militant group in Memphis. His reports characterized Watson as 
a thief and conman who had planned an armed takeover of the campus 
of LeMoyne–Owen College. Similarly, Withers told the FBI that Charles 
Cabbage, the Invaders’ co-founder, had dodged the draft, engaged in bomb 
making, and was involved with a prostitution ring. Withers’s primary FBI 
contact, William H. Lawrence, commented on the tensions across Move-
ment factions when he suggested that the photographer’s cooperation with 
the FBI may have stemmed from his desire to “detect and deter violence,” 
reflecting a “concern for the peaceful and effective preservation of the Civil 
Rights Movement” (Perrusquia, 2010).
Withers’s association with the FBI stemmed from the Bureau’s longstand-
ing “racial matters” program, which primarily targeted various groups and 
individuals associated with the Civil Rights Movement. Agents’ central 
emphasis was on the Movement’s “subversive” potential stemming from 
its alleged ties to various communist interests, though they focused as well 
on the movement’s extremist opponents, especially organized vigilantist 
vehicles like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Following the murder of three civil 
rights workers during 1964’s Freedom Summer voter registration project in 
Mississippi, the FBI initiated a formal counterintelligence program against 
so-called “White Hate Groups,” which at f irst targeted 17 KKK organizations 
and 9 other racist “hate organizations.”
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FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and a set of assistant directors in the Bu-
reau’s National Headquarters in Washington, DC, def ined the purpose 
of COINTELPRO-White Hate Groups: “to expose, disrupt and otherwise 
neutralize the activities of the various Klans and hate organizations, their 
leadership and adherents.” The memo initiating the program, sent to 17 
of the FBI’s 59 f ield off ices (mostly to off ices in the South, where KKK 
activity was centered), specif ied that agents fulf ill the program’s mandate 
by surveilling white hate targets “on a continuous basis,” publicly exposing 
their “devious maneuvers and duplicity,” “capitalizing upon organizational 
and personal conflicts,” and blocking efforts to recruit adherents or build 
alliances (FBI, 1964).
As part of this effort, Bureau agents aggressively sought to inf iltrate the 
KKK by extending their existing network of informants. Aided by agents’ 
ideological overlap with Klan constituencies, they succeeded in recruiting 
informants to a degree that far outstripped their parallel efforts to infiltrate 
civil rights, Black Power, anti-war, and student movements during this 
period (Cunningham, 2004). A few months into the White Hate Groups 
program, agents boasted that they recruited inf iltrators at an average rate 
of two per day. A later congressional report conservatively estimated that 
informants comprised at least 6 percent of the KKK’s overall membership. 
By early 1966, the FBI’s Charlotte f ield off ice reported that their coverage 
extended to hundreds of informants in 165 of the approximately 225 active 
Klan units in the state.
Throughout the mid-1960s, North Carolina was far and away the most 
active state for the KKK; by 1966, the United Klans of America (or UKA, 
widely known to be the preeminent KKK organization of the Civil Rights 
era) boasted more members in the Tar Heel State than in the rest of the 
South put together (US House of Representatives, 1967; Cunningham, 2013). 
The most highly valued of those North Carolina-based Klan informants was 
George Dorsett. A longtime adherent of various KKK and segregationist 
organizations and a regionally known evangelist preacher, Dorsett joined 
the UKA in 1964, quickly rising to be a key leadership f igure in that group’s 
“Carolina Klan,” which boasted an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 members by 
1965 (US House of Representatives, 1966, 1967).
That year, Dorsett also served as the UKA’s “Imperial Kludd” or national 
chaplain, and became a key part of the group’s inner circle. He was a featured 
speaker at hundreds of UKA rallies across the South, frequently described 
as both the group’s f ieriest orator and someone who could reliably f ill the 
donation buckets circulated at rallies. By 1966, the UKA was wracked by 
internal dissension and regular threats of emerging schisms, and Dorsett 
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was at the center of this organizational strife. His conflicts with Bob Jones, 
the UKA’s North Carolina “Grand Dragon” (or state leader), divided the state’s 
membership, and the following year Jones formally banished him from the 
organization. With the assistance of his FBI handler, Dorsett formed his 
own competing KKK organization, the Confederate Knights of the Ku Klux 
Klan, which siphoned members away from the UKA while operating under 
the Bureau’s watchful eye (Cunningham, 2004, 2013; Dorsett, 2005).
While Dorsett was among the FBI’s most highly placed KKK inform-
ants, the Bureau’s most infamous and widely known inf iltrator was Gary 
Thomas Rowe. An eighth-grade dropout from Savannah, Georgia, Rowe 
moved to Birmingham, Alabama, following stints in the Georgia National 
Guard and the Marine Reserves. By his 26th birthday, he was on his second 
marriage, working as a machinist at a Birmingham dairy, and fortifying 
his well-earned reputation as a tough bouncer and all-around hothead in 
the city’s bars and clubs.
Throughout, he had a strong desire to work with law enforcement. 
His county sheriff aspirations were stymied by his lack of a high school 
education, but undeterred, he frequently boasted about being a cop or 
agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and convinced 
his Birmingham police friends to let him ride with them at night in their 
patrol cars. His constant brawling also made him a police target, as well as 
drew the attention of the local UKA “klavern” (KKK parlance for chapter). 
After multiple arrests, Rowe was pegged by bartender and KKK member 
Loyal McWhorter as a “good red-neck Klansman.” Rowe was mulling the 
offer to join when a local FBI agent visited him in 1960 to investigate claims 
that his law enforcement boasts extended to his impersonation of a Bureau 
agent. Soon after, Rowe agreed to inf iltrate the Klan for the FBI as part of 
its “racial matters” investigations (May, 2005; McWhorter, 2001).
Rowe’s entry into the KKK came through the Eastview 13 klavern, among 
the most hard-core of the UKA’s units. He enthusiastically participated in 
KKK actions, including a number of acts of violence (and, he alleged, FBI 
requests to “sleep with as many Klan wives as I could, break up marriages”) 
(Rowe, 1976). Rowe’s status was controversially revealed in 1965, after Viola 
Liuzzo, a Michigan resident, was gunned down on an Alabama highway 
while shuttling civil rights workers as part of the Selma-to-Montgomery 
march. The cold-blooded murder gained immediate national attention, 
and despite the fact that FBI director Hoover told LBJ that solving this 
sort of crime with no obvious leads would be “like looking for a needle in a 
haystack,” the Bureau apprehended four suspects the following day. Rowe 
enabled the quick arrests, as he had been among the carful of klansmen 
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that had pulled alongside Liuzzo’s vehicle and shot and killed her. Rowe 
ultimately testif ied against his fellow Klan conspirators, denying that he 
himself had f ired any shots (May, 2005; Rowe, 1976). Assessing Rowe’s case, 
alongside those of Dorsett and Withers, allows us to explore the complex 
ways in which inf iltrators serve as f luid players both within and across 
contentious arenas, and to examine both the horizontal and vertical dimen-
sions that def ine these inf iltrators’ interstitial roles.
Horizontal Ties: Modes of Recruitment and Oversight
Inf iltrators are commonly conceived of as a category of actor, tied to the 
state’s interests and bound to the agencies that recruit and employ them. 
In that sense, their work as undercover “agents” makes them de facto ex-
tensions of that state and straightforward representatives of its goals and 
interests. However, the “infiltrator” category is considerably more fluid and 
heterogeneous – comprised of varying (and sometimes competing) goals 
and capacities – and should more productively be conceived of as a dynamic 
role that emerges within particular arenas of contention.
Perhaps the central element shaping the inf iltrator role, and the capac-
ity of the inf iltrator to pursue goals distinct from those of the employing 
agency, is the initial mode of recruitment, which reflects the motivations 
of both the agency and the recruit and defines in turn the degree and style 
of oversight associated with the inf iltrator’s actions. In his later work on 
undercover policing, Marx (1988: 85) similarly identif ies a range of entries 
into the “undercover role,” from sworn agents working surreptitiously 
as part of their police position, to private police temporarily deputized 
or otherwise enlisted by state agencies, to private citizens enticed by an 
ideological belief in the policing cause, an interest in law enforcement work, 
a sense of adventure, or – more commonly – in return for money or to reduce 
or eliminate criminal charges or other legal problems they themselves face.
These diverse entry points shape each inf iltrator’s orientation to under-
cover work. The mode of entry also def ines the inf iltrator’s relationship 
with the handler who oversees the operation and to whom the inf iltrator 
typically reports information. Agencies such as the FBI typically charge han-
dlers with the task of “developing” informants, a phrasing that signals the 
importance of the handler-informant relationship as well as the intended 
use of that bond to mold the infiltrator’s goals to align with those of the state. 
In practice, the handler’s orientation to informants varies signif icantly, and 
the evolution of the inf iltrator role is signif icantly shaped by the degree of 
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leverage associated with its mode of entry. Such structurally induced “lever-
ages,” of course, interact with individual proclivities and agency. Specif ic 
skill sets, thresholds for “deviousness” and vice, or a f inely honed sense of 
righteousness may condition the inf iltrator/handler relationship as well 
as the ways in which leverage is perceived and acted upon by both parties.
Indeed, Marx (1988: 156) notes that the “controller-informer relationship 
is usually seen to involve the former controlling the latter,” but highlights 
how the relationship in some cases can be upturned. Conceived as an 
exchange, the currency that informers provide centers on the provision 
of useful information that, in the short or long run, can be deployed to 
reduce the harm or challenge posed by the target being inf iltrated. As 
such, inf iltrators’ resources tend to vary in degree if not in type, with the 
value of information rooted in its quality and utility, a function both of the 
infiltrator’s ability to compellingly frame her contributions as pivotal and of 
whether that information might also be procured through alternate means 
(including by developing additional informants who might viably occupy 
an equivalent role5). An informant thus maximizes her leverage when 
occupying a “structural hole” between the state agency and its target – i.e., 
the sole link between these otherwise disconnected groups (Burt, 1995).
The currency that infiltrators receive in return, however, is more diverse 
– shaped by the motivations that def ine initial entry into the role, and 
reflecting the relative capacities of informers vis-à-vis their handlers. Inf il-
trators who respond primarily to tangible incentives – money, for instance, 
or a release from criminal charges – have less leverage in the exchange, as 
handlers can withdraw support if the infiltrator fails to perform. Informants 
motivated by the intrinsic rewards of the work or the ideological satisfaction 
it provides are less vulnerable to such resource withdrawals. Handlers thus 
have less control over their informants when the resources of exchange at 
their disposal are decoupled from inf iltrators’ primary motivations. The 
likelihood that an alternate informant could hypothetically provide the 
same information, thus lending a degree of redundancy and equivalence 
across inf iltrators, interacts with these dimensions, altering the latitude 
that handlers will allow a given inf iltrator in their abiding effort to ensure 
stable informant coverage.
George Dorsett represents a clear case of an informant, through his 
intrinsic motivations and leadership position in the KKK, who leveraged 
5 Indeed, agencies such as the FBI frequently seek to develop multiple informants in the 
same groups, in part as a way to cross-check the reliability of the accounts offered by particular 
inf iltrators.
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his signif icant capacities to nurture a loosely regulated and even collegial 
relationship with his handler. That agent, Dargan Frierson, was well-known 
within the Bureau for his ability to develop KKK informants, stemming 
in large part from his ability to relate to klansmen. He made good use of 
his deep local accent and was quick to disclose that his own grandfather 
had been in the KKK during the 1920s. He openly expressed his lack of 
enthusiasm about integration, and sometimes told klansmen to “cuss LBJ all 
you want; I don’t think any more of him than you do.” He would also “look the 
other way” when his informants were involved with cross burnings or other 
actions that, in his view, “wouldn’t hurt anyone.” To Frierson, working with 
top-level informants required such latitude. To maintain the trust required 
to access the KKK’s inner circles, he reasoned, inf iltrators like Dorsett “had 
to be out there, where it was going on. He had to talk like them, he had to 
act like them, he had to give f iery speeches” (Cunningham, 2009; Schlosser, 
2007; Dorsett, 2005 Frierson and Dorsett, 2004).
As a consequence, Frierson’s relationship to Dorsett developed as a 
partnership of sorts. The terms of Dorsett’s recruitment focused on financial 
incentives rather than any leverage related to the possibility of his avoiding 
arrest or criminal charges. The FBI also lacked other informants among 
the elite leadership of North Carolina’s UKA realm, and the absence of 
redundancy increased the value of Dorsett’s reports and limited checks on 
his behavior. Dorsett, for his part, articulated his informant role as a means 
to “keep down violence and trouble.” Though we might have cause to doubt 
his veracity, he frequently and proudly recounted particular instances in 
which he was able to stop a particular member from committing violent 
acts, though all the while he delivered “f iery” speeches at nightly UKA 
rallies that seemingly promoted violence and a disregard for legal authority.
This dissonance, while calling into question the veracity of Dorsett’s self-
proclaimed peace-keeping role, highlights as well his perceived orientation 
to the FBI in the context of his informant position. The lack of leverage that 
Frierson held over Dorsett was reflected in the latter’s articulation of the 
inf iltration dynamic; to Dorsett, the FBI was working with – and, in some 
cases, for – him, to accomplish a goal that he himself favored. While the 
terms of his partnership remained bounded by the organizational process 
of the FBI, Dorsett’s leverage over his handler stretched and loosened the 
boundaries typically imposed on informants within the FBI arena.
Despite the KKK’s heavy proscription on informing, such stretched 
boundaries enabled Dorsett to view his undercover status as an exten-
sion of his Klan work, and something that at times aided his efforts in the 
KKK. Such views were not merely self-delusions; Frierson’s collegiality 
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extended to providing Dorsett with protection for his colleagues to engage 
in perceived lower-level KKK terrorism such as cross burnings, as well as 
the resources to start his own competing KKK organization in 1967 (the 
Bureau ensured a foundation of members in Dorsett’s incipient group, by 
stocking the new group with lower-level informants and instructing them 
to encourage their KKK colleagues to leave the UKA). Additionally, Frierson 
set up Dorsett, a house painter by trade, with jobs painting the residences 
of new agents when they moved to the area (Schlosser, 2007; Dorsett, 2005; 
Frierson and Dorsett, 2004).
Gary Thomas Rowe enjoyed similar freedom to take part in KKK vio-
lence with seeming immunity from FBI reprisals, though the dynamic that 
produced that latitude differed markedly from Dorsett’s relationship with 
Frierson. In contrast with the UKA in North Carolina, which generally 
avoided acts of deadly violence, Birmingham’s Eastview 13 klavern was 
among the roughest KKK units in the nation. This militancy added urgency 
to efforts to develop informants who might procure advance information 
about future violent acts. The tough, insular character of the Eastview unit 
also ensured that the task of placing informants, and in particular those 
capable of penetrating the klavern’s violent core, would be more diff icult 
(McWhorter, 2001).
During the initial meeting during which Rowe agreed to inf iltrate the 
UKA for the FBI, his handling agent Barrett Kemp instructed him to avoid 
violence, in particular as an instigator. “Don’t start anything,” Kemp in-
structed. “Don’t be the one to jump up and say ‘let’s go’” (May, 2005: 9). While 
Rowe, like Dorsett, agreed to inf iltrate primarily for intrinsic reasons (in 
Rowe’s case, a longtime f ixation with law enforcement), the FBI’s leverage 
early on centered on the Bureau’s ability to “disown” and expose Rowe 
to criminal charges if implicated in a violent criminal act. This leverage, 
however, was tempered by the klavern’s insularity, which contributed to 
the Bureau’s inability to successfully develop informants other than Rowe. 
For a time, Kemp sought to mask that fact, and even lied to Rowe by telling 
him that he could cross-check the veracity of his information with reports 
from his (non-existent) stable of Eastview inf iltrators.
Rowe’s autonomy increased within a matter of months of his initial entry, 
when he was elected Eastview’s “Klokan Chief.” This new position as a valued 
klavern off icer left him in charge of reviewing new membership applica-
tions and thus privy to the sort of inside information that garden-variety 
members never learned. He knew this position would both “please” his FBI 
handler and loosen the bounds of his Bureau-imposed role, increasing his 
capacity to engage in a broader range of actions without threat of sanction.
InFIltratorS 171
By 1961, FBI off icials were referring to Rowe as their “ace in the hole,” and 
that year’s Freedom Rides provided one early indication of the latitude that 
came with such status. When Rowe reported to the FBI off ice that the local 
police had pledged to give klansmen 15 minutes of unimpeded time to attack 
the group of interracial bus travelers, agents failed to intercede, instead 
turning the information over to the local police behind the plot in the f irst 
place. Rowe enthusiastically participated in the beatings, and ostensibly 
to maintain his cover Birmingham agents failed to restrict or otherwise 
penalize him. As still no comparable informants emerged, Rowe’s leverage 
increased and his leash grew ever looser. The fact that he maintained his 
informant status throughout the f irst half of the 1960s only exacerbated this 
degree of immunity from serious Bureau control, and called into question 
the balance between his service to the Klan and his efforts, as a state agent, 
to hinder KKK violence.
The key paradox associated with Rowe’s multifaceted tie to the Bureau, 
as Marx (1988) observed in another context, is that his embeddedness in 
criminal violence enhanced his value as an informant but consequently 
made him more diff icult to control. Similarly, as with Dorsett, the long 
arc of his informant service – Rowe continued reporting to the FBI 
throughout the mid-1960s, until he was exposed in the Liuzzo investiga-
tion – increased the likelihood that the role would fail “to prevent harm 
or … actually stimulat[e] or contribut[e] to it” (Marx, 1988: 203-204). This 
overall dynamic emerges both because continuous success as an inform-
ant requires repeated validations of one’s activist bona f ides, and also 
because each subsequent act reinforces and reproduces the latitude that 
inf iltrators enjoy, as restrictions on any single act would risk exposing 
the agency’s culpability in the full complement of criminal or otherwise 
unsavory actions.
In contrast, Ernest Withers gained significant leverage through his stature 
in civil rights circles, which enabled his unique access to the Movement. His 
involvement predated his recruitment by the FBI, and while his expected 
contribution allowed the Bureau to loosen its restrictions on informants to 
place him on the payroll, his relationship to his handler remained distant, 
centered on the professional exchange of information and money. While 
the FBI saw Withers as an important asset, agents were reluctant to work 
with an informant who had previously been f ired from the Memphis Police 
Department. Ultimately, Withers’s access to key information and his status 
as a respected member of the activist community overrode those concerns. 
In a report f iled during Withers’s recruitment, his handler William H. 
Lawrence cautioned that:
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It is not believed that Withers can meet the Bureau’s reliability require-
ments as a (racial informant) wherein his activities can be directed or 
controlled. However, because of his many contacts in the racial f ield, 
plus his indicated willingness to cooperate with this Bureau, (…) it is 
recommend that Withers (…) be contacted regarding general criminal 
matters. If in the course of these contacts he volunteers any information 
relating to security matters or racial matters, it of course will be accepted. 
(Perrusquia, 2010)
Given Withers’s knowledge of the FBI’s initial trepidation, he surely was aware 
of how his value enhanced his leverage by loosening the boundaries typically 
associated with FBI operatives. As one of only five paid “racial informants” in 
Memphis in 1968, Withers still engaged in Movement activities and remained 
loyal to civil rights causes, while reporting to Lawrence periodically on 
“racial matters.” That relationship, however, lacked the personal component 
that characterized both Rowe and Dorsett’s experience, and instead evolved 
as a business-like exchange. “Periodically, we would meet in person under 
what we hoped were safe conditions to personally exchange information, go 
over descriptions, any photographs, things of that nature,” Lawrence later 
testif ied, adding that he paid Withers as much as $200 a month – about 
$15,000 a year today – for such reports (Perrusquia, 2010).
The Dorsett, Rowe, and Withers cases illustrate distinct kinds of relation-
ships that define the infiltrator role within the context of its complementary 
handler relationship. The obvious contrasting case, treated counterfactually 
here but described in signif icant detail in criminological studies of police 
informers (see, e.g., Churchill and VanderWall 1988; Marx 1988), involves an 
inf iltrator whose past criminal actions puts him or her in the debt of the 
handler, who can revoke any immunity or leniency previously granted as 
a condition for informant work. As the lesser capacity of those vulnerable 
informants causes the leverage pendulum to shift toward the handler, we 
might expect that the infiltrator’s relationships both to their state employer 
and to the group being inf iltrated to adjust accordingly. The contours of 
these relationships constitute one arena that defines the tenor of infiltration.
Vertical Contexts: Organizational Structure and the Contours of 
Infiltration
The handler-informer relationship is also embedded within the broader 
context of the handler’s position within the overall organization of 
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policing agencies. While many aspects of agencies’ bureaucratic structure 
and process relate to this dimension, one highly salient consideration for 
infiltration dynamics is the classic policing tension between: (1) a desire for 
centralized coordination and uniform standards enabled by tight top-down 
control; and (2) the decreased quality of infiltrator information and reduced 
responsiveness that results from such higher-level supervision (Marx, 1988).
Reacting to that tension, FBI leadership sought to balance an overall 
emphasis on centralized authority – signaled by the fact that the vast major-
ity of its counterintelligence measures against supposed subversives during 
the 1960s targeted individuals and groups identif ied as threats by National 
Headquarters rather than by f ield agents – by encouraging local handlers 
and f ield off ice supervisors to exploit their local knowledge in the devel-
opment and use of informants (Cunningham, 2004). Such organizational 
considerations def ine the vertical arena associated with the FBI itself, by 
shaping the ways in which handlers’ actions relate to their relationships to 
their superiors and the Bureau’s broader organizational routines. Here, we 
consider how such organizational policing dynamics shape the infiltrator’s 
relationship both with his/her handler and the targeted group that provides 
the basis for undercover work.
The FBI’s Birmingham f ield off ice, which shepherded Gary Thomas 
Rowe’s entry into the Bureau, felt this core tension strongly. FBI director 
Hoover was initially wary of Rowe’s background, and denied Barrett Kemp’s 
recommendation in 1960 that Rowe’s “excellent” potential should merit his 
development as a confidential informant. Only after Rowe was elected to 
a key off icer position in the Eastview 13 klavern, thus gaining signif icant 
leverage through his unique ability to offer valued high-quality information, 
was Kemp’s request accepted (May, 2005).
As noted earlier, Rowe’s newfound leverage also earned him a longer 
leash; despite Kemp’s general admonishments against participating in 
violent or criminal acts, he soon found himself able to engage in cross 
burnings without authorization or sanction. While f ield off ice reports to 
Bureau superiors were intended to control such activities, Rowe’s unique 
contributions provided signif icant incentive to circumvent the usual rules. 
In at least one instance, the Birmingham off ice’s report to headquarters 
willfully omitted Rowe’s involvement when reporting on Klan violence. 
Interactions between Rowe and Kemp increasingly acknowledged the ten-
sions between avoiding violence and procuring information. “We have to by 
law instruct that you are not to participate in any violence,” Rowe recalled 
being told. “However, I know you need to do this … to get the information. 
That’s the important thing: get the information” (quoted in May, 2005: 25-26). 
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When reporting the serious violence against the Freedom Riders in 1961, 
the handling agent sent a report to his immediate superior that distorted 
Rowe’s role. That superior then ignored clear evidence to the contrary and 
told Headquarters that Rowe was not personally involved in the brutal bus 
station beatings.
Given Rowe’s prized position, such autonomy was valued and reinforced. 
His handler Kemp complimented him on doing “one hell of a good job” 
and let him know that he considered Rowe the “f inest” Klan informant 
in the Bureau. When, soon after, Kemp resigned his post with the Bureau, 
he reiterated this praise and encouraged Rowe to stay on as an informant. 
Rowe agreed, and his next handler effectively reproduced the dynamic, 
advising Rowe to “stay straight, keep your eyes open, don’t get involved with 
anything, but furnish us the information.” So long as he did the latter, the 
former warnings generally went unheeded. In 1965, when Rowe agreed to 
testify against his fellow klansmen for a murder that he himself was a party 
to and failed to stop, the FBI authorized a deal that won Rowe’s immunity 
from both state and federal charges, the permanent relocation of his family, 
and a job in a locale of his choosing (May, 2005).
In other cases, the FBI’s bureaucratic process managed accountability 
among informants through organizational controls that either drew inform-
ants in or maintained distance. George Dorsett’s tenure as an informant 
clearly reflects the former approach. In North Carolina, repeated orders 
from National Headquarters to use informants to usurp the state’s top 
UKA leadership overruled local agents’ appeals to maintain stability in 
the state’s Klan outf it and thus maximize the utility of Dorsett’s access to 
the inner circle. As a result, Frierson partnered with Dorsett to foment a 
major leadership split and the formation of a new, Bureau-managed KKK 
outfit headed by Dorsett himself. The FBI gained leverage from the process, 
tightening the agency’s ability to bound its prized informant’s behavior, as 
Dorsett’s incipient Confederate Knights of the KKK relied on Bureau support 
to ensure stable membership and dues payments.
In contrast, FBI agents in Memphis sought to balance the signif icant 
benefits of tapping Ernest Withers’s access to civil rights circles with the 
risks they associated with his potential for impropriety and insubordina-
tion. To avoid the sorts of tangled complicities they weathered with Gary 
Thomas Rowe, for a long period the FBI avoided bringing Withers in as 
a full-f ledged confidential informant, instead maintaining semi-regular 
contact through less formal requests for information about criminal activity 
alongside implicit encouragement to link that information to known civil 
rights activists.
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Such a move illustrates the importance of each of the dimensions we 
highlight here: the mode of recruitment, primary incentive structure, and 
capacities and leverage that characterize inf iltrators’ orientations to their 
employing agencies. The protective insulation that agents erected in their 
work with Withers was not possible in the case of the even-more-combustible 
Rowe, who had no prior history as a Klan member and thus required formal 
Bureau status to encourage his initial entrée into the Eastview klavern. 
Withers’s willingness to provide information in return for monetary com-
pensation also enabled the sort of straightforward businesslike exchanges 
that would not have been tenable for Rowe or Dorsett, whose motivations 
centered, respectively, on an unfulf illed desire to become a bona f ide law 
enforcement officer and a wish to make use of police connections to advance 
careerist ambitions within the Klan. The fact that all three of these inf il-
trators could provide diff icult-to-obtain information provided them with 
degrees of latitude greatly exceeding that of most garden-variety infiltrators, 
who often offered redundant and thus easily replaceable benef its. Such 
value increased their ability to negotiate arrangements that circumvented, 
at least in part, the FBI’s tight centralized controls.
But even in cases where inf iltrators enjoy signif icant autonomy from 
their employing agency, the dynamics of their informant work – and in 
particular the terms of the “horizontal” relationship with their handlers 
– are shaped by the vertical organizational context within which those 
handlers reside. Indeed, one might imagine an agency that required less 
day-to-day accountability or provided less input or bureaucratic control 
on the conduct of inf iltrators as signif icantly shifting Rowe, Dorsett, and 
Withers’s actions and experiences. Similarly, the organizational contours of 
the social movement organizations that each of these men infiltrated – from 
Rowe’s highly insular Eastview klavern to the looser civil rights circles 
that Withers, with his established credentials and stature, could enter 
even in the absence of formal membership – shaped the overall experience 
of inf iltration. Such vertical considerations serve as crucial contexts for 
inf iltration, conditioning the experience by influencing the autonomy of 
both handlers and informants, altering the latitude associated with the 
inf iltrator role and thereby the dynamics of its interstitial position.
Interstitial Roles and Arenas of Contention
If, as Jasper argues in the introduction to this volume, groups engaged in 
collective political struggles are “never completely unified,” with individual 
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members defecting or pursuing their own goals alongside those of the 
group, inf iltrators represent perhaps the clearest (and most complex) case 
of players who balance multiple allegiances and interests. They themselves 
exist in an interstitial state, both in the broad arena that subsumes contend-
ing challengers and authorities and within the narrower organizational 
arenas that constitute specif ic groups on both sides of the struggle. While 
the nature of inf iltration requires that individuals negotiate – typically 
through deception – multiple relationships within and across these are-
nas, the cases of Ernest Withers, George Dorsett, and Gary Thomas Rowe 
demonstrate that the contours of those relationships relate to inf iltrators’ 
strategic capacities and affective orientations, as they intersect with the 
structure and process of both their employing agencies and the group 
being inf iltrated.
Here, we have captured the interactively constituted nature of inf iltra-
tors’ strategic capacities – the fact that such capacities do not solely reside 
within individuals but rather are conditioned by the settings within which 
they are deployed – through our focus on the inf iltrator-handler relation-
ship as an exchange characterized by differing leverages possessed by one 
or the other party. Such an approach emphasizes the ability of both sides to 
deal in the currencies of payment, persuasion, or coercion, and recognizes 
that, over time, such exchanges are conditioned by individuals’ ethical and 
deceptive orientations as well as the affective solidarities that characterize 
the primary handler relationship. Rowe, for instance, nearly abandoned his 
undercover role in the KKK when his handler Barrett Kemp left the FBI, 
and only agreed to stay on when both Kemp and his replacement provided 
assurances that maintaining his past successes was possible in the absence 
of his collaboration with Kemp (May, 2005).
Though the discussion here has focused predominantly on the manner in 
which informants attach to the state agencies that employ them, a complete 
analysis of the interstitial inf iltrator role should engage with the full set of 
horizontal and vertical relationships that constitute the inf iltrator role. In 
particular, the boundedness and insularity of targeted social movement 
organizations shape inf iltrators’ modes of entry, the degree of latitude 
and control that handlers can exert without compromising their cover, 
and their effectiveness – sometimes conditioned by emerging ambivalent 
solidarities – over time.
More generally, the cases examined here also highlight the very per-
meability of the boundaries that players face as they operate within and 
across multiple and embedded arenas. For informants, these boundaries 
can appear artif icial, as they utilize available leverage to act strategically to 
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extend or even rupture such constraints. Infiltrators perhaps appear unique 
as they necessarily navigate the uneasy waters of deceptive dual identities 
within competing arenas, drawing on capacities shaped by the leverage 
they possess on both sides of their role. The broader utility of the study 
of “undercover” players, however, might well be as a vehicle to illuminate 
the often-obscured negotiations that characterize how social movement 
players in general strategically navigate and reconstitute the boundaries 
that def ine arenas of protest.
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8 Liberal Violence
Strategies of Repression in Transitional Regimes
Vince Boudreau
Despite the prominence of violence in the authoritarian arsenal, dictator-
ships thread a line between stark repression and other modes of engag-
ing rivals, critics, and members of society. Alongside state violence, one 
sometimes sees evidence of these alternative modes of engagement: in 
movement sympathizers who might have acted but did not, in bystanders 
who, made to fear movement victories, more or less willingly consume 
the promise of social order that state agents claim to deliver. Among the 
collection of institutions and actors we call the state, rivals may hold their 
ambitions in check while government seems f irmly in control. Across 
the authoritarian order, the needs and ambitions of potential rivals are 
conciliated, intimidated, punished or eliminated. A dictatorship’s efforts 
to retain power reflect a great many decisions, from which a strategy of 
domination emerges.1
For a variety of reasons, state violence against opponents cannot be 
exclusively attributed to the decision of authoritative state actors alone. 
Many repressive acts are committed by low-level actors in the heat of the 
moment and beyond the strategic control of the man or woman in charge. 
When student demonstrations near the executive mansion or palace, they 
confront rows of security forces who may have clear orders to shoot or hold 
their f ire, but certainly also feel unease or even panic as demonstrations 
move closer. Moreover, in such situations, violence results from the interac-
tion between security forces, state leaders, demonstrators, bystanders, and 
others: soldiers who may initially intend to hold their f ire may f ire into an 
angry crowd that seems dangerous – where they might have stood f irm in 
their resolve against an apparently more measured protest march (Tilly, 
2003). Nevertheless, there is some reason to imagine that an authoritarian 
regime pursuing acts associated with the repressive repertoire of dictator-
ship – such as disappearing activists in secret, rather than dissuading a 
1 I gratefully acknowledge the help and criticism I received from Jim Jasper and Sid Tarrow in 
preparing this chapter. Sid in particular urged me toward a more interactive conceptualization 
of contention and repression, and while this work may fall short of what he envisioned, it is 
better for his efforts.
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public protest march – may more faithfully act on a strategic intention. 
Moreover, core political decisions about repressive strategy can set the tone 
for more contingent interactions among actors on the ground, and so we’ll 
begin elaborating the dictators’ strategic dilemmas with these big decisions.
I will f irst establish the importance of four big decisions in authorities’ 
approach to dissent. In making the case, I concentrate on breaking down 
the exercise of power into constituent considerations, rather than explain-
ing any specif ic repressive choice, or indeed, assuming that those choices 
suff iciently determine what violence will look like. The identif ication of 
these decisions leads us to a framework for thinking about how and why 
violence gets produced in one or another way, and what the consequences of 
that production will likely be for other players. At the core of my approach 
lies one large assumption: that a dictator would ideally seek to calibrate 
repression to achieve intimidation and control without triggering overly 
large and avoidable counter regime mobilization (Francisco, 2005) (although 
the def inition of “overly large” and “avoidable” will vary from situation to 
situation). Strategic dilemmas attached to repression, that is, take account of 
how one seeks to strike at targets and what those strikes will likely trigger in 
other players. After sketching out the basic contours of these big decisions, I 
consider the regime’s governing context, because variations in that context 
influence how the pursuit of coercion or conciliation interacts with the 
activity of other players in the contentious arena.
Taking my lead from the larger questions posed by this book, I will 
consider the construction of arenas and the interaction among different 
kinds of players as implicating each another: liberalizing pressure influ-
ences how a dictator will treat protest movements – but patterns of regime 
response to dissent also weaken or strengthen the democratic character of 
the political arena. Moreover, while these big decisions go a fair distance 
toward explaining alternative strategies for dictatorial control, they go only 
so far: by its very nature, repression reflects both cold calculations that 
discount the humanity of countless victims and the unthinking and often 
ill-conceived impulses of men (and boys and women) with guns. A fully 
interactive approach to the analysis of contention makes the causal weight 
of initial calculations, or even well-considered plans, fairly preliminary. I 
seek an understanding of how context helps explain the forces pushing 
on interactions among different actors in a contentious f ield, rather than 
a covering law that accounts for all decisions under given circumstances. 
Once we have established the broad contours of these decisions, I will move 
to a consideration of their relationship to patterns of interaction within a 
contentious arena under authoritarian conditions.
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Who Is a Dictator?
What exactly constitutes a dictator, or a dictatorship, and how do we 
link a regime designation like “dictatorship” to patterns of repression? 
For many, a propensity to repress is a def ining characteristic of dictator-
ship, but to then ask about the relationship between dictatorship and 
repression amounts to tautology. I’ll get around that diff iculty by def ining 
dictatorship as a concentration of power, the absence of checks on politi-
cal authority, and restrictions on participatory politics. Nor will I insist 
that dictatorship has a special relationship to repression – except as a 
more regularly used tool in the struggle to maintain his or her authority 
(Boykoff, 2007). Repression alone, however, does not def ine dictatorship. 
Rather, dictatorship represents a particular institutional patterning, and 
repression is a consequence of answers to the puzzles thrown up by that 
institutional patterning. It follows, then, that other institutional relations 
between states and societies throw up different puzzles, to which different 
answers (contributing to the production of different patterns of repression 
or conciliation) may emerge. The discussion that follows focuses on the 
dilemmas that attach to liberalizing dictatorships, but does so because 
these dilemmas are particularly illustrative of the larger questions at hand. 
As I’ll suggest, however, one can use the considerations that follow to think 
about repression in reliantly closed dictatorships, more open democratic 
regimes, or anything in between.
Moreover, pressures to liberalize represent core elements of the stra-
tegic dilemmas that will most concern us here: the quest for hegemony 
and control demands decisions about who to coerce, how much coercion 
to use, and what other political modes might be brought into play (Carey, 
2006; Kowalewski and Hoover, 1992; Touraine, 1985). As they interact with 
restive populations, divided security forces, dissident members of the 
media, international forces, and a host of other potential players, these 
considerations pull regimes to different positions along a continuum 
between dictatorship and democracy. Modes of liberalization and reform, 
democracy and dictatorship, are therefore every bit as much a conse-
quence of contentious interactions as a context for them. A dynamic, 
and interactive analysis requires that we allow the players, as well as 
the arenas and strategies, to evolve – making their reciprocal impact on 
one another a specif ic element of the inquiry. To illustrate the point, I 
will concentrate on dictatorships in liberalizing settings (or under great 
pressure to liberalize).
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A Framework for Analysis
Three separate questions help illuminate the strategic dilemmas under 
consideration. The f irst investigates the structural conditions under which 
these strategic interactions take place – conditions that both shape deci-
sions and evolve in consequence of them. The second involves the elements 
of dictatorship strategy, here depicted as four decisions that shape repres-
sion. The third involves the production of contention itself, conceived as 
the process by which others in the contentious arena interact with these 
decisions; in what follows, I identify four signif icant actors, including the 
dictator’s inner circle, and theorize their interactions with one another, 
under given sets of external conditions.
Dictatorships seeking to quash or manage dissent face four crucial 
families of decisions: targeting decisions, intensity decisions, exclusivity 
decisions, and publicity decisions. Targeting decisions help determine 
who receives the state’s coercive attentions and by what criteria those 
attentions are allocated. A key element is whether authorities target kinds 
of people or kinds of activity (Boudreau, 2009). Intensity decisions are 
initial cuts on how deadly or violent state coercion will be, although actual 
levels of violence are extraordinarily dependent on interactions among 
actors in the contentious arena. Regimes that imprison are coercive, but 
less intensively so than dictatorships that more often torture or murder 
– although incarceration duration also matters (Kowalewski and Hoover, 
1992). Exclusivity decisions shape the extent to which coercion carefully 
targets perpetrators and subversives, distinguishing discriminating regimes 
from those that sow terror more indiscriminately, sweeping up involved and 
uninvolved citizens in their dragnet (Gurr and Lichbach, 1986). Publicity 
decisions involve whether the state acknowledges or claims responsibility 
for its repression, how broadly it publicizes this responsibility and to what 
end, and how (or how effectively) it justif ies and explains repression to 
its victims, dissidents, bystanders, and elements of its internal apparatus 
(Earl, 2011).
The strategic element of these decisions reflects a concern (our analytic 
concern and the concern of state actors) for how they will interact with 
other players in a contentious arena. At least four different players matter: 
the dictatorship’s leading decision makers (our main object of investiga-
tion here), targets of repression and coercion, bystanders (including both 
individuals and organizations), and secondary factions of the state ap-
paratus. Each decision taken in relationship to an act of dissent or resistance 
will potentially have some impact on some or all of these actors, and so 
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in choosing repression, conciliation or any other political move, players 
must take broad account of its impact on the balance of political forces.
Authorities’ strategic decisions, the responses of other players to those 
decisions, and the interactions that ultimately produce contention are 
influenced by the general setting of politics – and the range of signif icant 
contextual factors with both domestic and international roots is potentially 
quite long. I concentrate on two such elements, because they have direct 
implications for the main lever I am trying to put in play: the relationship 
between repression and inclusion in how authorities manage dissent. My 
choice is deeply influenced by a model of political context often deployed by 
Charles Tilly. In many of his later works, Tilly liked to arrange his thoughts 
about state-society relationships in a 2x2 grid in which degrees of democ-
racy and variations in state capacity interact (Tilly, 2001). The state capacity 
axis is more or less straightforward, but in thinking about gradations of 
democracy, it is wise to take on board the complexity of Tilly’s appreciation 
of the concept. For him, democracy involved three important elements: 
status equality between government and governed, binding consultations 
with citizens, and the protection of basic rights and freedoms. The interac-
tion of all three elements matters for the analysis that follows.
Considerations of Setting
The choices and potential consequences of activity open to political authori-
ties connect to elements of the larger political setting in several important 
ways. The decisions that state leaders make accumulate to produce and 
sometimes change that context, and in writing this, I am mindful to avoid 
reifying the political structure in ways that separate it from action. Nev-
ertheless, longer term parameters of political activity make some answers 
to the decisions I’ve discussed more likely than others – particularly 
parameters connected to the extent and eff icacy of voice in the system, 
and the resources open to state authorities who determine that dissidents 
have exceeded those parameters. These considerations bring us to Tilly’s 
typology of democracy and state capacity.
The social and political life of contention and state violence depends on 
the larger relationships in which that contention unfolds. State actors and 
dissidents both evaluate the level of support that their claims generate, and 
the support they can expect for any tactic (Tilly and Tarrow, 2006: 70-71 
especially). A group of bystanders in a semi-democracy may approve of 
demands for land reform, but reject efforts to occupy and burn government 
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off ices in pursuit of those demands. While groups in government may not 
support a call for new elections, they may unite against a government that 
uses deadly force to repress those who do. Actors will respond to tactics in 
relation to the range of political performances that are normatively in play, 
the institutions of repression and representation at hand, and the political 
dispositions of other actors (Davenport, 1995; Ondetti, 2006; Tilly, 2000). 
Context profoundly influences the strategic resonance of any decision or 
act taken in a contentious arena, and so shapes how contention itself will 
ultimately emerge (Tilly, 2003). In this sense, a dictator’s decision to behave 
in one or another manner is merely an input into that set of interactions 
that ultimately shape contention.
Yet unlike production of collective violence (which always emerges as 
an interaction among at least two groups) or contention in more liberal 
settings (where the arena is open to a fuller range of participants and observ-
ers), there is some reason to privilege at least some dictatorship decisions 
over the interaction of different players in the production of repression. 
Dictatorships often work to clear the political arena before contention 
begins or following a spate of demonstrations – eliminating or isolating 
so-called enemies of the state in repressive acts designed to preempt politics, 
demobilize bystanders, and isolate activists from one another. Such acts 
of preemptory or retaliatory repression may be conceived and executed in 
more unilateral fashion (indeed, are designed precisely to be unilateral). To 
the extent that such attacks take place away from the sites of public politics, 
moreover, a regime will have more discretion in whether or not it will 
own up to its role in such attacks. Within a more fully elaborated political 
arena, of course, the broader range of interactions comes into play to shape 
contention – think of the mass demonstrations in many contemporary 
democracy movements. But here, too, decisions to repress may be taken by 
fairly isolated power holders and more faithfully carried out by a security 
force apparatus that stands more apart from society. For instance, while a 
whole range of actors produced the contention in Tiananmen Square, core 
elements of the violence followed from decisions taken by a small cadre of 
leaders removed from the scene (Nathan et al., 2001).
The point is not conceptual but empirical: dictatorships work hard to 
clear the political arena of adversaries, to establish or defend their capacity 
for unilateral activity. Some are more successful than others. Where dicta-
tors are more isolated and dictatorships more centralized, where bystanders 
fear punishment for expressing dissent, where media is stif led and free 
assembly impossible, the conceptualization and design of repression may 
be more unilateral, and more directly reflect regime calculations.
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A regime must decide how it will resolve grievances and hear claims – 
meaning both what institutions it will deploy to hear social demands and 
how access to those institutions will be distributed. In theory, a democratic 
government institutionalizes arenas for the expression and resolution of 
popular demands, and takes root as people commit to these venues in 
preference to efforts at self-help (Huber et al., 1997; Jenkins et al., 2008). 
To produce this effect, however, suff icient relevant institutions must 
exist, must provide roughly equal access, and must function with some 
impartiality and effectiveness. These conditions are not always met, even 
in acknowledged democracies. In dictatorships, the question of whether 
these institutions should exist and how impartially they function is even 
more open-ended. Dictators may seal their rise by eradicating representa-
tive institutions and routine avenues for resolving grievances: disbanding 
courts, closing the press, and pursuing a closed policy-making process.
Dictatorships may so compromise government institutions as to drive 
claim making away from the representation of grievances to government 
(Boudreau, 1996). Contention in such situations can range from broadly 
based, often explicitly moderate democracy protests, to narrower and more 
(tactically and politically) revolutionary uprisings, depending in part on 
whether the regime divides, whether bystanders involve themselves in the 
movement, or whether and how international forces weigh in. Conversely, as 
dictatorships liberalize, they at least open the prospect of less contentious 
modes of dispute resolution and claim making, and radical activity (either 
radical state repression or radical anti-state tactics) may attract less support 
(Ondetti, 2006). Nevertheless, we also know that liberalizing dictatorships 
predictably generate discernable spikes in both social and state violence 
(Fein, 1995; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002; Roessler, 2005; Savun and Tirone, 
2011). Accordingly, off icials and activists in such settings will be tempted 
both to tune their actions to emerging political norms and to act on their 
persistent apprehension of existential threats requiring a strong response. 
Further along the democracy spectrum, the sense of existential threat 
probably grows less tenable, and authorities may not be able to use strong 
violence without calling forth a torrent of social criticism or mobilization. 
Nor, given the range of other options open to them, would violence neces-
sarily be the most attractive political option in such cases, for the settled 
institutions of political representation often are all authorities need to 
domesticate contention (Lindekilde, 2012).
Dictatorships, however, cannot rely on that same institutional logic to 
diffuse resistance, both because they have not developed representative in-
stitutions with strong reputations and because they often face more sharply 
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counterhegemonic challenges. Given both considerations, dictatorships 
can be expected to take more active steps to thwart perceived enemies. 
Authorities in such circumstances often present themselves as under attack: 
besieged by communists, hamstrung by ineff icient civilians, beset by the 
clamoring rabble with their social needs, undermined by foreign enemies, 
or merely destabilized by a pressing need to develop, to modernize, and to 
build a future. If democracies can often manage dissent through political 
routines, dictatorships often must position themselves as countermove-
ments, setting out to defeat their opponents (Johnston, 2012; Kowalewski 
and Hoover, 1992).
High capacity dictatorships will be able to treat more opposition move-
ments as threats that require a response, while weaker or more divided dic-
tatorship will probably need to ignore some challenges, conciliate others, or 
work through non-state actors like independent militia or warlords (Migdal, 
1988). Weaker authorities may choose to concentrate their defenses around 
regions or institutions that matter most to their power: national centers, 
border areas, or places with particular resource endowments (Tilly, 2003). In 
either event, authorities settle for something less than complete hegemony 
over all populations. Where weak governments def ine threats as rooted in 
certain modes of behavior, they may de-criminalize a range of activities. 
Liberalization often opens the door to more formidable democratizing 
challenges, of course – but offers the immediate promise of alleviating 
policing burdens on the state. In such cases, however, unpredictable and 
exemplary acts of violence (the disappearance of a human rights activist, or 
the assassination of an opposition leader) can seem a low-cost alternative 
to systematic repression of proscribed, or undesired, activity.
Four Big Decisions and How They Matter
As I noted, four main decisions shape a regime’s approach to repression: 
targeting decisions, intensity decisions, exclusivity decisions, and public-
ity decisions. In all but the most totalitarian orders (and certainly when 
liberalization processes are underway), authorities must contend with the 
interaction of their own moves with those of other actors in the production 
of repression and contention. Three of the four decisions are what we may 
call battlef ield decisions, influencing who gets “hit” and how – and battle-
field decisions always interact with the decisions and actions of others in the 
contentious arena. The fourth involves regime efforts to frame their actions 
for other audiences, and so to control repression’s political consequences. 
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Let us take up these four decisions in turn, bearing in mind that however 
neat their rhetorical separation may be in this work, the issues are typically 
more mixed together in the act itself.
In making what I have called targeting decisions, authorities work out 
how they will regard the sources of resistance to their regime. In many cases, 
historical interactions between authorities and dissident social groups 
produce clear ideas about the sources of subversion and danger in a society, 
ideas that can emerge though historically grounded analysis and research. 
Some decisions about who to target may be linked to state resources, with 
weaker and more poorly supplied authoritarian orders compelled to let some 
dissent slide, or to subcontract repression out to local power brokers. In 
addition to these considerations, authorities arrive at some understanding 
about whether the threats they face typically emanate from subversives who 
represent danger in their very person, or from a range of destabilizing and 
harmful activities (no matter who commits them) (Boudreau, 2009; Haber-
korn, 2013). Why a regime follows one path or another has something to do 
with its overall system of power, but also reflects relational mechanisms 
that activate boundaries between political groups and polarize relation-
ships among them (Tarrow, 2012). That is, like most of these considerations, 
questions and answers are historically constructed via social and political 
interactions, rather than merely dreamed up by dictators.
Among varieties of repression and violence structured as an effort to 
identify irredeemable subversives, we f ind ethnic cleansing, campaigns 
to eradicate communists or ban membership in categories of organiza-
tion, and violent, often summary, executions of criminals brought to grief 
less because of a specif ic crime than because they have been prof iled as 
members of a recidivist underworld. We also, however, f ind activists in zero 
sum conflict with authorities over power and resources (something quite 
different than the activist demanding broader representation or access to 
political institutions). Where political challenges emerge in pitched and 
zero sum terms, the legality or illegality of an activist tactic is less at issue 
than the capacity of activism to accumulate power against the regime. 
In such situations, authorities will look past what an activist does and 
concentrate on who they are, how powerful they seem, and what they are 
seeking. In this sense, the committed revolutionary or nationalist – and 
even the democratic reformer – f ind their place alongside ethnic or religious 
others: all standing in existentially threatening contentious relationships 
to the regime. In such cases, state attention will not linger on the peaceful-
ness of a march, the apparent innocence of a mass education meeting, or 
even the content of a religious ceremony. People will face state violence 
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because they have become subversives, rather than that they have acted 
subversively.
In contrast, repression and violence meted out against proscribed acts 
require state authorities to link punishment with particular events, often 
justif ied in some public explanation or juridical process. Even a repres-
sive order may be policed by clear rules of conduct and behavior, so that 
shrewd activists may f ind ways of expressing dissent – often in deeply 
ineffective ways – that will not draw strong retaliation. Prosecution can 
be as much about changing patterns of behavior than about apprehending 
subversives (Beetham, 1991; Earl, 2003; Gilley, 2006; Oberschall, 1973). State 
repression and policing aim at preventing dissidents from acting on their 
views and steering bystanders toward modes of behavior that don’t disrupt 
the prevailing order. In such cases, we must naturally pay close attention 
to how repression takes place, but must also attend to the ways in which 
authorities write and rewrite the rules of conduct, the battles that take place 
over those legal processes, and the consistency with which the law, once 
written, is applied. (In contrast, where dictators seek to root out threatening 
individuals, the law may be a mere footnote and place little restraint on 
coercion.)
Between a regime seeking to proscribe specif ic acts, and the anti-subver-
sive purges of those eliminating classes of demonized enemies, lies a middle 
ground of great interest: published laws and regulations are sometimes 
insuff icient guides to those wishing to stay on the right side of the law. Civil 
liberties and freedoms may be defended rhetorically but violated in practice. 
Formally legal and typically unmolested demonstrations may, from time 
to time, come under violent attack. Movement leaders and organizers may 
disappear – not every day, not whenever they make themselves known, 
perhaps not even frequently. But sometimes they disappear, and as a result, 
activists and claim makers never know what the consequences of their 
activism will be. Under such circumstances, repression and violence – acts 
sometimes even condemned by authorities – obscure the line between the 
permitted and the banned (Kirschke, 2000).
Rather than regarding this inconsistency as random, I approach it here 
as a tactic, and one particularly effective in hybrid regimes or liberalizing 
dictatorships, when a broader discourse of human rights and civil liberties 
coexists with persistent authoritarian elements. In such cases, authorities 
sense that persistent and existential subversives exist and threaten the 
regime, but are constrained by a process-based politics that protects some 
rights and freedoms. The resulting violence is unpredictable, and frequently 
framed – after the fact – as the work of unknown zealots in government 
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service, vaguely def ined enemies of the peace, or undisciplined but lower-
ranking soldiers and police off icers. Authorities can claim to preside over 
a rule-based political order and benefit from a terror that sets those rules 
to naught.
Regimes also shape the intensity of violence – although in this connec-
tion, the term decision doesn’t reflect the reality that a great many acts 
of violence are shaped by interactions between a great many players. We 
now know enough about violence to understand that its production is an 
interactive and iterative process, and many acts of repression and coercion 
are unplanned escalations of what was initially intended to be a more 
measured or restrained response. Nevertheless, strategies based on punish-
ing proscribed acts often must f it a response to a specif ic kind of crime, 
positioning itself as measured and merited. The audience for this projection 
includes those who are apprehended by the state, but also onlookers who 
may even see authorities as legitimately acting to protect the public order. 
In contrast, authorities setting out to meet an existential threat to their 
power will cultivate a sense of this threat, and an image of themselves as 
strong enough to overcome it. Repression in such cases faces signif icantly 
less pressure for restraint. Rather than redirecting proscribed behavior via 
sanctions, authorities seek to overcome or eliminate the challenge, and this 
broader, more categorical mandate allows repression to be guided by purely 
battlef ield, rather than political or social considerations (Tilly and Tarrow, 
2006). Sometimes the battlefield logic will recommend restraint – but where 
it does not, violence can peak sharply and often spreads to involve non-state 
actors; indeed, Tilly’s work on collective violence (2003) locates the escalation 
and spread of that violence in the changing relations and unpredictable 
interactions among a broad range of involved actors. Action-based repres-
sion tends more exclusively to involve professionals, and while these still 
escalate and involve broader categories of actors, they do so less frequently. 
Nevertheless, some of the sharpest escalations in action based repression 
involve vigilante violence (i.e., the spread of violence from professional to 
non-professional violence specialists) frequently as a form of resistance or 
as criticism of perceived state inactivity (Goldstein, 2003; Tankebe, 2009).
As with the f irst dilemma, liberalizing or hybrid regimes produce ten-
sion between the comparative restraint and more unfettered battlef ield 
violence. In this intermediate zone, violence can be shocking because it 
erupts in what are commonly civil encounters. Tensions between efforts 
to enforce the rules of a liberal order and the defense of undemocratic 
power and privilege produces instances of students who disappear, human 
rights activists shot on the way home – intense violence that intrudes on 
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the more measured exercise of state authority. Such settings also produce 
unpredictable escalations of violence. A line of police who f ire into dem-
onstrators may have intended to do so all along, but this may also be the 
undisciplined act one would expect from security forces who believe they 
are under dire threat but have been ordered to practice restraint. That 
plausibility – the chance that a case of jitters, rather than the regime, is to 
blame – is the knife’s edge on which the whole approach to social control 
comes to balance. Episodes of intense but unpredictable violence derive 
their power to frighten, to anger, and to confuse via the juxtaposition of 
bloodshed and more civil political relationships, rather than through the 
simple pervasiveness of violence (Curaming, 2013).
Third are exclusivity decisions, meaning how carefully the regime con-
f ines its attack to specif ic targets. Exclusivity in part reflects the capacity 
to discriminate, something far more likely in acts of targeted assassination, 
arrest, and torture – and less possible in the heat of a demonstration or 
riot, when interactions among actors may cause things to escalate. But 
standing apart from those moments of public confrontation, regimes also 
ask the strategic question: under what conditions is indiscriminate violence 
useful, and when does it harm regime efforts to stabilize itself (Francisco, 
2005)? Three elements of an answer spring to mind. First, a regime may see 
subversion as pervasive and intractable, imagine that enemies of the state 
lurk everywhere, and believe that stability will only come through force of 
arms. In such cases, widespread and indiscriminate violence can seem the 
best way to keep opponents at bay. Second, the targets of regime violence 
may be both politically or physically isolated, and so largely unable to make 
common cause with others in society; under such conditions state actors 
may have no real incentives to discriminate in the exercise of violence. 
Finally, authorities may promote the idea that bystanders and sympathizers 
might “unfortunately” become collateral damage as a way to clear potential 
support away from the primary targets of state repression (Gamson, 1975; 
Wood, 2007). Of course, collateral damage wrought by indiscriminate 
violence may convert bystanders to activists and populations may break 
through their isolation and ally with other activist collectives, and so we 
should pay attention to the sorts of conditions that inf luence the way 
discriminate and indiscriminate violence will play out, and in particular, 
how people react (politically and emotionally) to that experience.
The f inal set of decisions contains what I have called publicity decisions: 
the choices regimes make concerning how and whether they will commu-
nicate information about their repressive activity (Jasper, 2006). First, will 
government authorities conduct violence in public view, or in any public way 
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acknowledge responsibility – or will attacks take place in clandestine ways 
and in out-of-the-way places (Anderson, 1990; Earl, 2011; Kirschke, 2000)? 
In the former category we f ind military shows of force at demonstrations 
or public executions, in the latter, we can place activist disappearances or 
clandestine assassinations. Second, authorities must decide how, and how 
vigorously, it will need to explain its actions. Obviously, secret killings 
seldom get in the way of explanation – though dictators and mobsters both 
sometimes turn speculation about how someone might “run into trouble” 
into a practiced art. The public discussion of other modes of repression 
potentially conveys some combination of two things: a sense of capacity to 
apprehend and overcome resistance, and a sense that state activity is just. 
The f irst element is useful to establish hegemony and dominance (particu-
larly when those things are under attack); the second speaks to legitimacy 
and so is useful in weaning potential support away from movements and 
their discontents. Unacknowledged state attacks may also convey capacity, 
but add to it a sense of impunity: a hidden hand that lays low the enemies 
of the state can make authorities seem more powerful (Bonner, 2009). On 
the other hand, the absence of any strategy to publicize or communicate 
violence suggests the primacy of instrumental concerns in the attack.
Players and How They Matter
Every move in the direction of repression has at least two objectives: what it 
accomplishes in itself, and what it communicates in that accomplishment. 
Repression certainly influences – even eliminates – its target. But it also 
communicates capacity, stability, resolve, a sense of social order – or the 
opposite of these: weakness, instability, indecision, or the violation of some 
values or norms. In killing, imprisoning, or “disappearing” opponents with-
out due process, dictatorships at once eliminate threats and communicate 
a capacity to act against challengers. When clearly communicating the 
whys and wherefores of an arrest or a killing, a regime both apprehends an 
offender and lays down rules of behavior that others might follow.
Apart from the dictator’s inner circle, which we here conceptualize as 
moving with a single and undivided purpose, at least three other players 
matter (in any contentious episode).2 First is the target of state repression, 
2 Of course, many more actors may matter. Tarrow and Tilly (2006: 71) for instance, reproduce 
a diagram from Pierre Favre’s La Manifestation (1990) showing a vast array of actors influencing 
contention in a single contentious arena.
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for whom state activity both accomplishes something immediate and sends 
a signal about the future of the struggle. Activists may be intimidated by 
repression, but may also see signs of state weakness or clues about what 
strategic shifts might produce greater results. They also pay attention to 
the impact of repression on bystander populations. Bystanders constitute 
the second player, representing both organized and unorganized people 
not initially involved in a contentious exchange (though they may have 
some sympathy in one direction or the other). The third players are factions 
inside the state, composed of people who may worry about their position or 
survival (particularly when the regime seems unstable) or may have some 
sympathy with reform goals. Such groups can pursue the greater good of 
a stable and just society, their own private interests, or some vision of the 
future that serves both. While some def ine the politics of state factions 
as somehow f ixed and distinctive, I view those politics as emergent and 
relational.
While I here describe the activity of “bystanders” or “state factions” as 
if they were singular collectivities, a fully developed picture would render 
them in complex and multiple terms. All manner of bystanders typically ex-
ist, and among them an act of state repression or reform may elicit a variety 
or responses. Bystanders also react to one another, creating groundswells 
in support of, say, human rights or a state move to eradicate drug deal-
ers. Similarly, state factions constantly eye one another and seldom move 
against the established order without some indication that they’ll have 
company. Here too we f ind a plurality of players, interacting rather than 
acting. Still, for the sake of relating interactions among players to issues of 
context and strategic decisions, I will map the interplay of only the four 
main players mentioned above.
I will call the primary targets of state repression movement activists, 
although of course all manner of unorganized bystanders are inaccurately 
accused of subversive action or aff iliation under dictatorships. Still, let us 
for the moment leave these people to the side and consider the options 
open to activists caught up in contentious struggle with authorities. Such 
activists, facing state repression, must make two calculations. First, do 
they expect to engage with authorities in isolation, or do they have some 
expectation of recruiting broader political support? Second, in light of 
this f irst question, should they respond with stronger resistance or with 
conciliation and moderation?
Activists without any real hope of support need to make what is es-
sentially a power politics calculation. If help will not come from some other 
quarter, their response to state activity depends on how many resources they 
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can muster within their own network, and whether they expect to make 
headway in a head-to-head struggle with the state. Isolated movements with 
strong support may envision a way forward via more militant confronta-
tion without recruiting bystander support, and may escalate unarmed 
protests into armed struggle; without such support, the movement may 
seem clearly overmatched, and so capitulate. On the other hand, movements 
more f irmly embedded in potentially supporting social networks can think 
about expanding their power both by f inding common cause with others 
and by conducting themselves in ways that generate sympathy. Militant or 
armed attacks on state targets may seem to assert movement capacity, but 
alienate potential supporters. A strategy that inspires strong state violence 
against movements in isolation may deplete the ranks, and absent a strong 
movement response, may make the movement seem incapable and doomed. 
A strategy that draws strong repression down on movements with many 
potential supporters (particularly if the movement has successfully asserted 
the worthiness of its demands and reasonableness of its tactics) may trigger 
a cascade of solidarity that is much more important than what it might 
accomplish by stronger militancy alone. In both cases, the advantages of 
militancy and moderation depend on the availability and likelihood of 
solidarity and social support.
Bystanders respond to state violence in various ways. They may be cowed 
by it – driven to inactivity by the display of state power, or by the apparent 
randomness of the attacks. They may be outraged by violence that seems 
to transgress political or moral norms. They may be recruited by violence 
– seeking, in a time of conflict, to ally themselves with the apparently 
most powerful combatant. Finally, they may be convinced or compelled by 
it – persuaded that the victims of violence behaved in ways that merited the 
attack. How bystander populations will react to state violence hinges on 
how bystanders see themselves in relation to the targets of state repression, 
how the security apparatus presents punishment and apprehension, and 
how carefully and exclusively that violence is directed against its intended 
targets (DeNardo, 1985). Bystander responses also reflect ideas about the 
relationship between activism and the established political system: is activ-
ism a necessary challenge to a closed system, a cherished bid for dignity 
amid degrading conditions (Wood, 2003)? A reasonable compliment to a 
more liberalizing order, or a threat to a system with expanding and more 
liberal possibilities (Rodriguez, 2012)? Bystander populations are potential 
recruits for either dissidents or state agencies, depending on their views of 
the broader political environment and the depth of their indignation at 
the regime.
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One of the signs that a state or regime has entered a period of crisis is that 
factions of that state (def ined either as particular actors or the leadership 
of signif icant institutions) may take independent action, often at variance 
with that of the regime’s inner circle (Johnston, 2012). These factions can 
be motivated by a variety of factors – fear of instability, a commitment to 
reform and democracy, ambition for power within the state, or some sense 
that their institutional interest or mission needs protection. State factions, 
in turn, can seek to shore up central rule by replacing a weak or faltering 
dictator; they may maneuver to bolster the dictator, and so their own posi-
tion in the regime. Or they may push for stronger repressive measures in 
reaction to liberalization. Finally, they may reach out to social forces in a 
pro-democracy alliance.
A number of factors influence these decisions. Some attach to the charac-
ter of the actors themselves. Strongly institutionalized or professional state 
agents, in particular highly professional security forces, will be inclined 
to defend their interests (Bellin, 2012). Others in the state will have strong 
ideological commitments – apt, for instance, to favor repressive moves 
against communists. Some decisions will reflect the overall character of 
the regime, with factions in patrimonial or personalistic regimes perhaps 
more easily motivated by fear and a desire to prop up the dictatorship than 
those in more bureaucratized forms of rule (Bratton and Walle, 1994). But 
many of these decisions are also made in light of actors’ more tactical efforts 
to position themselves in relation to others in the f ield of play. Hence, in 
responding to some political crisis, they will ask about the kind of opposition 
that exists, and whether it provides the prospect of a safe future for regime 
defectors. Where intra-state rivalries are particularly strong, factions will 
pay careful attention to power balances among them, and their relative 
relationships to the existing political order. In putting the pieces together, 
we can construct the logic of these interactions by linking the influence 
of context, of decisions about modes of repression, and reactions to those 
repressive modes together.
Putting the Pieces Together
While potentially independent of each another, the four decisions that 
actors make about repression are typically linked. We can connect the two 
clearest sets of associations under the respective headings of domination and 
contestation represented in Table 8.1. In domination, authorities approach 
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repression as a struggle with implacable enemies for control of territory or 
of the state. While bystander populations or civil society groups may exist, 
they f igure only weakly in repressive calculations. In such cases, repression 
against subversive people (i.e., based on the identity of the target) is likely 
to be more intensive, less discriminate, and less fully explained – though 
not always secret, because knowledge about a powerful state response to 
challenges enhance a regime’s reputation. Such targets are often politically 
isolated from a regime’s core constituents and supporters, to whom careful 
explanation of violence may not seem necessary. Where physically separate 
from core constituents, the violence may not be particularly discriminating, 
but it must be more so as it moves physically closer to those constituents. 
Under contestation, authorities are more clearly contending with rivals 
and dissidents for influence over a broader and more politically signif icant 
citizenry. In such cases, repression often occurs in acts chasing down the 
specif ic perpetrators of particular proscribed acts, and will likely be less 
intense, more discriminate, more publicly and carefully explained. Indeed, 
such explanation may be as important an element of the political project 
as the elimination of dissent or resistance.
Table 8.1  Domination vs. Contestation 
Decision Mode 1: Domination Mode 2: Contestation
Targeting Based on target identity Based on target action
Intensity Strong, draconian calibrated
Exclusivity Depends on proximity to politically 
significant populations
repression strictly limited to 
designated targets
Publicity repression can be covert or 
acknowledged
repression is public, acknowledged 
and explained
These packages are broadly associated with the broader dynamics of politics 
in any case. We can anticipate more closed participatory settings producing 
repression in the domination model and places with more open participa-
tory avenues commonly producing something that more closely resembles 
contestation. With fewer institutional avenues open to express grievances 
and scant expectations (particularly in personalistic or neo-patrimonial 
regimes) for equal access to those institutions, we would expect security 
force members to be directly involved in repression under conditions of 
strong state capacity, and state allies or sub-contractors more active in 
weaker states. Strong repression will target specif ic kinds of subversives for 
elimination, may make few distinctions between activists, sympathizers, 
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and bystanders, and use excessive force and focus on projecting an image 
of the state as indomitable rather than (primarily) just. We would also 
expect repression to be most unfettered when weak regimes sub-contract 
it out, because such situations do not require that specialists in violence 
moderate battlef ield calculations with the broader need to generate some 
national political support.
Conversely, in liberalized settings we anticipate more moderate and ac-
tion based uses of repression. State agents will try to make the punishment 
f it the crime, to separate perpetrators from bystanders, and to explain 
the administration of justice. Where more democratic states have great 
capacity, we anticipate that they will police a fairly broad range of activity, 
and that the scope of policing efforts will probably diminish under weaker 
state administrations (Jaime-Jimenez, 1998) – although it is also possible 
that weak liberalizing states will undertake rules based and calibrated 
repression in cosmopolitan enclaves and pursue (or allow others to pursue) 
something more akin to domination in more remote areas; in such cases, the 
political consequences of provincial violence depend on the mechanisms 
that transmit information from the countryside to the cities. More generally, 
the contestation model of repression replaces a narrative of rooting out 
subversion with a narrative of law and order. Still, this expected association 
serves to highlight cases in which repression defies that trend, and seems 
a more obviously excessive deployment of force.
The strategic dilemmas that most interest us in this discussion exist in 
the middle ground of a liberalizing regime – when security forces may still 
seek to eliminate rivals and subversives (often by whatever means they can 
muster) while still claiming to be the legitimate purveyor of just coercion: 
justice requires some due process, security requires decisive pursuit of 
subversive “types,” and the two goals operate at cross purposes. Authorities 
may try to explain away or disavow violence that clashes with emerging 
procedural or civil norms, or cultivate a sense of threat and danger that 
convinces bystanders to overlook the suspension of due process. Off icials 
may present kinds of people (subversives) as inherently prone to modes of 
proscribed behavior. Repression, that is, will not always emerge as clean 
distinctions between our two types (domination and contestation). Indeed, 
in such cases the contradictory pull of these different decisions may tell us 
more about what’s really going on.
The give and take between state authorities and challengers is only 
weakly structured by external conditions, and the alliances that may form 
during a campaign of repression are more fluid. All manner of actors in that 
mixed context will face dilemmas over repression. Bystander populations 
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may both be opposed to violence and dictatorship, and afraid of instability 
or of the demands that activists make. Security force members may support 
civilian rule but not trust civilians to maintain public order or respect 
military interests. Activists may support new democratic processes but fear 
that they will be outspent, outmaneuvered, or outgunned during elections. 
In this context, we cannot be certain, in advance of a sequence of repres-
sion and response, what decisions actors will make; such decisions will be 
interactive and contingent. Moreover, even after taking some course of 
action, actors will have mixed motives and persistent fears. Regime factions 
who defend due process and democracy may still feel that subversives need 
to be rooted out. Activists who demonstrate in favor of free elections and 
civil liberties may still hope to provoke state violence in order to recruit 
social support for more militant oppositional tactics.
Consider how different repressive acts may influence bystander popula-
tions differently, and what impact bystander responses have on others. The 
decision to start with bystander reactions is not arbitrary: authoritarian 
states often undertake liberalizing reforms explicitly to direct social support 
away from more radical reformers, and so direct reforms to achieve conse-
quences among bystanders. Repressive acts will disturb such bystanders 
when they are (1) at variance with the emerging liberal norms, and (2) 
insuff iciently justif ied as somehow necessary despite their anti-liberal 
character. While I cannot here claim to judge the likely bystander reac-
tion to all modes of repression, I can start with our two polar categories of 
domination and contestation, and assume that domination will more likely 
trigger bystander anger and sympathy for the targets of repression, while 
contestation will likely trigger less outrage and perhaps even acquiescence. 
Taking authoritarian decisions about how to repress as exogenous to the 
theory, then, what do we anticipate in terms of social reaction?
Beginning with an act of repression, bystander populations can either 
react to the violation of liberal norms, and express support for targeted 
activists, express appreciation for regime action against social threats, or 
simply retreat from any signif icant response.
Depending on bystander response, both activists and state factions 
will make their moves. An influx of bystander support to the movement 
may allow activists to be more politically assertive, but also encourages 
the adoption of movement tactics that demonstrate adherence to broad 
liberal and democratic norms – i.e., explicit non-violence, and perhaps an 
emphasis of processual as opposed to sharply redistributive claims. On the 
regime side, the spectacle of massive social sympathy for the victims of 
state repression, or expressions of anger at government violations of liberal 
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norms, can drive some factions into moderating postures in relationship 
to core regime elements. This sequence represents a classic anti-repression 
coalition, often important in pushing a liberalizing regime toward a fuller 
transition.
The opposite trajectory occurs when bystanders do not break for the 
regime, but either support government policing (as repression comes to 
be identif ied as a police or security action) or take little to no action. 
Absent popular support for activists, the movement will likely fall back 
on smaller and more clandestine modes of struggle, and may radicalize 
tactically: without an expanding popular base to constrain political 
choices, activists can be expected to drift toward instrumental and more 
violent tactics, rather than more open and peaceful demonstrations of the 
popular will. On the regime side, repression will likely be seen as justif ied 
politically and in security terms; at minimum, the social and political 
costs of repression may seem reduced. Consequently, we anticipate lit-
tle change in the regime, or even growing support for more repressive 
responses to dissent and opposition. However, little incentive exists in 
these interactions to moderate the relations between the regime and 
activists.
What is illustrated is the basic point that repression, whatever effect it 
produces on its primary targets, exerts broader political and social influ-
ence. Activists may suffer terrible losses to repression, but may also reap 
great political benefits from those losses. Conversely, activists who avoid 
state repression may, in consequence of their easy survival, attract less 
sympathy or support. Repression has both targets and audiences, and the 
key consequence of state violence often depends on audience reaction more 
than on target survival or surrender.
Liberalizing authoritarian orders, as we have seen, provoke additional 
dilemmas. State actors, for instance, must acknowledge and publicly 
conform to liberal norms despite their security fears. Hence, they may 
supplement patterns of violence generally in line with the contestation 
model with repression that targets specif ic people for intense, often lethal 
violence. This mode of violence combines decisions we have associated with 
the contestation and the domination models – and undertakes to repress 
in a context of a more widely advertised move in the directions of the rule 
of law. Similar hybrid tactics may emerge in activist engagement with the 
state – so that public demonstrations for democracy co-exist with more 
violent strikes at the regime, conducted in secret. Hence, while analysts 
have sought to explain increases in violence during regime transitions 
in terms of weak institutions, communal security dilemmas, and a new 
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leader’s attempt to generate support through violent nationalist appeals, 
we have identif ied another source of that violence: a disjunction between 
the liberal norms embodied in democratic aspirations (and the democratic 
avowals of those wishing to secure a place for themselves in an emerging 
democratic order) and the persistently sharp, often existential animosity 
that may still separate different forces in society.
Conclusion
We are not positioned to resolve the dilemmas that dictators face in the 
complicated setting of liberalization – because f luidity represents an 
essential part of the context. Dilemmas are just that, dilemmas. Nor, of 
course, has this discussion exhausted the possibilities of what we anticipate 
happening. But thinking about repression as both having an instrumental 
and a public aspect, and considering repressive acts in connection to the 
four big decisions we have discussed seems like a path toward better 
understanding.
Other questions remain. We have considered exclusivity decisions, for 
example, as simply a matter of tactical design – but they clearly also have 
something to do with context. Whether a repressive force can calibrate and 
focus violence on specif ic targets will depend on their will to do so, but also 
on how isolated those targets are from bystanders. Isolation is both a physi-
cal and an associational matter. The levels and kinds of solidarities in society 
will therefore also help explain how likely an isolated act of repression will 
be to incite spillover, either as collateral damage or solidarity. The secrecy 
of ad hominem repression in liberalizing states – the assassinations and 
disappearances that often occur alongside new elections or the roll-out of 
more open state institutions – certainly involves security force decisions to 
act in secret, but is aided and abetted by situations in which other members 
of society feel disconnected (demographically, geographically, or politically) 
from those victims. Secret killings are not simply discovered – they must 
be publicized and so require willing publicists.
Much remains to be done to unpack these issues. I hope I have demon-
strated that a way of looking at the interplay between repression, audience, 
and context can represent a fruitful entry point to some persistent and 
thorny questions about authoritarian violence in liberalizing settings. 
Whether I’ve succeeded or not depends on how the program gets carried 
forward from here.
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Part 3
International Arenas

9 The United Nations
Gay versus Anti-Gay Players in Transnational Contention
Clifford Bob
Conflict over gay rights has been a key battleground in America’s culture 
wars for decades. Although much of the social science literature focuses on 
the gay rights movement, there is of course a powerful rival: a movement of 
social conservatives that has played a strong role as the conflict has swirled 
across local, state, and national arenas. Less well known, the conflict is 
international. There are parallel battles over gay rights in other states, and 
international organizations are heavily involved.
This chapter highlights the latter aspect of the international f ight, 
focusing on the United Nations.1 Although the UN does not issue binding 
international law, its policies have considerable symbolic value and real 
political influence. With its universal membership and broad policy ambit, 
the UN is not representative of most international organizations. However, 
its importance in international affairs justif ies examining it here, as a key 
example of how international organizations act as arenas.
In the UN, two “compound players” clash with one another: a trans-
national network of gay rights proponents; and its foe, a transnational 
network of traditional religious believers. Like other compound players, 
both networks include diverse organizational and individual components, 
in this case foundations, media, individuals, and sometimes governmental 
off icials. At moments when policy decisions are made, having such of-
f icials in a network is often of great importance. But the most constant 
members of the two rival networks are non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), acting as steady advocates for or against gay rights. As with other 
compound players, the members of each network sometimes work together 
but more frequently act autonomously, albeit with broadly shared goals. 
In addition, they often compete with one another for members, resources, 
and influence, part of the general competition for organizational survival 
critical to every NGO (Bob, 2005). For this reason, in this chapter I focus 
1 This chapter is based on research conducted for my book, The Global Right Wing and the 
Clash of World Politics (Bob, 2012), and the empirical section draws heavily from that book. The 
Global Right Wing also includes a chapter analyzing transnationalized clashes over gay rights 
in Sweden and Romania.
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most of my attention on the NGOs within each network, treating them as 
the primary “players.” In addition, rather than highlighting conflict within 
the networks, I devote this chapter to exploring how the NGO players in 
each promote their goals in the UN arena. As will become clear, in addition 
to examining aff irmative strategies, I pay particular attention to ways in 
which the players seek to advance their goals by undermining players in 
the rival network.
The following section brief ly describes the UN as an “arena.” Next, I 
analyze how the gay and anti-gay rights networks conflict with one another 
using a variety of strategies and exploiting institutional characteristics of 
the UN arena. In the conclusion, I draw out broader implications of using 
the players and arenas approach, particularly in the common situation that 
rival players clash with one another.
The UN Arena
As an arena, the UN has several characteristics which it shares with other 
international organizations and to some extent with other types of arenas. 
First, it is fundamentally an arena composed of players (member states) 
who at least in theory and often in fact control its operations, decisions, 
and policies. Usually this is done through consensus procedures or, in 
some cases, majority voting by states. In addition, other entities, par-
ticularly NGOs, may act as players, seeking to inf luence states and the 
UN bureaucracy. NGOs may gain two forms of formal UN recognition, 
consultative or roster status, allowing them easy access to the UN but no 
voting privileges. Additionally or alternatively, they may influence the UN 
from outside, by generating public pressure, inf luencing states in other 
arenas, or other means. Frequently too, NGOs, as well as states, become 
parts of larger advocacy networks on particular issues. These networks 
are loosely tied compound players that act not only in the UN but also 
in other arenas, where developments may then be used to promote goals 
back in the UN.
Second, like many other arenas and particularly like other international 
organizations, the UN includes a number of discrete but inter-related sub-
arenas of varying power and importance. These offer a variety of sites in 
which players contend and interact with one another. Even the weaker sub-
arenas sometimes offer considerable possibilities for states, NGOs, or others 
to advance political agendas. At the UN, these sub-arenas include well-
known organs such as the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat 
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and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); specialized bureaucracies 
and quasi-judicial entities within these organs, such as ECOSOC’s Human 
Rights Council or the Secretariat’s Department of Disarmament Affairs; 
and allied organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization 
or World Health Organization.
Third, within each of these sub-arenas, players’ capabilities vary, de-
pending not only on their resources but also on the rules of the sub-arena. 
For instance, in the UN General Assembly, every country receives an 
equal vote, whereas in the Security Council, the f ive permanent members 
(the world’s most powerful nations at the UN’s founding in 1945) each 
may exercise a veto over decisions. Fourth, UN bureaucracies exercise 
considerable autonomy in issuing recommendations and distributing 
resources, notwithstanding ultimate oversight by member states. On 
many issues, state opinions are divided, offering UN off icials the ability 
to act as players – that is, as advocates for policies that the UN might 
adopt. The Secretary-General is the most important example of this, 
but at every level of UN off icialdom, agencies and individuals can and 
do act as players. Frequently too they become informal members of the 
advocacy networks noted above. The broader point is that the UN is far 
from a neutral arena; it is intrinsically and simultaneously composed 
of players.
Gay Rights Players
International gay activism began as early as the mid-1970s in conjunc-
tion with a global rise in “rights culture.” As policies toward homosexuals 
improved within states, particularly in northern Europe and parts of the 
Americas, gay groups began working overseas and in international arenas 
such as the UN. A key player was the International Lesbian and Gay As-
sociation (ILGA). Founded in 1978 and headquartered in Brussels, by 2010 
ILGA included over 670 NGOs from over 110 countries. (As such, like many 
of the compound players discussed in this chapter, ILGA is also an arena.) 
Coordinating transnational advocacy and supporting national campaigns, 
ILGA conducts research, publishes reports, and holds conferences. At the 
UN, it alerts local members about relevant policies, encourages home state 
lobbying, and facilitates members’ participation.
The International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGL-
HRC) is another major player. Begun in 1990 as a one-room off ice on San 
Francisco’s Castro Street, by 2008 the group had annual revenues over 
$1.7 million and 18 staff in New York, Buenos Aires, and Capetown. With a 
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primary goal of improving gay rights worldwide, IGLHRC helps gay com-
munities facing attack, builds the capacity of local partners, and works for 
policy change at the UN.
More recent additions to the gay network include Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch. For years starting in the late 1970s, 
both of these major rights NGOs had rejected overtures by homosexual 
activists. At the time, gay rights were deemed beyond the NGOs’ missions 
and too political. Only in the mid-1990s, after years of discussion, conflict, 
and pressure, did both groups open new and important programs on 
sexual rights.
Finally, the gay rights movement includes several major underwriters. 
Through the 1990s, the Ford Foundation provided much of the money, both 
for American groups such as IGLHRC and for overseas clients. For European 
NGOs such as ILGA, the European Union and member governments were 
major funders. Since 2000, the Arcus Foundation of Kalamazoo, Michi-
gan, and New York City has also become a key supporter of gay activism 
worldwide.
Why did these and other groups enter the global arena? The decision 
came only after substantial debate within each player, but a number of 
factors played a role. First, gay activists, who hail primarily from countries 
with the most robust rights, seek to backstop domestic gains. In recent 
years, the UN bureaucracy has generally favored gay rights – indeed, some 
off icials have become gay rights players – even as some member states re-
main hostile. Just as important is the “quest for recognition” of gay lifestyles 
(ILGA, 2006). In this, even failures to create new norms or treaties can be 
useful if they energize broader constituencies. Finally, advocates lobby for 
international agreements to pressure countries where rights are limited or 
societal violence rampant.
Anti-Gay Rights Players
As gay players entered the international sphere, religious conservatives 
opted to play there as well. This occurred despite the fact that some of 
these organizations have long held the UN in low repute. Given the power, 
symbolic if nothing else, of the UN, however, the religious groups ultimately 
came to believe that failing to use the UN would hurt their cause. Hav-
ing made that decision, many of them have become skilled players, often 
specializing in efforts to block or derail initiatives of gay players.
Their primary stated goal is preserving “traditional” or “natural” families 
against the “gendered” family, the concept of “sexual orientation,” and 
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“homosexual rights.” The network is a compound player, spanning govern-
ments, especially socially conservative Islamic, African, and Caribbean 
nations, as well as the Holy See, which enjoys special status at the UN. 
Again, however, the most focused participants in the debate are NGOs, 
most identif ied with various Christian denominations and most active in 
a variety of related “family” issues.
A major intellectual and organizational hub is the Howard Center for 
Family, Religion and Society based in Rockford, Illinois. Founded in 1976, 
the center’s mission is to “defend” the “natural family,” “the fundamental 
unit of society, not the individual, not the state, not the church, and not 
the corporation” (Howard Center, 2010). The Center and its biennial World 
Congress of Families (WCF) have thousands of individual members and 27 
partner organizations. Based in the Americas and Europe, with partners 
such as Focus on the Family, Real Women of Canada, Red Familia (Mexico), 
and United Families International, WCF members have played central roles 
in national and international debates over “family” issues.
The Catholic Family & Human Rights Institute (C-FAM), founded in 
1997, is another key player (and WCF member). Guided by “f idelity to the 
teachings of the Church,” C-FAM works to protect the “natural family” 
by “discrediting socially radical policies” such as recognition of same-sex 
marriage and even the “sexual orientation” concept itself (C-FAM, 2010). To 
reach these goals, C-FAM monitors and lobbies international institutions, 
particularly the UN, involving itself in everything from regular UN meetings 
to international conferences to treaty negotiations.
UN-Closeting Gay Rights
Given the vehemence of this opposition, gay advocates long avoided a frontal 
assault on the human rights citadel. Much though they might have preferred 
an international convention or declaration on gay rights, they were realistic 
about its dim prospects and took a more modest approach. First, they ini-
tially promoted international recognition of the “sexual orientation” and 
“gender identity” concepts, rather than seek the broader goal of gay rights. 
Second, they worked to expand interpretation of existing rights to include, 
implicitly, rights for homosexuals. They also chose to mount both efforts in 
low-level UN sub-arenas – conferences, quasi-judicial commissions, treaty 
monitoring bodies, and expert committees where incremental steps might 
be taken with less chance of raising opposition. The goal was new “norms” or 
“soft law” – declarations, publications, or rulings lacking the governmental 
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ratif ication necessary for international treaties or conventions. Through 
frequent citation and usage, such statements might nonetheless form the 
basis for more comprehensive and enforceable “hard law” sometime in the 
future. Yet, as we shall see, even these closeted approaches drew f ire.
The strategy’s f irst step was wooing potential allies, often at international 
conferences. These have been a staple UN sub-arena in many issues. They are 
usually of brief duration but often proclaim non-binding but symbolically 
important declarations or statements. As early as the 1975 UN Conference 
on Women in Mexico City, an International Lesbian Caucus formed ties with 
feminist delegates. Gay rights groups were also active at UN conferences in 
the 1980s and 1990s, gaining accreditation, making public statements, and 
winning occasional delegates to the cause. In these venues, gay concerns did 
not make it explicitly into UN documents. However, vague but potentially 
inclusive language favored by homosexual advocates sometimes did. For 
instance, in 1995 the Platform for Action of the Beijing Women’s conference 
declared that women should “have control over … their sexuality, including 
sexual and reproductive health” – although it also omitted four proposed 
references to “sexual orientation” (UN, 1995: Para. 96).
In 2003, Brazil introduced a resolution at another low-level sub-arena, 
the UN Human Rights Commission within ECOSOC, stating that the “enjoy-
ment” of universal human rights should not be “hindered in any way on 
the grounds of sexual orientation” (UN, 2003: 1). As discussed below, this 
resolution drew f ierce opposition, failed to garner majority support, and 
was later withdrawn. More prominently, in the UN General Assembly in late 
2008, France introduced a statement (requiring no vote) urging that states 
“commit to promote and protect the human rights of all persons, regardless 
of sexual orientation or gender identity” (UN, 2008: 1). Joined by 66 states, 
the statement also drew vehement opposition led by Syria, speaking for 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (now Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation) (OIC) in a counterstatement signed by 57 states.
Outside the UN, one related effort to build “soft law” is worth noting. In 
2006, two NGOs favoring gay rights, International Service for Human Rights 
and the International Commission of Jurists, gathered a distinguished and 
sympathetic set of experts to draft the Yogyakarta Principles. These claim 
to be “a universal guide to human rights which affirm binding international 
legal standards with which all States must comply” (ISHR and ICJ, 2006). 
Among the 29 principles and hundreds of directives, Yogyakarta holds that 
states must “embody … equality and non-discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and gender identity” in their constitutions or laws and 
must “ensure” that “freedom of opinion and expression” does not violate the 
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“rights and freedoms of persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender 
identities” (ISHR and ICJ, 2006: Prins. 2, 3, 19). Since their promulgation, the 
Principles have repeatedly been cited by gay rights players – and denounced 
by foes – in the UN and other arenas.
In sum, gay activists at the UN have a mixed record. They have won 
new governmental backing for their cause. Most of these allies support 
the concepts of “sexual orientation” and “gay rights” – and both ideas are 
far better known internationally than decades ago. But the UN as a body 
has not recognized gay rights, and even the concept of sexual orientation 
remains controversial there. As we shall see, conflict envelops an array of 
issues, from process to participation to substance.
Protesting Process
Opposition begins with denunciations of rights advocates’ core strategies. 
Far from accepting or overlooking incremental methods in low-level UN 
sub-arenas, religious conservatives disparage them as “an attempt by activ-
ists to present an aspirational, radical social policy vision as a binding 
norm” (Tozzi, 2007: 1). In this view, lobbying in obscure UN forums and 
grafting existing international treaties onto new issues are nothing more 
than cunning “maneuver[s]” to “by-pass ratif ication and avoid … confronta-
tions” with states having “contrary … national cultures and religious values” 
(Women for Faith & Family, 1999). Even the more open strategy pioneered 
by the 2003 Brazilian resolution provokes critique, less as to process than 
the uses to which such non-binding statements might be put. In this view, 
UN “soft law” has no legal value even if “dishonest” activists improperly 
exploit self-constructed “norms” to bootstrap their causes forward (Sylva 
and Yoshihara, 2007: 19).
But conservatives have learned that seeking to delegitimize “soft law” 
after the fact – or lambasting international institutions themselves – leaves 
them on the defensive. Faced with the threat that “international norms 
are beginning to shape the content of domestic law … [and] being used to 
deconstruct long-standing notions of family life,” conservative players are 
now engaging “in efforts to avoid negative outcomes and promote positive 
ones” (Wilkins, 2007: 370). As we shall see, part of this involves f ighting all 
aspects of gay rights initiatives at the UN. In addition, conservative groups 
use UN sub-arenas preemptively, to construct and strengthen their own 
rival norms. A key example occurred in 2004 when conservative activists, 
working with Qatar, hosted their own international conference, endorsed 
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beforehand by a UN resolution. The conference resulted in the Doha Dec-
laration, aff irming the “right of men and women” only to marry and the 
family as the “natural and fundamental group unit of society … entitled to 
protection by society and the State” (2004). In short, the Doha sub-arena 
created a direct competitor to the “soft law” produced by women’s and 
gay rights groups at their own conferences. This made it more diff icult 
to distinguish which of many competing statements in fact constituted a 
“new” norm. As one activist boasted, the Doha Conference and Declaration 
“take their place in the canon of declarations, platforms, and agendas from 
which international legal norms are derived by political leaders, judges, and 
lawyers” (Wilkins, 2007: 370).
Excluding and Expelling Players
No gay groups appear to have attended the Doha conference, making for a 
harmonious meeting. By contrast, most UN events on these issues are riven 
by conflict. Although conservative players often object to the processes and 
outcomes, they today participate as gamely as their adversaries. Indeed, 
the rival networks follow parallel tactics aimed at gaining advantage over 
one another. These begin with efforts to restrict their opponents’ participa-
tion in the UN. For activist groups, a key step to a formal if weak UN role 
is ECOSOC consultative status. In theory, gaining it is a routine matter, 
involving a brief application, perfunctory screening, and long-term status. 
Yet when it comes to homosexuality and other controversial issues, even 
the threshold question – Who participates? – draws f ire.
In 1993, ILGA applied for and obtained consultative status, a historic 
moment for its members.2 But jubilation soon turned to tribulation as 
Christian soldiers took to the warpath in two other arenas, the US Congress 
and broader American society. Their battle cry, bellowed in fundraising 
letters and blasted on prime-time news: ILGA must be ousted because its 
network included a pedophilia peddler, the North American Man Boy Love 
Association (NAMBLA).
Within months, Congress unanimously passed a law withholding $119 
million from the UN pending presidential certif ication that the UN ac-
credited no organizations promoting pedophilia. President Bill Clinton 
hastily signed the bill into law.
2 This and the next two paragraphs are based in part on Gamson (1997).
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The effect on ILGA was traumatic – as gleefully expected by con-
servatives who gloated over its coming “bind”: “If it kicks out NAMBLA, it’s 
hypocritical, if not it supports sex between boys and men!” (The Report, 
quoted in Gamson, 1997: 183-184). Unsurprisingly (except to NAMBLA), 
ILGA engaged in intense internal debate over NAMBLA’s membership. In 
June 1994, ILGA expelled NAMBLA and two other groups. In addition, ILGA 
changed its membership procedures. Within two years, it implemented a 
tough, four-step screening process to ensure that no group like NAMBLA 
would be admitted in the future. Most fundamentally, key members of 
the homosexual community redef ined the very boundaries of gay iden-
tity, with America’s largest advocacy group, the Human Rights Campaign 
Fund, bluntly stating, “NAMBLA is not a gay organization” (King, quoted 
in Gamson, 1997: 179, 185).
Despite all this, ECOSOC suspended ILGA in September 1994. The 
group had neglected to rid itself of a small German NGO that promoted 
decriminalization of pedophilia. Too late, ILGA re-emphasized its new 
identity by throwing out the Germans. It then waited f ive years to reapply 
for consultative status but was repeatedly rejected based on the earlier 
scandal. Tarred with the same feather, other players such as IGLHRC were 
harried at UN conferences. Only in 2006 did ECOSOC finally grant consulta-
tive status to ILGA-Europe.
Such efforts to exclude players from the UN, with their serious ef-
fects on gay groups’ structures, rules, and identities, are not exclusive to 
conservatives. Gay advocates have followed similar approaches, though 
without such signal successes. Human Rights Watch has griped that 
foes such as C-FAM “oppose the U.N. and all international human rights 
mechanisms” (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 84). The implication seems 
clear: such NGOs do not deserve consultative status and should play 
no role in the arena. In related cases, this has in fact come to pass. In 
the early 1990s, Human Life International’s (HLI) application failed due 
to its “hostil[ity] to a whole f ield of UN activity,” family planning (Wil-
letts, 1996: 4, 37). After C-FAM’s UN acceptance, it too faced accusations 
about its close relationship to HLI and alleged enmity to the UN. But 
these revelations, published by Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC) (now 
Catholics for Choice), an NGO supporting abortion, feminism, and gay 
rights, failed to catch f ire.
CFFC, whose own application for consultative status came under f ire 
from the Holy See in 1998, returned the favor in 1999 after it gained ac-
creditation. It launched its ongoing “See Change” campaign to strip Rome of 
its special UN status. Since 1964, the Holy See has been a “non-member state 
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permanent observer” – a position unique to any religious representative. In 
this capacity, it enjoys most rights accorded states – far more than NGOs in 
consultative status. The See Change campaign aims to reduce the Vatican 
to NGO status, but it too has gained little traction. For its part, C-FAM 
launched its own countercampaign defending the Holy See’s status. To date, 
the Vatican retains its unusual seat at the UN where it has been a leader of 
the conservative network on family issues.
The broader point remains, however. Key players seek to use UN arenas 
not only for advancing their own agendas, but also for preventing their 
opponents from setting foot there or by hobbling their foes at every turn. 
In this, even the UN’s relatively undemanding entry rules can be exploited, 
or external pressure may be exerted to sway UN decisions.
Coalition-Building – and Unbuilding
Beyond raising participation barriers, the rival players attack one another 
directly at the UN. Coalition-building, a central strategy to advance one’s 
cause by creating more powerful compound players, joins with a darker 
twin – undermining the enemy. As one part of this, the contending players 
denounce one another’s networks, casting funders and other supporters 
in sinister light. To take one of numerous examples, C-FAM’s Austin Ruse 
wrote in 2000,
[E]normous American foundations which are very radical in their world 
view … put direct pressure on governments to change their laws and vote 
a certain way on UN resolutions. … Their agenda is a leftist – even Marxist 
– agenda of what some call the “new class” who think they know better 
than what tradition has taught us from the dawn of time … Specif ically, 
they want the family to include homosexual couples, and make abortion 
a universally recognised “human right.” (Ruse, 2000)
In addition to such rhetorical swipes, conservatives labor to undermine 
opposition players directly. For instance, to deter developing countries 
from joining with “radical” NGOs and European governments, they have 
stoked anti-colonial sentiments. More generally, they stir “the resentment 
that heavy-handed pushing of novel norms generates in much of the world” 
(C-FAM, 2010).
Of course, these coalition bashers have engaged in their own networking. 
Most strikingly, even as they decry gay groups’ dependence on “socialist” 
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governments, conservative protestants and Catholics have joined with con-
servative Islamic states to form a kind of “Baptist-burqa” coalition. Forged 
in the f ires of the 1990s UN women’s conferences, this compound player has 
endured for years. Indeed, C-FAM has urged formation of a “permanent UN 
pro-family bloc,” predicting that “our victory will come” from this “potent 
alliance between Catholic and Muslim countries, … new in the world, new 
to history,” what “[o]ur enemies call … an un-holy alliance” (Ruse, 1999).
But again, building these ties is only half the story. Gay advocates have 
worked hard to impugn them. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has highlighted 
the “irony” of the “odd alliance” between Christian conservatives and re-
pressive Muslim states such as Egypt (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 83-84). 
Together the coalition “open[s] space for attacking human rights principles 
themselves – as not universal but ‘foreign,’ as not protectors of diversity 
but threats to sovereignty, and as carriers of cultural perversion” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2005: 71). Such rhetoric may inflame HRW’s constituents, but 
probably has little effect on its foes. More vexingly for conservative players, 
however, the network has suffered costly “defections,” as the gay rights activ-
ists have expanded their work to multiple arenas simultaneously (C-FAM, 
2010). Even in Catholic majority countries in southern Europe and Latin 
America, the gay rights movements has advanced, often with the support 
of ILGA, IGLHRC, or various organs of the European Union and Council of 
Europe. In turn, these countries become advocates for gay rights at the UN.
In sum, attacks on the composition of enemy players are powerful 
weapons in activist arsenals. At times, the volleys have their effects, forc-
ing changes in players’ structures, strategies, and even identities. Even 
when that does not occur, players are forced to devote scarce resources to 
defending themselves, thereby weakening their more aff irmative actions.
Sexual Orientation – or Disorientation?
Beyond attacking process, participation, and partnering, the opposing 
networks clash over substance, deploying rival authorities to press core 
claims and undermine opponents. In this, the very nature of homosexuality, 
rights, and religion are tumbled into the crucible, forcing each side to spend 
precious resources f ighting battles they had thought won long ago. For 
gay groups, “sexual orientation” is an innate if variable aspect of human 
nature. Supporting this view are scientif ic societies led by the American 
Psychological Association, although its shifting positions on the issue now 
seem to have settled into a compromise – that “nature and nurture both 
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play complex roles” (APA, 2008: 2). Promoting nature with consummate 
certainty are moral authorities like South African Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu who has intoned that, just as black people were made to suffer “for 
something we could do nothing about – our very skins. It is the same with 
sexual orientation. It is a given” (Tutu, 2004).
But those opposing the “homosexual agenda” have disputed and defamed 
the very concepts of sexual orientation and gender identity. Against Brazil’s 
UN resolution, for instance, United Families International (UFI) bandied a 
“wealth of peer reviewed social science data” claiming that homosexuality 
is nothing more than a “lifestyle choice,” a “passing social trend,” or a “fad” 
presenting grave “dangers” to “individuals, families, and societies” (Allred, 
2005). In 2008, the OIC similarly condemned France’s joint statement to the 
UN General Assembly supporting rights for all people regardless of sexual 
orientation. The Holy See also opposes, arguing that the concepts of “sexual 
orientation” and “gender identity” have “no recognition or clear and agreed 
definition in international law” (Holy See, 2008).
Gay advocates dismiss the foregoing arguments as misinterpretation, 
pseudo-science, or prejudice. For instance, in answer to smearing of the 
sexual orientation concept, HRW has urged that it be defined narrowly – “as 
understood in ordinary speech” (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 86). But, again, 
this effort takes a toll not only on gay players’ resources but also on their 
ability to attract support.
Rights: Equal or Special?
As noted above, a central goal of gay groups is equal rights. A matter of 
simple justice, explicit rights protection at the UN would create legal tools 
helping millions. In this view, sexual orientation and gender identity should 
never form the basis for discrimination. For its part, the UN should lead the 
way toward repeal or change of biased laws and cultural attitudes.
For conservatives, however, the idea that same-sex attraction, let alone 
marriage, should be acknowledged as a right is anathema. Because op-
ponents do not recognize the concept of “sexual orientation,” no rights 
can be grounded in it. Rather, as activists argued in f ighting the Brazilian 
resolution, claims to gay “rights” constitute “special human rights (rather 
than equal human rights),” aimed at protecting a behavior, indeed a perver-
sion, rather than a status (Allred, 2005). Worse still, as the Vatican argues at 
the UN, purporting to make conventional marriage “juridically equivalent 
to radically different forms of union” will “in reality harm [marriage] and 
contribute to its destabilization” (Benedict, 2006).
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Whatever the merits of these arguments, there is little question that 
repulsing them costs gay activists scarce time and resources. More wor-
ryingly these and more personal attacks may lead to self-censorship and 
deter potential allies from joining publicly with the movement, weakening 
the gay cause at the UN.
Culture: Established or Evolving?
So even while defending bedrock empirical and normative propositions, gay 
groups have turned the tables, working to undermine their foes’ fundamen-
tal beliefs. Most important, they have attacked “traditional” understandings 
of religion, whether Christian, Muslim, Hindu, or Jewish, as narrow and 
crabbed. As one sally, gay rights proponents parade religious liberals at UN 
conferences and other sub-arenas. There they directly challenge orthodox 
views, their presence and statements embodying more open, faith-based 
values. Catholics for Free Choice exemplif ies this strategy at the UN.
Outside the UN, gay activists enlist players whose eminence rivals the 
Pope’s – then deploy them to influence UN debates. In 2006, the Dalai Lama 
issued a statement at activists’ request, opposing “violence and discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation and gender identity and urg[ing] respect, 
tolerance, and the full recognition of human rights for all” (Dalai Lama, 
quoted in Sanders, 2006). More vocal still, Desmond Tutu has called persecu-
tion of homosexuals “every bit as unjust as that crime against humanity, 
apartheid” (Tutu, 2004).
Adopting a parallel but deeper strategy, the Arcus Foundation runs a 
program aimed at “refut[ing] beliefs that portray gay … people as sinful and 
immoral,” “achieving long-term change in cultural attitudes and religious 
institutions” and “creating a positive shift in cultural attitudes and values 
toward sexuality in general and GLBT … issues in particular” (2007). If such 
changes occur, as they already have in certain religions and countries, this 
would further affect state attitudes at the UN.
Outcomes
Whether or not these long-term strategies bear fruit, the result of opposition, 
both state and non-governmental, has so far been non-policy at the UN. As 
rights scholar Jack Donnelly has observed, “[i]n the short and medium run, 
there is no chance of anything even close to an international consensus on 
even a working text for a draft declaration on the rights of homosexuals” 
(2003, 237). To date, Donnelly’s prediction has held true.
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Of course, the gay movement has scored successes in Europe and the 
Americas, with various forms of gay rights recognized by some states, usu-
ally as a result of prolonged contestation within national arenas. But these 
signal victories are matched by a resurgence of attention to, enforcement 
of, and enlargement in sodomy laws, especially in parts of Africa, the Carib-
bean, and the Muslim world, again based primarily on developments within 
each national arena. On this basis, governments in both camps then act 
as players at the UN, usually in accordance with the state’s decision on the 
issue. There, NGO members of the Baptist-burqa network eagerly support 
their state allies, working strategically to block gay rights or even recogni-
tion of such basic concepts as “sexual orientation” and “gender identity.” 
Because of the UN’s consensus procedures, even states that are relatively 
weak in capabilities have been able to succeed in this strategy. The result 
has been stalemate.
Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, the players and arenas perspective, by directing 
attention to the recurrent clash of networks, provides a useful means of 
understanding the battle over gay rights at the UN. Rather than highlighting 
only one side to the conflict and rather than seeking to identify shifting 
political opportunities, the approach directs attention to strategic interac-
tions among players, as they are affected by the UN arena. As we have seen, 
both sides advance their goals, using both aff irmative and negative tactics. 
In addition, they creatively and strategically play UN rules and norms, or 
vault into other arenas where developments may indirectly help them at 
the UN.
More broadly, studying conflicts among players explains far more about 
the development, dynamics, and outcomes of activism than can be learned 
by analyzing only one side. These points jibe with two existing literatures, 
countermovements theory in sociology and the advocacy coalition framework 
in policy studies. Both recognize that movements face powerful foes who are 
themselves movements, and both draw attention to conflict. However, they 
have been deployed primarily to study interactions within states, especially 
the United States, not transnationally. More important, the countermove-
ments approach continues to focus primarily on one movement, typically a 
“progressive” one, viewing countermovements as part of the subject’s “oppor-
tunity structure” (Fetner, 2008; Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996). Advocacy coali-
tion analysts avoid this limitation but mostly discuss coalitions’ contrasting 
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beliefs and their direct effects on policy, rather than the ongoing process by 
which they conflict with one another (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).
By contrast, the approach developed in this chapter expands upon exist-
ing ways of understanding movement strategies. Players do not merely 
scrutinize the current political terrain for gaps, toeholds, and opportunities. 
They also survey government and civil society, scouting not only for allies, 
as the social movements literature has long noted, but also for foes. And well 
they should: in most cases new policy will impinge on interests and chal-
lenge values. The possibility of resistance is real, and all that is necessary 
for rival players to take up arms is minimal information about a nascent 
menace. As we have seen in this chapter, religious conservatives mobilized 
early on, largely in parallel to gay mobilization.
What is the effect of opposition, whether latent or real? Most basically, 
it influences players’ initial decisions on three crucial matters: goals (con-
ceived here as a problem/solution pair), members, and arenas. Of course, 
other factors both internal and external to the player enter into these deci-
sions too, although I have not covered these here. Nor are such matters ever 
permanently settled. Strategic corrections are made continuously, based 
on interactions with other players and arenas. The “outcomes” of conflict 
are always provisional and temporary. However, these three points must 
typically be faced early, setting a tone for the future.
A f irst issue is whether players will seek narrow or broad goals, a matter 
which opposition directly affects. The more diff iculty players anticipate, 
the narrower their construction of a problem and its solution – or the more 
camouflaged their portrayal of them. This does not mean that players will 
necessarily trim their problems and solutions in the face of opposition. But 
if players believe broad construction will endanger achievement of their 
substantive goals or maintenance of their organizations, they are likely to 
do so. As shown in this chapter, in the early years of activism at the UN, gay 
rights players, recognizing the power of opposition, portrayed their goals 
in narrow and veiled terms.
Reciprocally, opposition players face a decision about transforming 
latent into open resistance. Antagonists do not ref lexively counter one 
another. Rather, the more threatening the problem/solution to potential 
opponents’ interests and values, the more likely that rival players will act, 
often by constructing a rival problem. Its identity? As we have seen in the 
UN conflict over gay rights, typically it is the very solution offered by the 
original player – and the player itself. For the Baptist-burqa network, gay 
rights and even the sexual orientation concept were seen as major threats, 
along with the gay rights network.
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More generally, once conflict occurs, rival players will boost efforts to 
achieve their goals, each using the threat posed by the other as a basis 
for mobilizing its own. As a result, opposition will affect players’ size, 
membership, and identity. This occurs in at least two ways. First, anticipat-
ing hostility, players make proactive decisions about how and when to 
build their network. Certainly, the Baptist-burqa network strengthened 
itself with the aim of blocking and undermining its rival in the early 
1990s. Although the network is clearly a compound player, it has worked 
cohesively against gay rights for decades, despite major cultural differ-
ences between its members. In turn, the gay rights network redoubled its 
efforts to expand its membership. Second, players may be forced to react 
as a result of rivals’ attacks aimed at unbuilding their network. ILGA’s 
ejection of NAMBLA, under pressure from the Baptist-burqa network, 
exemplif ies this and shows how a foe’s attacks can reshape fundamental 
characteristics of a player.
Conflict will also affect players’ decisions about which arenas to enter. 
Most players operate in multiple arenas, but resource constraints force 
them to concentrate on a few primary ones. In explaining which are cho-
sen, the social movements literature highlights “political opportunities,” 
emphasizing the relative openness or closure of domestic and international 
institutions. As an important aspect of this, opposition affects an arena’s 
openness and a player’s decision to enter. All else equal, players will work 
where their foes hold least sway – and avoid arenas they dominate. In the 
extreme, if a player f inds its goals frustrated in one arena, it may move 
to another or establish a more friendly one. In the international conflict 
over gay rights, for instance, the rival networks created new sub-arenas 
to advance their causes and undermine their foes, with the Yogyakarta 
Principles and the Doha Declaration as key results.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an opponent’s foray into a hostile arena 
may motivate a rival player to act there, too. If, for instance, the arena is 
strategically crucial in a larger battle, reluctant warriors may nonetheless 
enter, attempting to block action, warp policy, or at least show the flag. In 
the gay rights case, for instance, although the UN’s bureaucracy has been 
generally favorable to gay rights in recent years, members of the Baptist-
burqa network could not ignore it. The UN is too important as an arena of 
international policy debate and formation. In any case, both networks have 
found ways of exploiting the UN’s norms, rules, and procedures, seeking to 
tilt those in their favor and against foes, with exclusion the ultimate prize.
Under f ire, a targeted player has three options: ignore, rebut, or coun-
terattack. The more threatening the attacks appear, the more likely that 
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the target will respond with rebuttal or counterattack. The result may 
be a vortex of venom reminiscent of a close election’s waning days. More 
generally, as McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly argue, contention further “polar-
izes” warring players, often strengthening opposed identities as well (2001).
How does opposition affect outcomes? The international gay rights 
conflict suggests two important but often overlooked points. First, the 
greater the opposition, the less effective a player will be in achieving its 
goals. Consider the Baptist-burqa network’s attacks on the legitimacy of 
UN processes. These have clearly undermined the gay network’s ability to 
achieve its goals. Second, conflict between players – rather than persua-
sion by one set of players – will shape outcomes. As one important aspect 
of this, analyses which highlight the role of framing in explaining policy 
decisions often ignore the fact that rival players fashion and promote 
potent, contradictory symbols of their own. Contention over whether gay 
rights are “equal” or “special” and whether religious principles are f ixed 
or evolving illustrates these clashes. Similarly, players deploy conflicting 
“authorities,” in this chapter, for instance, on the legitimacy of the sexual 
orientation concept. Of course, the deployment of frames and expertise 
may excite the sympathetic, acting as f lags to rally those who already have 
a generalized leaning to the position embodied in the frame or voiced 
by the authority. But it is unlikely that a new frame or a self-proclaimed 
expert will change the views of those with pre-existing antipathy to a 
position.
If by contrast, the analyst focuses on rival players working at odds with 
one another, it becomes clear that non-policy is a more likely outcome than 
policy. Even when opponents cannot extinguish policy making, they can 
often stall it. And even when delay ends, foes overtly or subtly shape the 
results. In some cases, their power is such that the policies produced are 
little more than “zombies,” so devoid of content that, while “alive” on paper, 
they are in reality dead. Sometimes these may be revived, but often they 
symbolize the fact that the arena in which a player has devoted substantial 
energy has turned out to be false: It may hold little prospect for achieving 
the player’s goals, despite expenditure of signif icant time and resources. 
In the international battle over gay rights, the UN is probably not a false 
arena. At minimum, it presents a prominent venue for promoting awareness 
of the issues in countries around the world. In some cases, this has doubt-
less incited more opposition, but in others it has likely bolstered support. 
Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether the UN is an arena in which gay 
rights players can hope to achieve their substantive goals, given the power 
of rival players.
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 Conclusion
Simplicity vs. Complexity in the Analysis of Social 
Movements
Jack A. Goldstone
In the sciences, it is always the goal, in words usually attributed to Albert 
Einstein, to make things “as simple as possible, but no simpler.” The ques-
tion posed by the essays in this volume is whether, when studying social 
movements and revolutions, treating the state as a unitary actor is making 
things too simple.
Of course, the notion of the state as a unitary actor has long been debated 
in political science. In their now classic analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Allison and Zelikow (1999) argued that seeing the state as a unitary actor 
facing other similar states in the international arena – the core of real-
ist theory – was only one way to approach the state. Other perspectives 
included seeing the state as a complex organization with actors within the 
state constrained and guided by its institutional structure, and as a set of 
distinct political elites feuding and cooperating to generate permissible 
decisions.
In the study of social movements, a great deal of progress was made by 
the simplif ication of social movement dynamics to the dyadic relations 
between a unitary movement that sought to change state policy, and a 
unitary state seeking to resist changes coming from any source “outside” the 
institutional political system of elections, legislatures, off icials and courts. 
In this “polity” model, put forward by Charles Tilly (1978) and adopted by 
distinguished scholars such as William Gamson (1975), social movements’ 
success could be judged in terms of two levels of accomplishment: First, 
achieving the desired changes in policy; and second, gaining admittance 
to the polity, by having its agenda and supporting personnel accepted in 
the institutional system of elections, legislative and executive off icials, 
and courts. While the second type of accomplishment did not immediately 
achieve the movement’s policy goals, it was considered an important step 
as state policy was expected not to be so resistant to changes sought from 
inside the political system.
Tilly’s original graphic presentation of the Polity model is shown in Figure 
C1. As can be seen, the “ruler and government” is a single actor, in coalition 
with other actors who are polity members. There is then a boundary around 
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these groups, marking the difference between polity members (incumbents) 
and “challengers” who are outside that boundary. Coalitions may cross the 
boundaries among actors in various ways, but it is “the state” (ruler and 
government) as such that enters into coalitions with other groups; and the 
state is never in coalition with challengers.
Figure C1 Tilly’s Polity Model, Static Version
Source: tilly 2000, 5
A great deal of excellent research on social movements was done using this 
theoretical framework, and it continues to be useful. I have used it myself, 
as in the study of state-movement dynamics of repression and concessions 
(Goldstone and Tilly, 2001). Moreover, the view of social movements as 
unitary actors has already been corrected and greatly enriched by the 
idea of separating multiple social movement organizations (SMOs) within 
a movement (Zald and Ash, 1966; Zald and McCarthy, 1997). The Political 
Opportunity Structure approach to movements (McAdam, 1982; McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 2011; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999) has also 
pointed to elite divisions as a crucial opportunity factor for movement 
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success, introducing the feuding among political elites as a factor affecting 
state responses to challenges.
Recently, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) have added complexity to the 
study of social movements with their work on strategic action fields (see also 
Goldstone, 2004, and Goldstone and Useem, 2012, for additional approaches 
to social movements as elements in social action f ields). Fligstein and Mc-
Adam separate the state into multiple policy f ields, led by a multiplicity of 
“internal governance units,” supported by a variety of “incumbents” and 
reshaped by the actions of numerous “challengers.” Yet their terminology 
reveals their debt to the challenger/incumbent dualism of the older Pol-
ity model. It is not easily possible in Fligstein and McAdam’s theoretical 
framework for actors to be simultaneously governance units, incumbents, 
and challengers within a single strategic action f ield. Yet that is exactly 
what we f ind throughout the essays in this book.
The fresh research in this volume produced by its distinguished contribu-
tors makes two novel points. First, there are no clear lines separating the 
roles of challenger (protestors or social movement activists), incumbents 
(those engaged in routine acceptance and membership in the polity de-
f ined by a policy f ield), and governance units (agents or institutions of the 
state). Second, the actors and structures within what we conventionally call 
governance units or state institutions or off icial positions are themselves 
a complex and constantly contested set, with some such actors sometimes 
indeed defending the policies of the governance unit, but at other times 
they or other state actors are found allying with certain specific incumbents 
against those policies, and at still other times they or other state actors are 
joining challengers to reshape the entire f ield.
Brian Doherty and Graeme Hayes skilfully point out the highly ambigu-
ous yet critical role of courts within the state/social movement f ield. Courts 
are the arenas in which decisions are made whether to treat protestors as 
criminal or innocent, and hence whether their actions are justif iable. In 
meting out punishment, it is the courts who play a critical role in the repres-
sion (or concessions) to protestors, as the police act mainly to forestall or halt 
protest action and arrest protestors. Unless the police themselves choose 
to inflict punishment (and that does often happen, especially in repressive 
authoritarian regimes), it is the courts that decide whether and to what 
degree punishments are meted out to those acting outside of institutional 
channels to challenge prevailing policies.
Yet the court’s role is ambiguous precisely because courts – especially in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence – are a composite. The state prosecutor is 
clearly the agent of the state, seeking to have the court enforce the state’s 
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view of justice and what should be done. The judge is no less an agent and 
representative of the state, but the judge’s job is to act as impartial media-
tor in the arena. Then another state agent – the state appointed defense 
attorney, if the protestors do not obtain private counsel – is designated 
to act on behalf of the protestors and argue their case. And f inally, yet 
another group, temporarily appointed by the state and granted the power 
to ascertain guilt or innocence, is explicitly chosen to represent what Tilly 
or McAdam and Fligstein would call the incumbents – members of society 
at large. That, of course, is the jury. We thus have career state agents on the 
side of the regime, on the side of the protestors (defendants), and mandated 
to be neutral, along with temporary state agents designed to represent 
neither the state nor the protestors but the broader society – all this within 
one unit of a unit of governance!
It should not be surprising that given this composite structure, courts 
have played a variety of roles, from conservative to radical, in history. From 
the earliest days of English courts, they were an arena (usually the sole 
arena) in which ordinary Englishmen could challenge the actions of lords 
(the King’s courts being able to adjudicate such cases without control of the 
local landowner). In the years leading up to the French Revolution, Parisian 
courts undermined the authority of the Crown, as a series of sensational 
cases put the spotlight on the abuse of political power through private 
scandals, the most notorious being the “Diamond Necklace affair.” The 
lawyers’ briefs in these cases – published in print runs of tens of thousands 
in the 1770s and 1780s – were critical in shifting public perceptions of the 
Crown (Maza, 1993). In America, at various times, the courts were critical in 
enforcing the Jim Crow regime and in overturning it. At times, it has seemed 
that the greatest radical force in America has not been street protestors, 
but the US Supreme Court, as when it ruled racial segregation illegal, cre-
ated a right of privacy that made f irst-trimester abortions legal, and now 
is moving steadily toward expanding the coverage of equal protection to 
people regardless of their chosen gender role. And the courts can be radical 
in other places and traditions as well: lawyers and courts played a major 
role in opposing the Pakistani ruler Pervez Musharraf, and were critical to 
overturning the manipulated election of Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine in 
2004, thus empowering the Orange Revolution.
Still, it is more often the case in authoritarian regimes that courts 
are much less ambiguous in their role. Rather than being composite and 
multi-sided, prosecutors, judges, and even defense attorneys collaborate 
to achieve convictions ordered by the regime, which treats the courts as 
simply putting a stamp of authority on the regime’s desires and views. To 
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raise a theme I shall return to several times in this essay, the f ield faced by 
social movements is very different in an authoritarian than in a democratic 
regime. In the former, the courts are usually – unless they defect and start 
to play a role in fomenting revolution – wholly agents of the state and act to 
support its interests. In democracies and some semi-democratic regimes, the 
courts have their own traditions and standards, and seek to act in ways that 
constrain state authority and often will support challenges to that authority.
Another ambiguous arena, as Katherine Krimmel demonstrates, is the 
legislature, due to the conflicts among political parties that occur there. 
The precise constellation of parties and legislative rules also shapes the field 
faced by social movements. And parties themselves, as I have shown else-
where (Goldstone, 2003), have deep and multifold links to social movements: 
they may have begun as social movements that became institutionalized; 
they may be engaged in deep partnerships with social movements that 
provide votes and f inancial support for their candidates; they may either 
adopt or oppose the goals of specific social movements in order to gain votes 
or weaken their opponents; and the same actors may appear as social move-
ment leaders, political party leaders and elected legislators and off icials. 
The relation of parties to movements can shift dramatically over time: in 
the nineteenth century it was the Republicans who championed black 
rights and Democrats (especially Southern Democrats) who campaigned for 
Jim Crow; but by the late twentieth century these party roles and relation-
ships had changed diametrically, so that it was the Democratic Party under 
President Lyndon Johnson that fought to make full civil rights for blacks 
the law of the land, while the Republican Party became the dominant 
party among Southern conservatives. Today it is the Tea Party movement 
– a movement of incumbents rather than challengers, dominated by the 
prosperous older white middle class – that has among the closest links to 
any political party, backing those Republicans who promise to lower their 
taxes and stop perceived threats from immigration and excessive state 
spending (Skocpol and Williamson, 2013; Van Dyke and Meyer, 2014).
Yet Krimmel points out that not only the party platforms matter, but 
the conf igurations of power in the legislatures as well. Where an open, 
multi-party structure prevails, as in many European parliaments, new 
parties based on social movements can easily gain entry to the legislature 
as parties, as with the Green parties or even the Pirate parties (favoring 
open information access) that have sprung up across the continent. In 
countries with a two-party structure, it is much harder for movements to 
enter politics without gaining allies in one of the major parties – although 
as a two-party system starts to breakdown, as in Britain, smaller parties 
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can make themselves felt as well. Moreover, when a party system becomes 
so polarized and deadlocked that very little can be done, as in the United 
States at present, it becomes much harder for social movements to benefit 
from having allies in the major parties, and much harder for them to achieve 
any policy goals, as all sides seem bent on frustrating the aims of everyone 
seeking action.
Hélène Combes underlines for us the close relationship between parties 
and social movements by looking at Latin America, where this relationship 
has often been symbiotic. Moreover, Combes shows how very personal 
the relationship between movement and party can be, highlighting two 
individuals – Evo Morales in Bolivia and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil 
– who rose from being the leaders of social movements to the presidents of 
their country – quite a transition from challenger to head of the ultimate 
governance unit. Yet they essentially pursued the same policies throughout 
their careers.
Again, the context in which such a distinction does make sense is in 
one-party authoritarian regimes. In that context, the party and regime 
are often a single integrated organization, which seeks to squelch civil 
society and limit the influence of any independent social movements. Even 
in Latin America, Mexico under the years of domination by the PRI Party 
or Argentina under Perón are good examples of regimes that sought to 
incorporate all major organized social groups within the party and treated 
any social movement from outside the party as a hostile challenge.
The chapters by Imrat Verhoeven and Christian Bröer and by Donatella 
della Porta and Kıvanç Atak also show how actors that we think of as “state 
actors” can be incumbent or even challenging actors as well. Verhoeven 
and Bröer look at policy conflicts between municipal and national govern-
ment in the Netherlands. This is a fairly common situation in multi-level 
and federal systems. In the United States, for example, federal policy on 
marijuana and gay marriage is being openly challenged by state and local 
governments who have legalized both. In these cases is it non-federal but 
clearly state actors (lower-level governance units) who are challenging the 
policies of peer and higher-level governance units.
This is not a matter of revolution or radical or unusual circumstances. 
Rather, it happens quite frequently that various governance units in the 
same system differ on policies and challenge each other either through con-
trary legislation or through the courts. When we have various governance 
units in conflict, and that conflict is mediated by the courts, but the courts 
are trying to mediate between the letter of the law and popular sentiment 
as expressed through media and the actions of social movements, we have a 
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complex f ield of action indeed! When gay rights activists succeed in placing 
a referendum to approve gay marriage on the ballot, which is defeated 
(as in California), it appears that “challengers” have been turned back by 
“incumbents.” But what if the courts then reverse that outcome by saying 
that gays have a legal right to marry that is based on the state constitution, 
and state legislators act to aff irm that right? Have the “governance units” 
then become the “challengers” who are acting against the “incumbents”?
A similar tale can be told of policing, again with the caveat that the 
role and options of police create very different f ields in authoritarian and 
democratic regimes. della Porta and Atak show very clearly that the institu-
tional constraints and behavior of police are very different in authoritarian 
and democratic societies (I have argued this as well; Goldstone, 2012). In 
authoritarian societies, the police treat social protestors as enemies of the 
state to be stopped at all costs. They will use lethal force, follow up arrests 
with imprisonment and often torture to break the will of protestors, and 
impose long jail terms on the leaders of protests. In democratic societies, 
by contrast, police treat protestors (if peaceful) as exercising legal rights. 
They may try contain the protests to permitted spaces, but if things get out 
of hand they will use non-lethal force (mainly tear gas, in extreme cases 
water cannon and rubber bullets). More important, most of those arrested 
will be released, and the leaders are likely to be called to bargain over 
group demands rather than shut away for long terms in prison. Police thus 
play very different roles vs. social movements, as enabling vs. disabling, in 
democracies vs. dictatorships. Indeed, as Joseph Luders (2010) has shown by 
contrasting the conduct of various local authorities during the Civil Rights 
Movement, when the police exceeded the bounds of expected reasonable 
response to protests, their actions delegitimized the state government and 
policies they were trying to protect, and helped catalyze national support for 
the Civil Rights Movement. In areas where police were far more restrained, 
their actions generated no national outcry and produced more moderate 
outcomes.
If police can be variable in how they shape the arena of protest and how 
their interactions with protestors shape outcomes, this is even more true 
for armies and militia. Ian Roxborough shows very clearly that when view-
ing the assemblage of army, police, constabulary and militias engaged in 
responding to social protests, we must “abandon … any notion that we are 
dealing with a unif ied actor, much less a unif ied and coherent rational 
actor” (p. 133). Roxborough nicely demonstrates, through an outstanding 
analysis of the evolution of Ireland’s independence movement in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that the British government was 
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unable to mount a coherent response in part because of its incomplete 
control of various elements of its army, the Irish constabulary, the Ulster 
militias, and the police, each of which had different approaches and 
levels of commitment to f ighting the actors involved in the movement 
for Irish independence. Eventually, this incoherence and conf licting 
agendas enabled the Irish to prevail and win their own state – with, 
once again, the leaders of a social movement becoming the leaders of 
the new government.
Even in authoritarian states, the repressive forces of the state may be 
divided. In the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the excessively harsh and 
humiliating treatment of petty opposition (including the horrif ic death of 
Khaled Said) by the police eventually led to massive protests. Yet the police 
by themselves, however good at informing on the opposition and controlling 
limited demonstrations, were simply unable to cope with uprisings that 
grew to include tens of thousands. However, the army, when called upon, 
refused to attack the revolutionary crowds, and indeed moved to protect 
them and support their demands for a change in regime. As analysts of 
state forces from Katherine Chorley (1943), Stanislaw Andrzejewski (1954), 
and D.E.H. Russell (1974) to Zoltan Barany (2011) have shown time and time 
again, the loyalty of the army is critical to authoritarian regimes when facing 
large-scale protests. Yet the armed forces themselves are often internally 
divided, with those divisions reflecting the cleavages in the broader society 
(Goldstone, 1991: 241-243). Ethnic divisions, or strife between junior and 
senior off icers, or even inter- and intra-service divisions (as in the USSR in 
1991, when elements of the military leadership planned and began a coup 
only to find that other elements in the military leadership would not support 
them), and not simply the defection of the army as such, may be the factor 
that transforms the social movement f ield.
David Cunningham and Roberto Soto-Carrión provide a fascinating 
narrative of how the ambiguity in the role of police extends right down to 
the role of certain individuals. Inf iltrators are required to simultaneously 
act as police and as social movement activists. The brilliance of this chapter 
is to show that inf iltrators for the FBI – George Dorsett and Gary Thomas 
Rowe in the KKK, and Ernest Withers in the Civil Rights Movement – were 
not just tools of the police. Rather, they played their role on both sides with 
skill and autonomy. Withers in particular made such singular contribu-
tions to the progress of the Civil Rights Movement that he was acclaimed 
as an activist, so much so that the revelation of his role as an FBI source 
was greeted with incredulity. Again, we f ind the overlap of challengers, 
incumbents, and governance units not merely across organizations or time, 
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but simultaneously, for long periods, within the role and actions of single 
individuals.
The last two chapters in this volume, by Vince Boudreau and Clifford 
Bob, demonstrate the importance of arenas in shaping the interaction of 
states and protestors. Showing very clearly that not all governance units are 
alike, these two essays span a range – from the dictatorships examined by 
Boudreau to the multinational global governance unit that the UN aspires 
to be, examined by Bob.
In Boudreau’s dictatorships, regimes have to calculate how to deal with 
dissent in a way to preserve their power at the least cost to their legitimacy. 
Still, that usually leaves challengers isolated and incumbents intimidated, 
except in the exceptional conditions of state breakdown that can lead dic-
tatorships to dissolve suddenly in revolutionary tumults (Goldstone, 2014). 
By contrast, in the sprawling, multi-level multinational arena that is the 
UN, the name of the game is forming broad coalitions with those desiring 
to keep gay rights off the UN Human Rights agenda (the “Baptist-burqa 
alliance”) in order to prevent gay rights from becoming a core part of UN 
concerns. On both sides, extensive networks of NGOs jockey for position, 
allies, and influence. Yet this is not merely a matter of challengers acting 
against government forces; indeed, there really are no forces in the UN 
governance unit acting for or against either side. Rather, what we see is 
different NGO networks trying to leverage organizational elements of the 
UN’s procedures to gain institutional support or to block and frustrate 
action. The governance unit in this case shapes the f ield not by its ac-
tions, but by its structure, which provides certain avenues and limits on 
how NGOs can seek to create changes in global standards for treatment of 
gays and lesbians in diverse societies. Nor would the UN even be relevant, 
except for the fact that many other governance units – those of the member 
states – are themselves in conflict over the issue. Perhaps the best way to 
describe this f ield is one in which international networks of incumbents 
(with signif icant power in their own societies) are jockeying for control of 
decisions in one governance unit (the UN) in the hope of influencing the 
policies of other governance units (the member states). This is the “global 
movement boomerang” discussed by Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink 
(1998; see also della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Smith, 2010).
To sum up, the essays in this volume force us not only to shift away from 
the simply dyadic core of the state/social movement relationship, but also 
to move beyond existing schemes of social movement f ields, which are 
still too simple to guide us in understanding the options and constraints 
that both movements and state actors face. The f ields of social movement 
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action in this book show enormous overlap among movement actors, in-
cumbents (or bystanders) and governance units, both as individual actors 
and organizations. At the same time, they show enormous internal divisions 
and conflicts and role shifting within social movements, among incumbent 
groups, and inside of states. In Figure C2, I have tried to redraw the space 
of social f ields in a way consistent with this reality.
Figure C2 A More Complex View of Fields of Action for Social Movements
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The upper portion of Figure C2 (Part A) shows the social movement f ield 
typically faced by a social movement in a democratic society. Within the 
boundary of the society, there are no clear lines separating challengers, 
incumbents (everyone is in the boundary of the state), and the state. There 
are multiple challengers and challenging organizations, with diverse links 
among them. Some of these – such as the municipal governments in the 
Netherlands discussed by Verhoeven and Bröer or the state governments 
in the United States that have legalized the sale of marijuana – are wholly 
inside the state or are themselves governance units. The actors and institu-
tions within the state are varied and disparate with considerable autonomy 
and separation among them, having varied links to challengers and external 
actors and organizations (which also link to various challengers and other 
groups). As one example, the anti-gun control movement in the United 
States is led by the National Rifle Association (NRA). Many members of 
Congress are proud members of the NRA, which engages in action both 
through protest and through institutional political action (supporting party 
candidates, helping to draft legislation, and bringing actions in courts to 
defend gun ownership). At the same time, there are over a thousand anti-
gun control groups that the Southern Poverty Law Center (2013) def ines 
as “patriot groups” and “anti-government militias” driven by their fear 
that authorities will strip them of their guns and liberties and that act 
far more radically and wholly outside the state. The f ield also includes 
countermovements, which also have varied links among themselves, to 
state actors and institutions, and external actors and organizations (Meyer 
and Staggenborg, 1996).
A similar but still distinct f ield configuration of these elements is shown 
as typical for authoritarian regimes in Part B. In these f ields there are 
relatively few challenging groups and they are wholly outside the state. 
The state itself is more tightly integrated and unified. There are other organ-
ized groups in society, but they are not challengers; rather, they tend to be 
corporatist groups allied with the state. Meanwhile, the state dominates 
relations to external actors and tries to exclude social groups inside society 
from linking up with external and international organizations except with 
its approval.
Comparing Part A and Part B, it is possible to see how transitions take 
place from authoritarian to democratic f ields. In an authoritarian society, 
the number of challenging groups and the links among them increase; 
within the state the separation and differences among state actors and units 
increase as well, and some of them start to link to challenging groups (Tilly 
2003). Meanwhile, external actors may become more active in supporting 
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challengers or reducing support of the state. In short, as the f ield structure 
in Part B changes to more closely resemble that in Part A, pressures for a 
shift to democracy grow, though whether that results in gradual reform (as 
with the PRI regime in Mexico or the end of Franco’s regime in Spain) or 
more rapid decay (as with the collapse of the USSR) or even revolution (as 
with the color revolutions in the Philippines, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere) 
depends on local conditions and the degree of resistance to change.
Is this now too complex a reality to deal with? I would argue not. Indeed, 
what I believe this volume makes clear is the limits on analysis we face in 
treating the state, or social movements, or the rest of society, as composed 
of distinct sets of self-interested actors pursuing characteristic goals across 
various settings or arenas. Modern complexity theory, as applied to social 
systems, tells us very clearly that we often cannot explain social outcomes 
by adding up the separate goals and actions of particular actors or groups 
taken individually (Root, 2013). Rather, social outcomes emerge from the 
multiple interactions of various actors and groups in highly non-linear 
fashion. Relationships move toward tipping points, coalitions build and 
expand, and security forces hold then suddenly divide and break. Thus, 
we need to focus more on seeing how state, movement, and social groups 
and actors overlap and forge relationships, how those relationships shift, 
and how the arenas and institutions in which they are working shape and 
constrain their choices and actions. Only then can we do justice to the true 
dilemmas of social movement actions, and the complex dynamics of how 
social movements shape society.
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